Thread by @TCG_CrisisRisks

Ukraine SITREP 1. The Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Kharkiv Oblast continues to push east and southeast into Luhansk re-securing strategic roads and settlements. We will continue to refrain from operational details as things are shifting quickly on the ground.

2. Russian air/missile strikes continued yesterday and overnight, but Russia is loosing aircraft at an incredible rate with reports that another Su-25 was downed yesterday along with two Su-30’s and an Su-34. Further drones and an Mi-8 helicopter were also reportedly downed.

3. Several impacts were reported in Zaporizhzhia overnight, but most continue to be around Bakhmut in the southeast and around Kherson in the south.

4. Russian shelling was intensive towards Bakhmut, north of Donetsk and towards Zaporizhzhia, but is mostly sporadic in other impacted regions.

Heavy fighting continues east of Bakhmut, and in and around Lyman.

5. East of Zaporizhzhia the Ukrainian counteroffensive is now also making some pivotal gains and we shall hold off on details of any operational successes here.

6. There was heavy Ukrainian air activity here again yesterday with several Russian vehicles destroyed and defences degraded, including numerous ADS destroyed.

7. In the Kherson region there were heavy Ukrainian strikes on Nova Kakhovka again overnight and much forward activity by Ukrainian forces across the Inhulets.

8. Several Ukrainian operations are underway around Kherson requiring continued OPSEC. Ukrainian aircraft destroyed Russian vehicles, and at least two ADS near Kherson yesterday.

9. Ukrainian forces continue to operate at a high tempo, morale is high and they continue to adapt with rigour and agility, using their new weaponry acquisitions and western training with significant initiative.

10. Winter is coming though, which could actually aid the Russian mobilisation and regeneration.

11. However, the recent Ukrainian successes and their ability to secure extensive resupply and communication lines across widespread counteroffensives, (and so effectively and quickly), is a very positive indication of future capability.

12. Hence Putin’s veiled threats of escalation with nuclear weapons. A very real risk, especially as the Russian ‘partial mobilisation’ announcement accelerates significantly the growing discontent amongst much of the Russian populace to the invasion.

13. The Kremlin is now in its tightest spot in a long time. The invasion in essence is finished. Unless we see significant bombing campaigns, some clever ground offensives and fast, without such Russia’s frontlines will degrade faster and further as morale and resupplies erode.

14. With Russia’s resupply and logistics degrading so quickly the Russian Ministry of Defence have appointed Colonel-General Mikhail Mizintsev as a new Deputy Defence Minister specifically to overhaul logistics and resupply issues, replacing Army General Dmitry Bulgakov.

15. As well as people across Russia becoming discontent, now the important support the Kremlin had from China, India and Turkey is showing fractures, perhaps slipping away, and the sanctions keep coming, along with more advanced weapons and more training for Ukrainian forces.

16. How and when it will end now is the concern. President Putin is unlikely going anywhere soon, and he certainly doesn’t have to really believe in the escalation to a tactical nuclear option as the right or useful strategic option in order to order it.

17. More he just has to come to a realisation that it could be his least bad option and may provide escapism from a fast declining Russia, both militarily and politically. That’s the next big risk!