1/6 It really doesn't matter how innovative US manufacturing might be, as long as the role of the US in the global trade and capital regime is to provide the deficits needed to accommodate the surpluses of...
2/6 ...countries like China, Germany, and Japan, by running the capital account surpluses that accommodate their excess savings, the US share of global manufacturing must decline as the share of the surplus countries rises. carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancial…
3/6 Nothing that US manufacturers do, or US manufacturing policy does, can ever prevent the global balance of payments from balancing. As long as these countries run surpluses, and as long as the US financial markets absorb their excess savings, the US must run deficits.
4/6 That's because net capital inflows force adjustments in the US economy that prioritize consumption over production. US producers are forced effectively to subsidize US consumers so as to reverse the subsidy consumers in surplus countries are forced to provide to producers.
5/6 When analysts or policymakers say that US deficits would end if only US manufacturers were more efficient, or more productive, or if Americans were thriftier, they clearly do not understand the balance of payments or how the global trade and capital regime works.
6/6 The balance of payments must balance. Global savings must equal global investment. Production must equal demand. The role of the US in the global system is to make everything balance, and that comes at a cost for both the US and the global economy. carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancial…
This 2017 ITIF research piece suggests how a persistent trade imbalances may affect the evolution of a country's share of global manufacturing.
1/4 We seem top have forgotten that a key part of the success of many Chinese "entrepreneurs"during the high-investment boom phase was their privileged access to a heavily administered (rather than market-driven) banking system.
2/4 In a financial system with highly-repressed lending rates, government-directed equity capital, and extensive "window guidance" driving the direction and quantity of credit creation, privileged access to credit and funding all but guaranteed business success.
3/4 Repressed interest rates were transferring at least 4% of GDP (according to IMF) every year from households to borrowers. Under those circumstances financial repression probably did more to benefit the most successful businesses than "animal spirits".
1/9 The idea that China's astonishing growth over the past three decades was the result of its embrace of free markets, and its recent slowdown a consequence of its rejection of free markets, is much more ideological than empirical.
2/9 What really drove decades of Chinese growth was first, the removal of especially foolish forms of Maoist economic control and then, much more importantly, the surge in government-led investment in an economy that had been starved of effective investment for over five decades.
3/9 It is true that the private sector did extremely well over this period, but I'd argue that this is because they benefitted enormously from a government-led development model that emphasized investment over everything else.
1/5 S&P says that "China's self-developed high-tech industries, such as advanced microprocessors and cellular networks, are set to be the next key driver of loan growth for the nation's banks."
I'm pretty skeptical about the implications for the economy.
2/5 It's hard to get a sense of how large a component the high tech sector is of the Chinese economy, but it is probably 5-10%. Even in the most high-tech-dependent advanced economies, like Japan and the US, the high-tech sector comprises roughly 9-10% of GDP.
3/5 By contrast the property and infrastructure sectors comprise at least 40-50% of GDP and possibly more (with investment in those sectors alone amounting to 25-30% of GDP). Shifting from these sectors to high-tech as a source of growth won't be easy.
2/8 Decoupling won't be easy because there is a reason China-based manufacturers are so "competitive" internationally. Chinese subsidies to manufacturers – not just direct but, especially, indirect – are far greater than those of any other country.
3/8 The extent of these subsidies explains China's huge domestic imbalances and the persistent weakness in its domestic demand. These subsidies must be paid for, after all, and they are implicitly and explicitly paid for by the household sector.
1/4 I would add to Brad's analysis that the surge in German exports in 2009-12 was almost certainly related to the extraordinary surge in Chinese infrastructure and property spending in its response to the sharp contraction in its trade surplus after the GFC.
2/4 This suggests that German exports to China are especially sensitive to China's investment cycle. With China currently investing 42% of its GDP, and even more in the past, this has been a lucky bet, but there's no way China can maintain such high investment levels much longer.
3/4 The world on average, after all, invests roughly 25% of its GDP, and even "high investing" developing economies in the midst of their growth booms typically invest no more than 29-33% of their GDPs.
1/9 Very interesting story on what is in effect a cautionary tale: "Once Asia’s biggest manufacturer of aluminium extrusions, Zhongwang thrived in the 2000s as China’s booming property sector created strong demand for its products in construction."
2/9 "Then, as the economy cooled," the article continues, "its business started to collapse, a victim of its own overexpansion and leveraged asset buying."
This is the story of a systemic problem, not a problem of an individual out-of-control CEO.
3/9 The article cites a Shanghai lawyer as saying: "The [lesson from] the fall of Zhongwang is the failure to crack down on these alleged self-financing activities. Such practices are a ticking time bomb."
I don't think "cracking down" was ever a realistic possibility.