(1/4) On 14 October 2022, Belarussian president Aleksandr Lukashenko said that 70,000 Belarusian troops and up to 15,000 Russians would be involved in a new Russian-Belarussian Group of Forces.
(2/4) On 15 October 2022, the Belarussian authorities released a video claiming to show the arrival of Russian troops in Belarus. However, to date it is unlikely that Russia has actually deployed a significant number of extra troops into Belarus.
(3/4) Russia is unlikely to be able to generate combat-ready formations of the claimed size: its forces are committed in Ukraine. The Belarussian military highly likely maintains minimal capability to undertake complex operations.
(4/4) The announcement is likely an attempt to demonstrate Russian-Belarussian solidarity and to convince Ukraine to divert forces to guard the northern border.
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(2/5) On 19 October, Wagner Group owner Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed online that his engineering team were constructing an extensive fortified βWagner Lineβ of defences in Russian-occupied Luhansk Oblast, and posted a map showing the planned extent of the project.
(3/5) Imagery showed a section of newly constructed anti-tank defences and trench systems southeast of Kreminna in Luhansk Oblast.
(1/4) Russian forces continue to reinforce crossing points over the Dnipro River, and have completed a barge bridge alongside the damaged Antonovskiy bridge in Kherson.
(2/4) Although the use of heavy barge bridges was almost certainly included in Soviet-era planning for operations in Europe, it is likely this is the first time the Russian military have needed to utilise this type of bridge for decades.
(1/6) On 18 October 2022, recently appointed commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, General Sergei Surovikin, told Russian media that βa difficult situation has emergedβ in the Kherson area.
(2/6) He endorsed the previously announced plans of the occupation authorities to evacuate the civilian population.
(1/5) Eight months into the invasion, major elements of Russiaβs military leadership are increasingly dysfunctional. At the tactical level, there is almost certainly a worsening shortage of capable Russian junior officers to organise and lead newly mobilised reservists.
(2/5) Eyewitness testimony suggests that the shooting of 11 Russian soldiers near Belgorod by a fellow recruit on 15 October 2022 occurred after an officerβs abusive comments towards ethnic minority recruits.
Since 10 October, Russia has maintained a heightened tempo of long-range strikes against targets across Ukraine.
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These have been conducted by cruise missiles, air defence missiles in a surface-to-surface role, and Iranian-provided Shahed-136 one way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles.
Logistical issues faced by Russian forces in southern Ukraine have likely become more acute following damage to the Kerch Bridge on 08 October 2022. Repair efforts are ongoing, and it is open to some traffic.
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However, a large queue of waiting cargo trucks remains backed up near the crossing.