Gilt yield increases & GBP weakness a rational reaction to clear market of >£60bn new issuance required to fund #MiniBudget in 22/23. 3 areas HMT staff will be briefing Chancellor about over coming months: 1) Market reaction; 2) Intergenerational impact; 3) Behavioural response
Market reaction determines gross cost of these measures as they are entirely funded, initially, by borrowing. As Gilt yields rise there is a double squeeze - potential APF losses, & the Gilt refinancing cycle. Weak GBP will also raise RPI interest on £600bn of index-linked Gilts
Intergenerational transfers. #minibudget takes consumption from future to fund resources today. Given what we know about today's beneficiaries (older demographics) then analysis should assess degree to which fiscal activism (contentious macro) reinforces generational inequality
Finally, behavioural response. The success or failure of this package does not hinge on trickledown. It is encouraging those with additional resources/fewer regulatory hurdles to change behaviour & avoid big deadweight loss. For⬆️trend growth, behavioural change is the catalyst
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There are a couple of editorials today from the Wall Street Journal - wsj.com/articles/the-u… & @Telegraph that suggest financial markets do not understand the policy pivot now being undertaken in the U.K. A 🧵from someone who actually writes sell side economics research (1/n)
There are quite a number of pro supply side initiatives in #minibudget2022 worthy of positive appraisal. Accelerating key infrastructure planning approval, abolishing bonus cap & increasing work search conditionality/work coach engagement. 👍
On personal & corporate tax changes - the evidence that these (that are largely reversals of recent increases) can improve the performance of the U.K. supply side is unproven. Hard to argue (credibly) to clients that this helps support a trend growth uplift to 2.5%.
A 🧵 on economic issues thrown up by Conservative leadership contest in U.K. Firstly, & most crucially, whilst the arguments have centred on issues of inflation/fiscal sustainability from tax changes, these are relatively marginal (IMHO) given exogenous shock facing U.K. economy
There are v respectable arguments for looser fiscal policy into -ve demand shock (@rbrharrison) & tighter monetary/looser fiscal mix (@DrGerardLyons@MrRBourne). But also ok (my position) to suggest proposals unlikely to generate supply side response claimed/are poorly targeted
The turf war over inflationary impulse from tax cuts is a little like arguing over the curtains in the Colosseum as Rome burns. In short there are bigger economic forces at play. Responding to huge energy squeeze (industry, households, energy security) rather than a debt/GDP rule
Radical supply side reform: a 🧵 A Tory MP suggests this was point of Brexit - a 2nd derivative of “taking back control” (below). Reforms to clear labour & product markets efficiently is v welcome. Indeed you would be hard pressed to find an economist arguing against them (1/n)
However there are pre-conditions for decent supply side reforms. Firstly be SPECIFIC. 5 years post-Brexit saying supply side reforms does not make them so. What is it shorthand for? One area gov did address was planning reform - a similar Wattsapp group brought that to its knees
Secondly, “easy” supply reforms are ones that redistribute producer to consumer surpluses. Or corporate profits to wages. Again not a problem but where are objectives & the evidence for suboptimal distribution? Little evidence in Conservative 2019 manifesto of trade off analysis
Last day of Q2 and we have updated our U.K. growth estimates for the rest of the year given the growing confidence of the weakened link between infections and hospitalisations/deaths. In March were at 6.5% (180bp > consensus) and have moved to 7.0% (30bp > consensus).
There are more bullish forecasts out there and there are undoubted upside risks including post 19/7 and post-Euros (don’t jinx it 🏴) surge in sentiment . But there is also considerable downside risk that could crystallise. For me there are four areas:
1/ Precautionary saving. Recent card spend rolled over & if hhlds fear end of transfer payments/⬆️ tax this may mute spending. 2/ Inflation. Transitory it may be, but v visible pockets may yet permeate expectations & trigger BoE hawkish pivot in Nov. Fin conditions wld front run