An Internet news outlet is asking a lot of people I know, and some I don't, what I've been up to lately. Lord knows what they'll ultimately publish, so I thought I'd just write this instead. -->
We are in my 14th year of working to build our venture firm, Andreessen Horowitz. The overwhelming credit for A16Z's accomplishments goes to Ben and all our partners, but I do what I can to contribute.
We are about to pass 500 employees, we've dramatically expanded our investing scope, and we've implemented an entirely new operating model on the other side of COVID. I could not be more proud of the firm and our colleagues, and we're just getting started.
I work extensively with our many portfolio companies and their teams -- some where I'm on the board, but many where I'm not but can scrub in at key times, usually either when things are going really right or really wrong.
I am stunned daily by the creativity and courage of our founders, and I love working with all of them.
I spend much of the rest of my time helping to evaluate and close new investments. Most new investments A16Z makes are not led by me, but I often partner with my colleagues to land new deals, and I occasionally lead an investment with a founding team I particularly connect with.
I am currently on 12 boards, 9 private and 3 public, and try to always have at least one slot open for the next big thing.
Mainly I try to learn a lot. For example, the political events of 2014-2016 made clear to me that I didn't understand politics at all, so I deliberately withdrew from political engagement and fundraising.
Instead I've read my way back in history and as far to the political left and political right as I could. I'll list some books I've found particularly interesting at the end.
I keep up something of a public presence. I go back and forth on the virtues and faults of a daily social media presence. I write on occasion, and talk to interesting people in public. You may enjoy these recent podcasts:
After a surreal 2020, my family and I almost left California. In fact, we bought property in Las Vegas and almost bought in Manhattan, but decided to stay and double down on California instead.
We rationalize our decision as choosing to live in the ruins of a once great civilization -- like Rome in maybe 250 AD, we live amidst an enormous flowering of culture and creativity, but the roads are becoming unsafe and nobody is quite sure why.
Interesting books on culture and society I've read recently. I don't necessarily agree with any of them, but they're all useful and informative. -->
1. The Ancient City by Numa Denis Fustel De Coulanges -- the single best book I have found on who we are and how we got here.
2. The Machiavellians, and The Managerial Revolution, by James Burnham -- together, the best explanation for the current structure of our society and politics.
3. Four books on the Spanish Civil War, which was the trial run for the hundred years of Western history that followed.
The Spanish Civil War by Hugh Thomas
Homage to Catalonia by George Orwell
Spain In Our Hearts by Adam Hochschild
Mine Were Of Trouble by Peter Kemp
4. Six books on the deep history of the American right.
Lindbergh by Scott Berg
The Ambassador by Susan Ronald
The Guarded Gate by Daniel Okrent
The Second Coming of the KKK by Linda Gordon
War For Eternity by Benjamin Teitelbaum
The New Right by Michael Malice
5. Two comprehensive biographies of Adolf Hitler.
Hitler: A Global Biography by Brendan Simms
Hitler: Ascent and Hitler: Downfall by Volker Ullrich
6. Six books on the deep history of the American left.
The God That Failed by Richard Crossman
The Romance of American Communism by Vivian Gornick
Witness by Whittaker Chambers
Joseph McCarthy by Arthur Herman
Days of Rage by Bryan Burrough
Radical Chic by Tom Wolfe
7. A comprehensive biography and a key chronicle of Vladimir Lenin.
Lenin by Victor Sebestyen
Lenin On The Train by Catherine Merridale
8. A New World Begins by Jeremy Popkin, on the French Revolution.
9. Two books on fascism and anti-fascism, titled Fascism and Anti-Fascism respectively, both by Paul Gottfried.
10. The True Believer by Eric Hoffer -- a brilliant book on the nature of mass movements and collective psychology.
11. The Captive Mind by Czeslaw Milosz -- the definitive work on intellectual life under totalitarianism.
12. The Power of the Powerless by Vaclav Havel -- the definitive work on practical life under totalitarianism.
13. Two books on the evolution of modern culture and civic religion, both by John Murray Cuddihy:
No Offense: Civil Religion and Protestant Taste
Ordeal of Civility
14. Two more books on who we are and how we got here, one on culture, the other on genetics:
The WEIRDest People In The World by Joseph Henrich
Who We Are And How We Got Here by David Reich
15. Two of Thomas Sowell's many brilliant books on how our current politics and culture came to be:
A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Origins of Political Struggles
The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulation as a Basis for Social Policy
16. Public Choice Theory and the Illusion of Grand Strategy by Richard Hanania -- a sobering reexamination of how democratic governments actually make decisions.
