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Michael Kofman Profile picture
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Sep 23 • 2 tweets • 1 min read
Appears the initial mobilized wave will receive 2 weeks of training. This is an incredibly short amount of time especially given the process is more de facto phased general mobilization. It suggests Russian mil desperation to stabilize their lines by throwing people at the front.
I've seen various sources suggesting two weeks training. This is quite early and the situation is rather murky.

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Michael Kofman Profile picture
Sep 21
A few incomplete thoughts on the question of mobilization. It won't solve many of the RU military's challenges in this war, but it could alter the dynamic. Fair to say that these are uncharted waters, and so we should take care with deterministic or definitive claims. 1/
I wouldn't suggest that this can turn around Russia's fortunes in the war. However, I would take care being overly dismissive, especially looking out towards the medium term of this winter and 2023. Force availability and manpower matters, hence the implications can vary. 2/
The Russian military has had structural manpower deficits throughout the war leading to problems with recruitment, retention, and rotation. Units can't be rotated, leading to exhaustion. Number of refuseniks grew. Hiring short term volunteers exacerbated retention issues. 3/
Read 21 tweets
Michael Kofman Profile picture
Sep 8
Brief thoughts on UA Kharkiv offensive. It appears ambitious, intended to envelop Izyum and try to trap Russian forces there. Likely seeking to interdict ground lines of communication at Kupyansk. The Oskil river east of Izyum makes the pocket vulnerable for RU forces. 1/
UA offensive looks to have made substantial gains, placing RU forces in a precarious position. From what one can tell, and these are early impressions, the advance made good use of armor in conjunction with infantry. 2/
Russian forces appear to have been spread thinly, and mil leadership unprepared despite earlier evidence of UA buildup. I think it’s fair to assess that RU was caught by surprise with little in the way of reserves locally available. 3/
Read 8 tweets
Michael Kofman Profile picture
Sep 7
Good thread by Jack. I've largely shied away from this conversation, because I often saw it falling victim to the false certainty of shaky numbers and estimates that seemed predicated on big assumptions.
My intuition has been that Russia probably had less usable ammunition to start than being given credit for, but also a lower daily use rate (15-20k vs the 50-60k figures which struck me as unrealistic), and production capacity which could be ramped up over time.
I suspect Russia has run low on certain types of ammunition, perhaps large caliber MLRS, 122mm artillery rounds, and PGMs. And that as Jack suggests, there will be bottlenecks in production. That said, I doubt US sanctions have much to do with Russian arty ammo production.
Read 5 tweets
Michael Kofman Profile picture
Sep 4
A few brief thoughts on the UA offensive. First, its best to manage expectations, these types of operations take weeks or months to play out. In my view its very early, there is limited information available, and far too soon to issue judgments. Thread 1/
My best guess on UA approach is to steadily press Russian forces towards the Dnipro river. Perhaps splitting the main Russian group of forces between those defending the city Kherson and those holding territory east of the Inhulets river. 2/
As Russian forces are pressed to choose between retreat and envelopment, over time they will likely withdraw to secondary defensive lines, steadily compressing the battlespace. If successful, UA may begin to isolate these groupings into several large pockets. 3/
Read 14 tweets
Michael Kofman Profile picture
Aug 25
Redoing short thread since it didn't post right. I think that there are different ways to interpret the exec order. My own view is that it is partly codifying the present situation in the Russian military, but also reflects future expansion plans, which may be aspirational. /1
The order in my view does not necessarily presage a larger draft, or greater mobilization - it could, but it may be a way of accommodating the various current recruitment efforts to create additional volunteer battalions in the force, and build in room for force expansion. /2
The volunteer units in aggregate do not amount to a dramatic expansion of the force. But Moscow may expect to integrate occupation forces, and LDNR troops, especially if they go through with annexation. Putin had mentioned he supported giving LDNR fighters army veteran status. 3/
Read 6 tweets
Michael Kofman Profile picture
Aug 25
Good thread by Dara. I think that there are different ways to interpret this order. My own view is that it is in part codifying the present situation in the Russian military, but also reflective of future expansion plans, which may be aspirational. /1
The order in my view does not necessarily presage a larger draft, or greater mobilization - it could, but it may be a way of accommodating the various current recruitment efforts to create additional volunteer battalions in the force, and build in room for force expansion. /2
The volunteer units in aggregate do not amount to a dramatic expansion of the force. But Moscow may expect to integrate occupation forces, and LDNR troops, especially if they go through with annexation. Putin had mentioned he supported giving LDNR fighters army veteran status. 3/
Read 5 tweets

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