Thread by @BrynnTannehill

Things in Ukraine might appear to be a stalemate again, as the lines in Luhansk, Kherson, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia all appear to be static right now. I don't expect it to remain this way for long, however. I expect Ukraine to succeed in further offensives. A 🧵 1/n

Russia had a choice between doing mobilization the smart way (training up recent contracts with an experienced cadre) or the stupid way (grab random guys off the street, hand them a rifle, send them almost immediately to the front). They chose B. 2/n

https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1580414234575265792

The results are predictable: lots of KIA, WIA, and POW without adding much in the way of combat power. We can see horrifying (yet comical) examples of how proficiency is cratering as they run out of experienced people in key positions (like drivers). 3/n

https://twitter.com/olex_scherba/status/1580551789509689344

Here we see a Russian APC driver either failing to notice the mines, or failing to recognize that even if you don't run the tracks over the mine, many of them have magnetic influence detonators. 4/n

https://twitter.com/saintjavelin/status/1580329304453709825

Pro-war, pro-mobilization, and nationalist Russian milbloggers, who exert a significant (surprising) amount of influence, are (rightly) unhappy with the way the mobilization has been executed. The issues stated here have been seen elsewhere. 5/n

https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1580497639266975745

Russian losses have been high. One estimate puts their irretrievable losses at 90,000 since the war began. That's roughly half of all the forces they sent in February 22. Russia is scraping manpower any way they can, and many experienced troops gone. 6/n meduza.io/en/news/2022/1…

There's also massive issues for Russia in terms of materiel. Their barrages against civilian targets have depleted their inventories of missiles, while having no real effect on the course of the war. 7/n nytimes.com/2022/10/11/wor…

We're seeing signs that Russia is running out of it's most advanced systems, and may have dipped deep into their "war reserve" intended for use against NATO. 8/n

https://twitter.com/piotr_butowski/status/1580518449373016064

Iran reportedly gave 300 Shahed-136 suicide drones to Russia. These may be nearing exhaustion, and Iran may not be able to produce more. We're seeing the the smaller, less capable Shahed-131 showing up now. 9/n

https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1580499898872385536

Russia appears to be dipping into its stocks of WWII era artillery, in this case the D-1 155mm howitzer, which it is issuing to LNR/DNR allies. The D-1 lacks range and accuracy, and LNR/DNR troops are reportedly less than thrilled. 10/n

https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1580229323516444674

While Russian propaganda brags about updating 800 T-62s over the next 3 years. I am dubious of their capacity to do so, but more importantly, it begs the question why they aren't modernizing more modern systems? (Hint: deployed or destroyed). 11/n

https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1580251449321132032

Speaking of failed RU propaganda, this visit by SHoigu to a shooting range is inadvertently hilarious: there's sounds of gunfire everywhere, but no one has a magazine in their rifle, and one mobik appears to be aiming an invisible gun. 12/n

https://twitter.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1580251547606208512

The logistic situation for Russia also continues to degrade. The strike on the Kerch bridge has stopped trains from crossing, and road traffic has been sharply limited. They appear to be relying on ferries, which are badly backed up and slow. 13/n

https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1580230919306502151

Unless the rail lines are opened quickly, it will have significant downstream impact on Russian capabilities, which are reliant on rail, fuel, and artillery. It might take a few weeks or a month to see the impact in the field, but it could be catastrophic. 14/n

On the other side of the coin, there's Ukraine, which is trying to mobilize the smart way. They're only taking on as many people as they can effectively train, with help from NATO countries. 15/n euroweeklynews.com/2022/10/01/aut…

The first of 10,000 troops trained by the UK are finishing training now. They're coming back to a Ukrainian military that is better equipped than it was in February and March. It's also far more experienced. 16/n ukdefencejournal.org.uk/first-of-10000…

According to Oryx, Ukraine is capturing more vehicles than they're losing. Much of what they have captured is modern Russian equipment. They have also solved some of their ammunition problems after capturing the depots around Izyum. 17/n

Despite running low on Soviet-era S-300 SAMs, Ukraine will have modern, shorter range NASAMS which use AMRAAM missiles (which are very common, NATO standard, have been in production for decades, and still are). 18/n reuters.com/world/us-worki…

Compare Russian "training" with the use of modern simulation equipment for Ukrainian trainees. 19/n

https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1530933715471409155

Ukraine continues to have interior lines of communication as an advantage. They have advantages in morale, leadership, purpose, training, logistics, strategy, experience, OODA loops, etc... The imbalance in material is shifting (slowly) their way. 20/n

There will be further offensives by Ukraine, at times and places of their choosing. They will select ones that are to their advantage as the Russian situation slowly deteriorates, and we will see further breakthroughs. 21/n

P.S. Some people have asked me about this. I believe it to be mostly for propaganda. It's been geolocated miles behind the front lines, not in a vital area, and it's not connected to any other defenses. Unless we see LOTS more, it has no effect. 22/n

https://twitter.com/Ukrainene/status/1580230015895375876

A little more on why these trenches are more about propaganda and copium than actual defenses. The'ye only 1500 meters long. Need a lot more than that. 23/n

https://twitter.com/_uslengh/status/1580595676416573440