17. History Has Begun: The Birth of a New America by Bruno Macaes -- on the country and culture the United States is evolving into, not necessarily decline, but something very different.
18. Three books on the philosophical underpinnings of our time:
The End of History and the Last Man by Francis Fukuyama
Alexandre Kojève: Wisdom at the End of History by James Nichols
Beyond Good and Evil by Friedrich Nietzsche
19. Two books on the nature of the public intellectuals who lead our society:
Intellectuals by Paul Johnson
Intellectuals and Society by Thomas Sowell
End 🙂
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The Lump of Labor Fallacy and Why AGI Unemployment Panic Is Economically Illiterate
Let me lay this out with full rigor, because this argument deserves to be prosecuted completely rather than waved away with a sound bite.
I. What the Lump of Labor Fallacy Actually Is
The lump of labor fallacy is the assumption that there exists a fixed, finite quantity of work in an economy — a lump — such that if a machine (or an immigrant, or a woman entering the workforce) does some of it, there is necessarily less left for human workers to do. It treats employment as a zero-sum pie.
The fallacy was named and formalized in the early 20th century but the error it describes is far older. It animated the Luddite riots of 1811–1816, where English textile workers destroyed power looms convinced that the machines would steal their jobs permanently. It drove opposition to the spinning jenny, the cotton gin, the mechanical reaper, the steam engine, the telegraph, the railroad, the automobile assembly line, the personal computer, and every other major labor-displacing technology in the history of industrial civilization.
Every single time, the catastrophists were wrong. Not partially wrong. Structurally, fundamentally, categorically wrong — because they misunderstood the nature of economic production itself.
The reason the fixed-pie assumption fails is this: demand is not fixed. Work generates income. Income generates demand for goods and services. Demand for goods and services generates new categories of work. This is an engine, not a reservoir. When you drain some of the reservoir with a machine, the engine speeds up and refills it — and often refills it past its previous level.
II. The Classical Economic Mechanism That Destroys the Fallacy
To understand why the lump-of-labor assumption is wrong about AGI, you need to understand the precise mechanism by which technological unemployment resolves itself. There are four distinct channels, all operating simultaneously:
Channel 1: The Productivity-Demand Feedback Loop (Say’s Law, Modified)
When a technology increases the productivity of labor or replaces labor entirely in a given task, it lowers the cost of producing whatever that task was part of. Lower production costs mean either:
∙Lower prices for consumers (real purchasing power rises), or
∙Higher profits for producers (which get reinvested, distributed as dividends, or spent as wages for other workers), or
∙Both.
Either way, aggregate real income in the economy rises. That additional real income does not evaporate. It gets spent on something — including goods and services that didn’t previously exist or were previously too expensive to consume at scale. That spending creates demand. That demand creates jobs.
This is not a theoretical conjecture. The average American in 1900 spent roughly 43% of their income on food. Today it’s around 10%. Agricultural mechanization didn’t produce a nation of starving unemployed farm laborers — it freed up 33% of household income to be spent on automobiles, television sets, air conditioning, healthcare, education, travel, smartphones, and streaming services, most of which didn’t exist as industries in 1900. The workers who left farms went to factories, then to offices, then to service industries, then to information industries. The economy didn’t run out of work. It metamorphosed.
Channel 2: The Baumol Effect and the Inexhaustibility of Human Want
William Baumol’s “cost disease” is usually discussed as a problem, but it contains within it the answer to why technological unemployment can never be permanent at the macroeconomic level.
Baumol observed that productivity gains are uneven across sectors. Sectors that are easily mechanized (manufacturing, agriculture, data processing) see dramatic productivity increases; sectors that resist mechanization (live performance, personal care, bespoke services, therapy, teaching, craft) do not. As mechanized sectors get cheaper, the relative price of labor-intensive sectors rises, and society allocates more of its spending toward them — not less.
This means technology creates a systematic tilt toward human-intensive services precisely because it succeeds in automating the easily automated stuff. The more AGI automates routine cognitive work, the more valuable — and more in demand — genuine human connection, judgment, creativity, and embodied physical skill become. Not as a consolation prize, but because relative scarcity drives relative price and therefore relative employment.
