Thread by @StMichael71

This discussion is tiresome because interlocutors refuse in principle to engage with arguments and instead accuse me of being uncharitable for bringing up questions of heresy, and engage in tu quoque responses.

Let's review my points carefully.

churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/the-i…

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1. I discuss universalism in general & focus on 'heresy' because we don't need to prove orthodoxy is TRUE in order to argue that universalism conflicts with orthodoxy. My argument is that universalism requires beliefs about divine or human freedom that conflict with orthodoxy.

My argument's success depends only on whether you accept orthodox beliefs about God. I do not need to resolve how grace-free will are compatible in order to show universalism is heretical. I only need to show universalism requires rejecting orthodox beliefs.

2. Someone's indignation at the suggestion their positions are heretical is not sufficient to respond to the argument. Show either universalism does not entail the heretical beliefs, or the implications are not heretical. If the argument is sound, universalism is not orthodox.

3. That 'all will be saved' is a necessary truth (cannot possibly be false) only if either God cannot do otherwise than save all, or humans cannot do otherwise than love God. DBH's strategy is much stronger than strictly necessary to defend universalism, as he endorses both.

4. DBH argues not only that God cannot do otherwise than save all, but that God can never do otherwise in general. DBH claims that creation remains contingent & that this does not entail God is compelled by factors outside of Himself, but only that God could not do anything else.

That creation depends on God to exist is not relevant to whether God's decisions could be otherwise. As DBH admitted, his view entails "it is impossible God would do otherwise" than create. There is no possible situation where God does not create.

a. Others (e.g. Hinduism or Islam) might accept God creates necessarily but orthodox Christianity does not. The Church and Fathers rejected SPECIFICALLY this position: God acts necessarily from His goodness to create the world. This is not about compulsion, but God's nature.

b. DBH argued that God being able to do otherwise would require God to act for no reason (arbitrarily) or deliberate (weigh His reasons, actualize potential). But God being able to do otherwise does not mean God acts for no reasons, can do nonsense or evil, or chooses randomly.

Affirming God was able not to create, or to create a different world, does not require God deliberating. What it means is simply that His choices could have been other than they are, that God had possible good reasons not to create. 'Necessary' means 'unable to be otherwise.'

Similarly, the principle "the good is diffusive of itself" is not the same as nor entails God creates necessarily. Many accept this principle & reject that God creates necessarily, as they think God's goodness diffuses in the Triune life. God is perfectly the Good, intrinsically.

c. We can show orthodoxy is correct. DBH's view requires God has no reasons, or no good reasons, to do otherwise than He does. If God acts without reason, 'automatically' from what He is, He'd be like a natural force or gravity, not a rational being. We should reject that.

God has no reason to create (or not create) outside His own goodness or happiness, as He exists as what He is independently of creation. Yet, the only way God could not have reasons NOT to create is that God cannot be God without creating.

Creating would be required for Him to express His Goodness. But this contradicts that God is Good itself and does not require doing anything outside to be Good. God can have no good possible reason not to create only if God depends on creation to be God, the Good. This is false.

5. While DBH holds God's choices are all necessary, you can also argue God cannot do otherwise than save all humans. Here, God's benevolence is supposedly incompatible with allowing the possibility of hell. I.e., God can have no possible good reason to allow anyone to go to hell.

6. I argued ONLY that DBH has not shown God *could not have* a good possible reason. I don't need to prove that God DOES have such a good reason at all to show that DBH's arguments are unsound. In fact, I see no way to *demonstrate* God could not have such a good reason for hell.

7. The arguments that God has no good reason to permit hell all (without exception) reject only some possible reasons God might have to permit hell, but do not exhaust all possible reasons God could have. Many such arguments rely upon misconceptions about what hell requires.

A common feature of universalist argumentation generally is to ignore orthodox doctrine that grace can be resisted, that all evil comes from us, and God in no way causes sin. They presuppose human acts are caused by God such that they cannot be otherwise - God necessitates all.

It is, however, a heretical (Calvinistic) view of God's grace/Providence that He causes us to sin or be damned. Often, they misinterpret Banezian Thomism as if it were Calvinism. Whether Banezian Thomism is defensible, however, is irrelevant to whether universalism is heretical.

8. Just ONE possible reason would undermine universalism. And I can conceive of possible good reasons for God to permit damnation if people end up in hell not b/c of God, but purely from their own actions, and where God's permission is an expression of His love for the damned.

8. On the second fork, one might also think there is a contradiction in humans choosing not to love God (not even God could create humans who...) or that humans in our actual world are made so that they cannot ultimately fail to love God. Either way, mortal sin is impossible.

DBH argues humans necessarily love God because human beings necessarily act from a desire for the Good, which is God. If you are acting for reasons, and not merely arbitrarily, you are acting from love of God. Those who fail to love God only do so from non-culpable ignorance.

This argument is weak. You can act for the Good generally, without acting arbitrarily, and still not be acting on specifically love of God. And one can act on what appears a good reason (that's not in fact a good reason) by being negligent or culpably ignorant of what is right.

The view mortal sin is impossible is heretical. Orthodoxy holds we can choose not to love God and lose grace. If we necessarily loved God, we would be born with charity, in a state of grace, and it would be impossible to lose grace. The Cross and sacraments would be unnecessary.

9. In the end, universalism requires heretical beliefs about divine or human freedom. Even if it were not condemned by the Church, as it is, universalism would still be heretical because of what it requires in order to be true.

I have seen, so far, no response to my arguments.