There are a couple of editorials today from the Wall Street Journal - wsj.com/articles/the-u… & @Telegraph that suggest financial markets do not understand the policy pivot now being undertaken in the U.K. A 🧵from someone who actually writes sell side economics research (1/n)
There are quite a number of pro supply side initiatives in #minibudget2022 worthy of positive appraisal. Accelerating key infrastructure planning approval, abolishing bonus cap & increasing work search conditionality/work coach engagement. 👍
On personal & corporate tax changes - the evidence that these (that are largely reversals of recent increases) can improve the performance of the U.K. supply side is unproven. Hard to argue (credibly) to clients that this helps support a trend growth uplift to 2.5%.
Running a much larger primary deficit to fund these tax changes will require (short term) higher Gilt yields & a lower Pound to clear the market of new issuance. Seeing that outcome does not make one a “Doomster” - it is an entirely logical reaction.
Now “Boosters” will say “why can’t the market look through to stronger trend growth?”. And here three factors are important. First, U.K. growth will (for some time) hinge on an exogenous factor - energy prices. So whether inflation & debt comes down is not in U.K. gov control
Second & a pet topic of mine: Credibility. Some of those advocating supply side reforms are same voices who promised a v different Brexit outcome. This damages credibility of those voices, ex ante, even if they are eventually prove correct. That is rational - track records matter
Third, this pivot has take place amidst a flurry of attacks on OBR, HMT & BoE. These institutions are definitely not above criticism & no macro framework is forever. BUT independent institutions matter for market sentiment (see Turkey for details) whether we like that, or not.
Overall, I would be delighted to see this week’s #minibudget reforms (& some good tax reform stuff suggested in todays papers) lean into slowing trend growth in the U.K. But the idea that financial markets are receiving imperfect information/acting irrationally does not stack up
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Gilt yield increases & GBP weakness a rational reaction to clear market of >£60bn new issuance required to fund #MiniBudget in 22/23. 3 areas HMT staff will be briefing Chancellor about over coming months: 1) Market reaction; 2) Intergenerational impact; 3) Behavioural response
Market reaction determines gross cost of these measures as they are entirely funded, initially, by borrowing. As Gilt yields rise there is a double squeeze - potential APF losses, & the Gilt refinancing cycle. Weak GBP will also raise RPI interest on £600bn of index-linked Gilts
Intergenerational transfers. #minibudget takes consumption from future to fund resources today. Given what we know about today's beneficiaries (older demographics) then analysis should assess degree to which fiscal activism (contentious macro) reinforces generational inequality
A 🧵 on economic issues thrown up by Conservative leadership contest in U.K. Firstly, & most crucially, whilst the arguments have centred on issues of inflation/fiscal sustainability from tax changes, these are relatively marginal (IMHO) given exogenous shock facing U.K. economy
There are v respectable arguments for looser fiscal policy into -ve demand shock (@rbrharrison) & tighter monetary/looser fiscal mix (@DrGerardLyons@MrRBourne). But also ok (my position) to suggest proposals unlikely to generate supply side response claimed/are poorly targeted
The turf war over inflationary impulse from tax cuts is a little like arguing over the curtains in the Colosseum as Rome burns. In short there are bigger economic forces at play. Responding to huge energy squeeze (industry, households, energy security) rather than a debt/GDP rule
Radical supply side reform: a 🧵 A Tory MP suggests this was point of Brexit - a 2nd derivative of “taking back control” (below). Reforms to clear labour & product markets efficiently is v welcome. Indeed you would be hard pressed to find an economist arguing against them (1/n)
However there are pre-conditions for decent supply side reforms. Firstly be SPECIFIC. 5 years post-Brexit saying supply side reforms does not make them so. What is it shorthand for? One area gov did address was planning reform - a similar Wattsapp group brought that to its knees
Secondly, “easy” supply reforms are ones that redistribute producer to consumer surpluses. Or corporate profits to wages. Again not a problem but where are objectives & the evidence for suboptimal distribution? Little evidence in Conservative 2019 manifesto of trade off analysis
Last day of Q2 and we have updated our U.K. growth estimates for the rest of the year given the growing confidence of the weakened link between infections and hospitalisations/deaths. In March were at 6.5% (180bp > consensus) and have moved to 7.0% (30bp > consensus).
There are more bullish forecasts out there and there are undoubted upside risks including post 19/7 and post-Euros (don’t jinx it 🏴) surge in sentiment . But there is also considerable downside risk that could crystallise. For me there are four areas:
1/ Precautionary saving. Recent card spend rolled over & if hhlds fear end of transfer payments/⬆️ tax this may mute spending. 2/ Inflation. Transitory it may be, but v visible pockets may yet permeate expectations & trigger BoE hawkish pivot in Nov. Fin conditions wld front run