Channel 3: Comparative Advantage and the Ricardo Insight
David Ricardo’s law of comparative advantage is one of the few truly non-obvious and consistently correct insights in all of economics, and it applies directly here.
Even if AGI becomes absolutely better than humans at every cognitive task — faster, cheaper, more accurate, more creative — it does not follow that humans have no economic role. What matters is comparative advantage: what can humans produce at the lowest opportunity cost relative to AGI?
Ricardo proved this with trade between nations: England should produce cloth and Portugal should produce wine even if Portugal is more productive at both, because specializing in their comparative advantages and trading leaves both better off than autarky. The same logic applies to humans and AGI. If AGI is 10x better at legal reasoning but 1,000x better at data entry, humans should do legal reasoning and let AGI do data entry — even though AGI dominates absolutely at both.
The AGI unemployment catastrophists implicitly assume that comparative advantage can somehow be zero — that there is literally nothing humans can do where the opportunity cost tradeoff favors human labor. This is not just empirically unsupported; it’s almost mathematically impossible given the structure of the argument. As long as human time has any value to humans themselves (which it trivially does), and as long as there is any production that requires human presence, consent, or subjective experience, comparative advantage exists.
Channel 4: New Industry Creation (The Jobs-That-Don’t-Exist-Yet Problem)
This is the channel that the catastrophists most egregiously ignore, perhaps because it’s the hardest to model in advance. The most important jobs created by technological revolutions are jobs that simply couldn’t have been predicted before the technology existed.
In 1900, nobody predicted that “film editor,” “radio broadcaster,” “airline pilot,” “software engineer,” “UX designer,” “social media manager,” or “podcast producer” would be major occupational categories. These jobs didn’t exist. They emerged from the new technological landscape and then became massive employers.
The argument against AGI-driven unemployment is not that we can predict exactly what the new jobs will be. The argument is that the historical base rate of technology creating new job categories at least as fast as it destroys old ones is 100% across every major technological transition in recorded economic history. Opponents of this view need to explain why this time is categorically different in a way that would break a pattern that has held without exception for 250 years of industrialization.
III. The Specific Structure of the AGI Unemployment Argument and Where It Goes Wrong
The AGI catastrophist argument typically runs like this:
1.AGI will be capable of performing any cognitive task a human can perform.
2.Cognitive tasks constitute the majority of employment in advanced economies.
3.Therefore, AGI will be able to replace the majority of workers.
4.Therefore, mass permanent unemployment follows.
Step 3 to Step 4 is where the lump of labor fallacy smuggles itself in. The argument assumes that the quantity of cognitive work to be done is fixed, such that when AGI does it, humans are left with nothing. But this is precisely what is not true, for all four channels described above.
Let me be more specific about how each gap in the argument fails:
Gap A: “AGI can do the task” ≠ “There is no more task to do”
When spreadsheets replaced bookkeepers in the 1980s, they did not reduce the total amount of financial analysis done in the American economy. They increased it, massively, because the cost of analysis fell, which meant more analysis got demanded, which meant more analysts got hired — to do more complex, higher-value analysis that the spreadsheets enabled. Automation of the low end of a cognitive spectrum does not eliminate work in that domain; it shifts the frontier of what human effort gets applied to upward.
AGI will do the same thing. If AGI can draft a competent first-pass legal brief in 30 seconds, law firms won’t employ zero lawyers. They’ll employ lawyers who review, refine, strategize, negotiate, argue in court, build client relationships, exercise judgment in novel situations — and they’ll take on far more cases per lawyer because the cost per case has fallen. Total legal work done in the economy will increase, not decrease, because more people will be able to afford it.
Gap B: The Argument Ignores Price Effects on Demand
The catastrophist framing treats the displacement of workers as a pure subtraction problem. But displaced workers who find new jobs (as they historically do) are also consumers. The productivity gains from AGI don’t disappear into a void — they show up as lower prices, higher real wages, or both. Higher real purchasing power means more consumption of more goods and services, which means more demand for labor to produce them.
Furthermore, the catastrophist argument generally ignores what happens to the profits generated by AGI-driven productivity. Those profits go to shareholders, who spend and invest them, creating demand elsewhere. Or they get competed away in product markets, lowering prices and raising real consumer purchasing power. Either pathway generates demand for labor.
The only scenario where this mechanism fails is one where the gains from AGI are so concentrated and the distribution so pathologically skewed that effective aggregate demand collapses — which is a political economy problem (a distributional problem solvable through tax policy and redistribution) rather than a fundamental unemployment problem caused by the technology itself.
