I think Kremlin may view nuclear strike on Ukraine (with an American retaliatory strike) as a rational move. It may not make much sense in the context of foreign policy, but it does in the context of domestic policy. Meanwhile foreign policy is just domestic policy by other means
My argument is based on three premises:
1. Foreign policy serves domestic policy goals 2. Keeping power is *the* top priority of domestic policy 3. Kremlin is looking for a way out of the conflict
Launching a nuclear strike and getting a retaliatory one may be seen as a way out
If Putin is looking for a way out, that probably means he is looking for a way out that would allow him to keep the supreme political power. Which may be incompatible with suffering a humiliating military defeat from a supposedly inferior force. Like Japan in 1905 and Ukraine now
Many argued that Putin should be allowed to "save face". The thing is: it is nearly impossible for him to save face at this point. Inability to crush Ukraine is already a loss of face, no matter how you frame it. For a simple reason that Ukraine had been considered an inferior
The very idea that Ukraine can stand its ground against Russia would have been considered totally insane at the start of this year, both in Russia and outside of it. The fact that it does means that Putin has already suffered a major loss of face, and will continue suffering it
To keep power, you need to save face. And how can you save face? One obvious solution is: try to engage with the U.S. Make a nuclear strike that would inflict an American retaliatory strike. If you and your power survives that, that gonna be total win. Absolute victory
Russian public opinion considers Ukraine as absolutely inferior. That is why standards for not losing face in this conflict are pretty high. Since Ukraine is so ridiculous, inability to crush it is humiliating, no matter how you frame it. You can't defeat it, you lose your face
But Russian public opinion does not view the US as inferior, it's the other way around. That is why standards for not losing face in a conflict with the US are so much lower. I would say that inability of the US to crush Russia would be seen as American loss and Putin's win
Compare two scenarios:
1. Russia engages Ukraine. Then Russia not crushing Ukraine is Ukrainian victory. High bar 2. US engages Russia. Then the US not crushing Russia is Russian victory. (Seemingly) low bar
He absolutely may choose 2 as the bar for not losing face is lower
I would even say that provoking an American retaliatory strike may boost the regime. The US tried to defeat us, used the deadly force, but we still exist - that's the story of honour, heroism and stoicism. For the Putin's target audience I mean. That's a great and powerful myth
Meanwhile, mobilisation may stabilise the regime by simply getting rid of young males that could otherwise create problems. For example, if they were recruited by anti-regime forces, should the supreme power weaken. The less young males in the country, the stronger is Kremlin
Engaging with the US directly may sound suicidal foreign policy wise. At the same time it may sound totally rational domestic policy wise. Simply because the bar for saving your face (=keeping power) in this conflict would be much lower. They didn't destroy you = you win. The end
PS For example, the US destroying the Black Sea Navy as a response for a Russian nuclear strike absolutely may count as Putin's victory. It is very, very much easier to frame this scenario as honourable, than let's say an obvious military defeat from Ukraine
PPS Withdrawing before the US is very much preferable than withdrawing before Ukraine. In the first case, you can frame it correctly, save your face and prepare for a round 2. If you withdraw before Ukraine though, there may be no round 2
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Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.