The Chancellor is expected to announce a large package of permanent tax cuts on Friday without a new set of forecasts from the OBR. This is disappointing.
So, in the absence of official scrutiny from the OBR, we @TheIFS have stepped into the breach. 🧵
In short, the government is planning a substantial package of permanent tax cuts that will mean a sharp and sustained increase in borrowing, just as borrowing becomes more expensive, in a gamble on growth that may not pay off. You can't assume your way to fiscal sustainability.
You can read the full report by my colleagues here. This is part of the IFS Green Budget & funded by @NuffieldFound. The analysis is based on a new set of macroeconomic forecasts from Citi.
Under these forecasts, a worsening economic outlook and a big package of tax cuts mean that even once the (enormous) Energy Price Guarantee has expired, borrowing would be running at ~£100bn/year (~3.5% GDP) into the mid 2020s. That's ~£70bn/year more than was forecast in March.
That would mean:
1) A persistent current budget deficit (i.e. borrowing to finance day-to-day spend)
2) Debt on a steady upwards path as a share of national income
i.e. the existing fiscal targets (legislated in January) missed by a wide margin
(side note: this is all based on policy as currently announced. If the Chancellor announces further tax cuts on Friday, that would change things and almost certainly mean even higher borrowing. In that case we'd of course update after the fact)
Borrowing more and allowing debt to rise temporarily to finance one-off support packages in a crisis (e.g. furlough, energy price guarantee) is justifiable and can be sustainable.
The same cannot be said for allowing debt to rise indefinitely to enjoy lower taxes now.
In other words, temporary, time-limited measures need to be thought of separately to any permanent changes to tax and spending. The latter ought not to be announced outside of a 'proper' fiscal event and without scrutiny from the OBR.
This sharp increase in borrowing will take place amidst rising gilt yields (not just in the UK, but globally), which makes that borrowing more expensive. The Bank won't be stepping in to buy bonds either - they're looking to unwind QE. It's not risk-free.
Finding a way to somehow boost the UK's (meagre) rate of economic growth would undoubtedly help and be good news for the public finances. But there's no simple miracle cure. We get a new 'plan for growth' most years. No guarantee it will materialise. Relying on it is a gamble.
There's lots more detail in the full piece, which you can find at the link above. We've also got an event tomorrow where we'll be talking through this analysis (among other things), and answering questions. Come along!
During the leadership campaign, Liz Truss promised to reverse the recent increase in National Insurance Contributions (NICs). That's widely expected to be announced on Friday in the mini-Budget.
But there's one key question on the NICs cut I've yet to see answered. 🧵
Pre-warning: this is probably one for the enthusiasts and fiscal nerds. But the specifics here have the potential to matter a lot for the NHS, schools, and other public services.
The reversal of the recent (employee and employer) NICs rise has been widely costed at around £13 billion. That's the *net* amount expected to be raised by the policy when it was originally announced (see the final column of row 10 here).
We’ve heard a lot from the Conservative leadership candidates about their plans for tax cuts.
We’ve heard much less about their vision for public spending. In the meantime, inflation is squeezing public service budgets as we head towards a difficult winter. A long-ish thread:
The UK economy is under the cosh. Under the Bank of England’s latest forecasts, we are set to experience both a recession and an extended period of high inflation. That poses serious challenges to households, businesses and policymakers (including the next prime minister).
But higher inflation also means a squeeze on public services, because their budgets are fixed in cash terms and do not automatically increase in the face of higher prices.
It means the government’s spending plans are less generous than they were originally intended to be.
The short version: regional pay deals aren't a crazy idea (both Brown and Osborne flirted with the idea), but tricky to implement. And we should be clear about where the proposed savings would come from: pay cuts for public sector workers outside of London and the South East.
This is the key chart (which is from the last time we did the analysis in 2019 - we'll update shortly). The public-private pay differential is positive in most bits of the country (largest in places like N. Ireland, the North East, Wales) but negative in London & the South East.
Sunak's income tax proposals mean that the candidates' tax plans are increasingly similar, particularly on personal taxes. The big differences are in overall scale and timing, and over how best to use the tax system to boost business investment. [1/6]
Even on personal taxes, though, there are a few key differences, because Truss wants to cut national insurance contributions (or undo a recent rise, if you prefer that framing) while Sunak wants to cut income tax. These differences are spelled out here. [2/6]
There's one thing about Sunak's proposals I think is worth drawing out. Because of the choices he made as Chancellor (i.e. calling it a Health and Social Care levy) it seems inevitable (to me, at least) that the NICs rate will increase in future to "fund the NHS". [3/6]
Quick summary: (1) with money tight, clear temptation to target pay awards at the low-paid on cost of living grounds, but (2) public sector pay is a very blunt tool for this task, and (3) further compressing pay scales isn't risk free and could threaten public service delivery.
The starting point here is that the government’s spending plans, fixed in cash terms at last autumn's Spending Review, cannot accommodate pay awards at anything remotely like the current rate of inflation. Awards of 9 or 10% just can't be met from within existing budgets.
I'm increasingly convinced that the GDP deflator (which underlies official calculations of how generous government spending plans are) isn't a helpful way of looking at the cost pressures on public services this year.
This is nerdy, but important. A thread 🧵 [1/13]
Under @OBR_UK's latest forecasts the GDP deflator is forecast grow by just 2.8% in 2022, vs 7.4% growth in CPI. Why? In part, because the government consumption deflator is forecast to be negative (i.e. the price of buying public services is forecast to FALL) [2/13]
If that sounds weird, it's because it is.
The government consumption deflator (roughly, the measured cost of public services) has gone haywire during the pandemic. Look at this from the ONS: +20% growth in 2020, followed by -5% in 2021.