Little Tech is our term for tech startups, as contrasted to Big Tech incumbents.
Little Tech has run independent of politics for our entire careers. But, as the old Soviet joke goes, “You may not be interested in politics, but politics is interested in you.”
We believe bad government policies are now the #1 threat to Little Tech.
We believe American technology supremacy, and the critical role that Little Tech startups play in ensuring that supremacy, is a first class political issue on par with any other.
The time has come to stand up for Little Tech.
Our political efforts as a firm are entirely focused on defending Little Tech.[1] We do not engage in political fights outside of issues directly relevant to Little Tech. But we will fight for Little Tech – for the freedom to research, to invent, to create jobs, to build the future – with all of our resources.
We find there are three kinds of politicians:
* Those who support Little Tech. We support them.
* Those who oppose Little Tech. We oppose them.
* Those who are somewhere in the middle – they want to be supportive, but they have concerns. We work with them in good faith.
We support or oppose politicians regardless of party and regardless of their positions on other issues.
America led the 20th Century because we are preeminent in three dimensions:
(1) Technology – America drove the Second Industrial Revolution through the 1930’s, and then the Computer Revolution since the 1940’s.
(2) Economy – America’s free market system created enormous societal wealth and dramatic improvements in quality of life for everyday people.
(3) Military – American military might drove victory in World War I and World War II, and then catalyzed the unilateral surrender and dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Each of these dimensions reinforces the other two:
* Our technology preeminence powers our economy and our military.
* Our economic growth pays for our massive investment in technology and in our military.
* And our military dominance keeps us safe from foreign threats and hostile ideologies that could crush our technology, our economy, and our people.
And, America’s success has positive global spillover effects to much of the rest of the world. American technology is the global standard. The American economy is the leading production and consumption partner of many other nations. And the American military has maintained overall global peace and prosperity since World War II to a level unprecedented in world history.
Naysayers say America’s best days are behind us, that the 21st Century will see America play a diminished role in all three dimensions.
We disagree.
There is no reason American technology, economic, and military leadership cannot continue for decades to come.
There is no reason the 21st Century cannot be a Second American Century.
STARTUPS
American technology leadership is the result of a complex system built over the last 150 years that includes our pioneering spirit, our work ethic, our rule of law, our deep capital markets, our higher education system, and long term government investment in scientific research. And university, government, and corporate labs have all played key roles.
But the vanguard of American technology supremacy has always been the startup. From Edison and Ford to Hughes and Lockheed to SpaceX and Tesla, the path to greatness starts in a garage.
A startup is what happens when a plucky group of outcasts and misfits comes together with a dream, ambition, courage, and a particular set of skills – to build something new in the world, to build a product that will improve peoples’ lives, and to build a company that may go on to create many more new things in the future.
The enormous advantage of any startup is a clean sheet of paper – a single shot to imagine and realize a different and better world.
But startups start with every other disadvantage. Specifically, they must go up against incumbent companies that have overwhelmingly superior brands, market positions, customer bases, and financial strength – incumbents that are out to strangle startup competition in the cradle.
Incumbents often have another enormous advantage – the ability to wire the government against startup competitors.
Dominant companies don’t start out that way. In fact, they start as startups, fighting their way uphill until they reach a position of power where they seek to lock in their gains, to pull the rope ladder up behind them. They inject themselves into the political system and seek regulatory capture – a wall of laws and regulations that protect and entrench their positions, and that new startups cannot possibly scale.
The historical result of regulatory capture in market after market has been government-enforced monopolies and cartels.
And the motto of every monopoly and cartel is, “We don’t care, because we don’t have to.”
When this cycle is allowed to play out, when big companies can weaponize the government against startups, the result is stagnation and then decline.
There are many signs of stagnation and decline in the American economy today.
Economists measure the rate of technology improvement in the economy as productivity growth. And productivity growth today, after 50 years of the proliferation of the profoundly powerful technologies of the computer and the Internet, is lower than before the 1970’s.
The real world consequences are staggering:
* Low productivity growth means low economic growth.
* Low economic growth means a low rate of improvement in quality of life for regular people, if not outright backsliding. See, for example, skyrocketing prices and stagnating quality of education, health care, and housing – sure signs of regulatory capture.
