1/ A key question going into 20th Party Congress was would personnel selections reflect an attempt to balance Xi Jinping’s power or was Xi going to run the table. It’s pretty clear, he completely ran the table – this was a clean sweep for him.
2/ We have known that the influence of the China Youth League (CYL) has been severely diminished through a decade of anti-corruption purges under Xi, nevertheless it was one of the only barometers left to gauge whether there would be any checks on Xi's authority/decision making.
3/ In this regard, it was important to see whether Wang Yang and Li Keqiang, both affiliated with CYL, would remain in the Standing Committee. Both 67 years old, so according to the previous norms around retirement age, they could both have remained in the PSC. Xi removed both.
4/ The other to watch of course was Hu Chunhua, protégé of Hu Jintao/CYL, who was speculated to be in the running to be elevated into the Politburo and PSC and potentially to serve as Premier. Hu Chunhua did not get elevated to the Politburo, let alone the PSC.
5/ Xi’s political ally Li Qiang will likely become next Premier; will be the first since 1976 not promoted from a Vice Premier position. He does not have national governance experience. Both Hu Chunhua and Wang Yang had been Vice Premiers w/ nat'l economic governance experience.
6/ Against all that backdrop, we watched Hu Jintao (the most senior political figure in China affiliated with the CYL) forcibly removed from the session on Saturday in full view of all Party delegates and the international media.
7/ And while I suspect Hu's removal was likely health related, nevertheless the optics and symbology of that are quite striking now that it is clear Xi has removed anyone with CYL affiliation and replaced them all with Xi loyalists.
8/ There was no clear successor designated. The youngest elevated to PSC was Ding Xuexiang at 60 yrs old. He is not viewed as a successor. Heirs are typically appointed in their early to mid 50s. Xi was appointed to PSC at the 17th Party Congress in 2007.He was 54 at the time.
9/ Xi was ranked above Li Keqiang, an indication that he was going to succeed Hu Jintao as China's next leader.
10/ What does all this mean for governance and policy making in China? PSC is now made up of all political allies of Xi, and as such, I suspect they will be focused above all on helping Xi accomplish his political and ideological agenda.
11/ National security, CCP political security, self-sufficiency in science and technology will all be key areas of emphasis. May seen downgrading in priority of economic growth relative to zero-covid and other Xi policies.
12/ Having run the table on PSC selections is strong indicator that Xi has solidified political control; he also appears to enjoy fairly wide public support. But to what extent will growing resentment over Covid controls/lockdowns & a slowing economy undermine popular support?
13/ No indication that Xi/CCP intend to modify their approach to foreign policy. In fact I would expect more continuity here than change. If anything, we can likely expect to see an even more assertive/aggressive approach to FP under Xi in next 5 years as power is consolidated.
14/ Many outsiders have been surprised by how quickly and abruptly the current leadership moved away from Deng’s “keeping a low profile” and took a series of assertive and aggressive actions over the last 10 years to include:
15/ ramping up military spending, further build up of nuclear capabilities, stepping up militarization and patrols in East/South China Seas, military clashes on China’s border with India, intensified military drills in Taiwan Strait/continued coercion and pressure toward Taiwan.
16/ All these more assertive and coercive actions have been accompanied by an aggressive style of coercive diplomacy adopted by Chinese diplomats in the Xi era known as Wolf Warrior Diplomacy
17/ Additionally, Xi and Putin’s strategic partnership, signed less than 3 weeks before Russia conducted a full-scale invasion of Ukraine has put a spotlight on important shifts under Xi in China's foreign policy.
18/ All the while, US-China relations continue to deteriorate w/ much greater antagonism in rel'p than at any point in the 40+ years of official US-China relations. And many countries in region reassessing their own ties w/ Beijing given their own bilateral challenges w/ China.
19/ Going forward, I expect we will continue to see China act even more assertively in defending what it sees as its core interests. “Security” was a major theme of Xi’s work report as was the great risks/threats to China and the need to maintain a fighting spirit (斗争精神).
20/ So I would say that the key message at the Party Congress on foreign policy was one of continuity. We can expect Xi to continue – perhaps even ramp up - the assertive posture we have seen over the last 10 years. END
4a/ another CYL member expected to be elevated into the Politburo was Madam Shen Yueyue, the president of the All-China Women's Federation. She did not make it into the Politburo in the end. Another blow to the CYL and a setback for women in leadership in China.
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