I think Kremlin may view nuclear strike on Ukraine (with an American retaliatory strike) as a rational move. It may not make much sense in the context of foreign policy, but it does in the context of domestic policy. Meanwhile foreign policy is just domestic policy by other means
My argument is based on three premises:
1. Foreign policy serves domestic policy goals 2. Keeping power is *the* top priority of domestic policy 3. Kremlin is looking for a way out of the conflict
Launching a nuclear strike and getting a retaliatory one may be seen as a way out
If Putin is looking for a way out, that probably means he is looking for a way out that would allow him to keep the supreme political power. Which may be incompatible with suffering a humiliating military defeat from a supposedly inferior force. Like Japan in 1905 and Ukraine now
Many argued that Putin should be allowed to "save face". The thing is: it is nearly impossible for him to save face at this point. Inability to crush Ukraine is already a loss of face, no matter how you frame it. For a simple reason that Ukraine had been considered an inferior
The very idea that Ukraine can stand its ground against Russia would have been considered totally insane at the start of this year, both in Russia and outside of it. The fact that it does means that Putin has already suffered a major loss of face, and will continue suffering it
To keep power, you need to save face. And how can you save face? One obvious solution is: try to engage with the U.S. Make a nuclear strike that would inflict an American retaliatory strike. If you and your power survives that, that gonna be total win. Absolute victory
Russian public opinion considers Ukraine as absolutely inferior. That is why standards for not losing face in this conflict are pretty high. Since Ukraine is so ridiculous, inability to crush it is humiliating, no matter how you frame it. You can't defeat it, you lose your face
But Russian public opinion does not view the US as inferior, it's the other way around. That is why standards for not losing face in a conflict with the US are so much lower. I would say that inability of the US to crush Russia would be seen as American loss and Putin's win
Compare two scenarios:
1. Russia engages Ukraine. Then Russia not crushing Ukraine is Ukrainian victory. High bar 2. US engages Russia. Then the US not crushing Russia is Russian victory. (Seemingly) low bar
He absolutely may choose 2 as the bar for not losing face is lower
I would even say that provoking an American retaliatory strike may boost the regime. The US tried to defeat us, used the deadly force, but we still exist - that's the story of honour, heroism and stoicism. For the Putin's target audience I mean. That's a great and powerful myth
Meanwhile, mobilisation may stabilise the regime by simply getting rid of young males that could otherwise create problems. For example, if they were recruited by anti-regime forces, should the supreme power weaken. The less young males in the country, the stronger is Kremlin
Engaging with the US directly may sound suicidal foreign policy wise. At the same time it may sound totally rational domestic policy wise. Simply because the bar for saving your face (=keeping power) in this conflict would be much lower. They didn't destroy you = you win. The end
PS For example, the US destroying the Black Sea Navy as a response for a Russian nuclear strike absolutely may count as Putin's victory. It is very, very much easier to frame this scenario as honourable, than let's say an obvious military defeat from Ukraine
PPS Withdrawing before the US is very much preferable than withdrawing before Ukraine. In the first case, you can frame it correctly, save your face and prepare for a round 2. If you withdraw before Ukraine though, there may be no round 2
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If you want to imagine Russia, imagine a depressive, depopulating town. Now on the outskirts of a town, there is an outrageously over-equipped, overfunded strategic enterprise that has literally everything money can buy in the world. It feels like a spaceship from another planet
Strategic industry is extremely generously equipped. Western companies look scoundrels in comparison. That’s why I am so sceptical about the whole “corruption” narrative. Not that it’s wrong. It’s just that it is the perspective of a little, envious bitch.
What needs to be funded, will be funded. It will actually be overfunded and most literally drowned in money. Obviously, overfunding the strategic sector comes at the cost of underfunding almost everything else (like urban infrastructure). That’s why the town looks so grim.
We have successfully documented the entire Russian missiles industry, mapping 28 of its key enterprises. Read our first OSINT sample focusing on the Votkinsk Plant, a major producer of intercontinental ballistic missiles. How does it make weaponry?
The strategic missiles industry appears to be highly secretive and impenetrable to the observers. And yet, it is perfectly OSINTable, based on the publicly available sources. This investigation sample illustrates our approach and methodology (31 p.)
Our first and invaluable source is the state propaganda, such as the federal and regional TV channels, corporate media, social media and so on. It provides abundant visual evidence, particularly on the hardware used in the production of weaponry.
In August 1999, President Yeltsin appointed his FSB Chief Putin as the new Prime Minister. Same day, he named him as the official successor. Yet, there was a problem. To become a president, Putin had to go through elections which he could not win.
He was completely obscure.
Today, Putin is the top rank global celebrity. But in August 1999, nobody knew him. He was just an obscure official of Yeltsin's administration, made a PM by the arbitrary will of the sovereign. This noname clerk had like 2-3% of popular support
Soon, he was to face elections
By the time of Putin's appointment, Russia already had its most favoured candidate. It was Primakov. A former Yeltsin's Prime Minister who broke with Yeltsin to contest for power. The most popular politician in Russia with massive support both in masses and in the establishment.
In Russia, the supreme power has never ever changed as a result of elections. That simply never happened in history. Now that is because Russia is a (non hereditary) monarchy. Consequently, it doesn't have any elections. It has only acclamations of a sitting ruler
Obviously, there has been no elections of Putin in any meaningful sense. There have been only acclamations. And that is normal. His predecessor was successfully acclaimed with an approval rate of about 6%. Once you got the power, you will get your acclamation one way or another
Contrary to the popular opinion, Russia doesn't have any acclamation ("election") problem. It has a transition of power problem. Like Putin can get acclaimed again, and again, and again. But sooner or later, he dies. What next?
My team has documented the entire Russian missile manufacturing base. That is 28 key ballistic, cruise, hypersonic and air defence missile producing plants associated with four corporations of Roscosmos, Almaz-Antey, Tactical Missiles and Rostec
The link is in the first comment
Our report How Does Russia Make Missiles? is already available for download
By the next weekend, we will be publishing the first OSINT sample, illustrating our methodology & approach. The rest of our materials will be made available laterrhodus.com
Key takeaways:
1. Missile production is mostly about machining 2. You cannot produce components of tight precision and convoluted geometry otherwise 3. Soviet missiles industry performed most of its machining manually
That was extremely laborious and skill-intensive process
No one gets famous by accident. If Alexey @Navalny rose as the unalternative leader of Russian opposition, recognised as such both in Moscow and in DC, this indicates he had something that others lacked. Today we will discuss what it was and why it did not suffice 🧵
Let's start with the public image. What was so special about the (mature) @navalny is that his public image represented normality. And by normality I mean first and foremost the American, Hollywood normality
Look at this photo. He represents himself as American politicians do
For an American politician, it is very important to present himself as a good family man (or woman). Exceptions do only corroborate the rule. Notice how McCain defends @BarackObama