* Low economic growth also means the rise of smashmouth zero-sum politics, as gains for one group of people necessarily require taking things away from other people.
* Zero-sum politics lead to corrosion of the national spirit of opportunity and growth. We can feel this corrosion all around us.
The way to prevent this outcome is to encourage new startups – to drive innovation, competition, and growth – and to prevent big companies from weaponizing the government to crush them.
Little Tech is our term for tech startups, as contrasted to Big Tech incumbents.
Little Tech has run independent of politics for our entire careers. But, as the old Soviet joke goes, “You may not be interested in politics, but politics is interested in you.”
We believe bad government policies are now the #1 threat to Little Tech.
We believe American technology supremacy, and the critical role that Little Tech startups play in ensuring that supremacy, is a first class political issue on par with any other.
The time has come to stand up for Little Tech.
Our political efforts as a firm are entirely focused on defending Little Tech.[1] We do not engage in political fights outside of issues directly relevant to Little Tech. But we will fight for Little Tech – for the freedom to research, to invent, to create jobs, to build the future – with all of our resources.
We find there are three kinds of politicians:
* Those who support Little Tech. We support them.
* Those who oppose Little Tech. We oppose them.
* Those who are somewhere in the middle – they want to be supportive, but they have concerns. We work with them in good faith.
We support or oppose politicians regardless of party and regardless of their positions on other issues.
America led the 20th Century because we are preeminent in three dimensions:
(1) Technology – America drove the Second Industrial Revolution through the 1930’s, and then the Computer Revolution since the 1940’s.
(2) Economy – America’s free market system created enormous societal wealth and dramatic improvements in quality of life for everyday people.
(3) Military – American military might drove victory in World War I and World War II, and then catalyzed the unilateral surrender and dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Each of these dimensions reinforces the other two:
* Our technology preeminence powers our economy and our military.
* Our economic growth pays for our massive investment in technology and in our military.
* And our military dominance keeps us safe from foreign threats and hostile ideologies that could crush our technology, our economy, and our people.
And, America’s success has positive global spillover effects to much of the rest of the world. American technology is the global standard. The American economy is the leading production and consumption partner of many other nations. And the American military has maintained overall global peace and prosperity since World War II to a level unprecedented in world history.
Naysayers say America’s best days are behind us, that the 21st Century will see America play a diminished role in all three dimensions.
We disagree.
There is no reason American technology, economic, and military leadership cannot continue for decades to come.
There is no reason the 21st Century cannot be a Second American Century.
STARTUPS
American technology leadership is the result of a complex system built over the last 150 years that includes our pioneering spirit, our work ethic, our rule of law, our deep capital markets, our higher education system, and long term government investment in scientific research. And university, government, and corporate labs have all played key roles.
But the vanguard of American technology supremacy has always been the startup. From Edison and Ford to Hughes and Lockheed to SpaceX and Tesla, the path to greatness starts in a garage.
A startup is what happens when a plucky group of outcasts and misfits comes together with a dream, ambition, courage, and a particular set of skills – to build something new in the world, to build a product that will improve peoples’ lives, and to build a company that may go on to create many more new things in the future.
The enormous advantage of any startup is a clean sheet of paper – a single shot to imagine and realize a different and better world.
But startups start with every other disadvantage. Specifically, they must go up against incumbent companies that have overwhelmingly superior brands, market positions, customer bases, and financial strength – incumbents that are out to strangle startup competition in the cradle.
Incumbents often have another enormous advantage – the ability to wire the government against startup competitors.
Dominant companies don’t start out that way. In fact, they start as startups, fighting their way uphill until they reach a position of power where they seek to lock in their gains, to pull the rope ladder up behind them. They inject themselves into the political system and seek regulatory capture – a wall of laws and regulations that protect and entrench their positions, and that new startups cannot possibly scale.
The historical result of regulatory capture in market after market has been government-enforced monopolies and cartels.
And the motto of every monopoly and cartel is, “We don’t care, because we don’t have to.”
When this cycle is allowed to play out, when big companies can weaponize the government against startups, the result is stagnation and then decline.
There are many signs of stagnation and decline in the American economy today.
Economists measure the rate of technology improvement in the economy as productivity growth. And productivity growth today, after 50 years of the proliferation of the profoundly powerful technologies of the computer and the Internet, is lower than before the 1970’s.
The real world consequences are staggering:
* Low productivity growth means low economic growth.
