"An idiot could've told you there was no possibility of losing money."
"You don't get that many great opportunities. When life finally gave me one, I blew it."
"That decision cost me about $5 billion."
Why was Belridge so appealing? See thread:
Belridge owned 33K acres in Kern County. They had 3K shallow stripper wells producing 7M barrels of heavy crude a year. And these wells had three advantages:
1) Cheap finding & lifting costs 2) Exemption from price controls 3) Low-risk growth capex in EOR (steam & fracking)
These advantages produced excellent financial performance.
Belridge's 1975 results:
Revenues: $85M (23% y/y)
EBIT: $49m (57% margin)
Net profit: $25 million (31% ROE)
The valuation?
Munger paid $115 per share for Belridge in 1976, which was:
- 4x earnings
- 2x earnings net of cash
- 1x book value
He was also getting a 12% yield on his purchase price.
Why was Belridge so cheap?
Belridge didn't:
- File with the SEC
- Trade on an exchange
- Meet with outsiders
- Provide reserve estimates
They also had just 9% of the shares held by non-insiders.
How did Munger's investment perform?
In late 1979, Shell acquired Belridge for $3,665 per share.
Munger made:
- 32x his purchase price in capital gains
- 75% of his purchase price in dividends
His CAGR? +150% a year (with reinvestment)
Were there risks? Yes
- Belridge's field was in decline until 1973 (Pre-EOR)
- Belridge earned low returns before 1973
- The founding family controlled Belridge
- The CEO was an unknown quantity (Munger: [He was] eccentric and heavy-drinking. But the oil field wasn't drinking.)
Note on reserves:
Before 1978, Belridge didn't publish reserve tables. But Munger could've estimated reserves via Belridge's Form EIA 23 filing with the DOE. Even at the low-balled estimate (248M million barrels estimate vs 377M actual), Belridge was a bargain.
From another investor that was involved with Belridge:
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Another deal Buffett passed on that turned the would-be buyer into a billionaire:
Irvine Co.
Insiders described the deal as:
"The best real estate deal since Peter Minuit bought Manhattan Island."
"An absolute slam dunk."
Why was the deal so good?
Irvine owned:
- "100 sqmi of land sitting in the path of LA's southward sprawl."
- "15% of the land of fast-growing Orange County."
- 73K acres valued at "less than $1 an acre."
You were also buying from an uninformed forced seller (Irvine Foundation).
The price for Irvine Co in 1977? $337 million ($100 million equity)
What's it worth today? ~$15 billion
But it gets even better. The eventual buyer (Donald Bren) invested around $30 million for his 100% interest in Irvine. That's a 500x return (not counting distributions).
Buffett & Munger passed on several deals that turned the would-be buyers into billionaires.
One of those deals: Detroit International Bridge ("DIB")
DIB's Ambassador Bridge:
- Connects Detroit / Windsor.
- Handles 30K crossings a day.
- Enables 25% of US-CA trade.
Buffett & Munger offered to buy 100% of DIB in 1977 for $20 million.
Why'd they offer to buy DIB?
- Volume growth: MSD vehicle crossing growth
- Margins: 70% pre-tax margins
- Capex: 2% capex to sales
- Cash flow: ~100% cash conversion.
- Valuation: 8x net income
But the main reason they wanted DIB: Pricing Power
DIB charged 15 bps of the value of goods that crossed the bridge. A buyer could raise prices to reflect the bridge's status as a critical link between US-CA. And these price increases would go straight to cash flow.