Thread by @wartranslated

🧵 An interesting analysis of the 🇷🇺 logistics in the south by the 🇷🇺 military researcher Atomic Cherry. They show that 🇷🇺 relied heavily on the Crimean bridge and the damage to it will have long-lasting consequences given the lack of alternatives to supply south:

"The story with the Kerch bridge has a more complex background than it seems at first glance, with much more long-term consequences that can have a direct impact on the course of hostilities.

What is this about? It’s about logistics.

What do we know about the structure of Russian military logistics? It is customary to compare it with Soviet logistics, but this comparison is deeply erroneous.

The USSR professed the so-called "layered" approach, based on a powerful military infrastructure and voluminous, pre-prepared stocks of military-technical equipment.

The Soviets were far behind in implementing the innovations that were brought by the supply science during the Cold War (such as, for example, pallets), and yet the Soviet Army had an advanced system of delivery of military supplies, which was built around the railway and…

…automobile transport components, which were reinforced by a powerful fleet of military transport aviation.

Russian military logistics is in every way a step backwards: it is built exclusively around railways and is highly dependent on a network of large logistics centers.

On the other hand, the RF Armed Forces never needed anything more than that: the Russian army was focused on low-intensity combat operations against obviously weak opponents, i.e. the scenario of a "counter-terrorist operation" in Chechnya or a "peace enforcement operation" in…

…Georgia. With such termins, a developed military logistics was not envisaged doctrinally, and the peak of the rear's capabilities was to supply strategic-level exercises.

What does the Kerch bridge have to do with it?

It's simple - it was the only transport artery that provided the supply and transfer of reinforcements for the southern group of the Russian army.

RF Armed Forces could not build the logistics along the so-called “land corridor”, due to the specifics of the region’s railways, which run close to the current front line and are de facto in the zone of fire control of the missile and artillery units of the Armed Forces of…

…Ukraine. For this reason, the RF Armed Forces used the railway network of the peninsula, supplying their forces by relying on the logistics center in the Dzhankoya region.

Damage to the railway bridge across the Kerch Strait completely changes the strategic layout for the Russian group in the south. At the moment, it is de facto cut off from supply and operates at the expense of previously accumulated reserves.

It is difficult to call the situation critical, because cargo and reinforcements can also be delivered along the "land corridor", but with several reservations.

In such a scenario, the Russian Federation will be forced to switch to automotive-type logistics: this entails a severalfold decrease in cargo traffic, a significant increase in the delivery time of everything necessary to the front line, as well as a number of organisational

problems.

Automobile army logistics is sensible only at distances up to 100 km, while in the case of using the Novoazovsk-Mariupol-Berdyansk-Melitopol route and beyond, we are talking about a distance of ~ 450 km (the route has no alternative due to the small operational depth of the…

…southern front).

This problem can be partially resolved by the use of the ports of the Sea of ​​Azov, which can meet the needs of logistics columns in fuel and spare parts (the Russian Federation cannot establish maritime logistics due to the lack of a sufficient number of transport vessels).

So far, however, there are no signs of a reorientation of Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine.

Apparently, the high command of the RF Armed Forces is counting on the speedy repair of the railway bridge across the Kerch Strait and on the previously accumulated stocks of military equipment in the area of ​​Dzhankoy and Chaplinka.

At the same time, the condition of the bridge itself is currently unclear.

Due to the peculiarities of its design made out of full-metal ballast troughs, the burning out of 450 tons of diesel fuel, followed by extinguishing with cold sea water, could seriously damage the integrity of the structure.

In a word, the true consequences of what happened to the bridge are just beginning to manifest themselves at least on a somewhat full scale . What they will eventually result in will become clear over the next 3-4 weeks."

End of thread

Source: t.me/atomiccherry/4…