* Low economic growth means a low rate of improvement in quality of life for regular people, if not outright backsliding. See, for example, skyrocketing prices and stagnating quality of education, health care, and housing – sure signs of regulatory capture.
* Low economic growth also means the rise of smashmouth zero-sum politics, as gains for one group of people necessarily require taking things away from other people.
* Zero-sum politics lead to corrosion of the national spirit of opportunity and growth. We can feel this corrosion all around us.
The way to prevent this outcome is to encourage new startups – to drive innovation, competition, and growth – and to prevent big companies from weaponizing the government to crush them.
“You live in a deranged age — more deranged than usual, because despite great scientific and technological advances, man has not the faintest idea of who he is or what he is doing.”
— Walker Percy
“Our species is 300,000 years old. For the first 290,000 years, we were foragers, subsisting in a way that’s still observable among the Bushmen of the Kalahari and the Sentinelese of the Andaman Islands. Even after Homo Sapiens embraced agriculture, progress was painfully slow. A person born in Sumer in 4,000BC would find the resources, work, and technology available in England at the time of the Norman Conquest or in the Aztec Empire at the time of Columbus quite familiar. Then, beginning in the 18th Century, many people’s standard of living skyrocketed. What brought about this dramatic improvement, and why?”
— Marian Tupy
“There’s a way to do it better. Find it.”
— Thomas Edison
Lies
We are being lied to.
We are told that technology takes our jobs, reduces our wages, increases inequality, threatens our health, ruins the environment, degrades our society, corrupts our children, impairs our humanity, threatens our future, and is ever on the verge of ruining everything.
We are told to be angry, bitter, and resentful about technology.
We are told to be pessimistic.
The myth of Prometheus – in various updated forms like Frankenstein, Oppenheimer, and Terminator – haunts our nightmares.
We are told to denounce our birthright – our intelligence, our control over nature, our ability to build a better world.
We are told to be miserable about the future.
THE TECHNO-OPTIMIST MANIFESTO part 2
Truth
Our civilization was built on technology.
Our civilization is built on technology.
Technology is the glory of human ambition and achievement, the spearhead of progress, and the realization of our potential.
For hundreds of years, we properly glorified this – until recently.
I am here to bring the good news.
We can advance to a far superior way of living, and of being.
We have the tools, the systems, the ideas.
We have the will.
It is time, once again, to raise the technology flag.
It is time to be Techno-Optimists.
THE TECHNO-OPTIMIST MANIFESTO part 3
Technology
Techno-Optimists believe that societies, like sharks, grow or die.
We believe growth is progress – leading to vitality, expansion of life, increasing knowledge, higher well being.
We agree with Paul Collier when he says, “Economic growth is not a cure-all, but lack of growth is a kill-all.”
We believe everything good is downstream of growth.
We believe not growing is stagnation, which leads to zero-sum thinking, internal fighting, degradation, collapse, and ultimately death.
There are only three sources of growth: population growth, natural resource utilization, and technology.
Developed societies are depopulating all over the world, across cultures – the total human population may already be shrinking.
National resource utilization has sharp limits, both real and political.
And so the only perpetual source of growth is technology.
In fact, technology – new knowledge, new tools, what the Greeks called techne – has always been the main source of growth, and perhaps the only cause of growth, as technology made both population growth and natural resource utilization possible.
We believe technology is a lever on the world – the way to make more with less.
Economists measure technological progress as productivity growth: How much more we can produce each year with fewer inputs, fewer raw materials. Productivity growth, powered by technology, is the main driver of economic growth, wage growth, and the creation of new industries and new jobs, as people and capital are continuously freed to do more important, valuable things than in the past. Productivity growth causes prices to fall, supply to rise, and demand to expand, improving the material well being of the entire population.
We believe this is the story of the material development of our civilization; this is why we are not still living in mud huts, eking out a meager survival and waiting for nature to kill us.
We believe this is why our descendents will live in the stars.
We believe that there is no material problem – whether created by nature or by technology – that cannot be solved with more technology.
We had a problem of starvation, so we invented the Green Revolution.
We had a problem of darkness, so we invented electric lighting.
We had a problem of cold, so we invented indoor heating.
We had a problem of heat, so we invented air conditioning.
We had a problem of isolation, so we invented the Internet.
We had a problem of pandemics, so we invented vaccines.
We have a problem of poverty, so we invent technology to create abundance.
Give us a real world problem, and we can invent technology that will solve it.