“There are three ways to make a living in this business: be first, be smarter, or cheat.”
Okay.. Let's ask @mjmauboussin for a more robust framework of inefficiencies. It's called BAIT: behavioral, analytical, informational, technical.
“You should have a good answer to: “Who is on the other side?” You are specifying the source of your advantage, or edge."
Informational: “arises when some market participants have different information than others and can trade profitably on that asymmetry.”
Possible but market has become a lot more efficient since the internet and Reg FD.
Analytical: "one investor can analyze it better than the others can."
Possible but also much more challenging in a market dominated by pros.
Pick a game where you stand out. Recognize biases that wreck analysis (confirmation, recency). Consider time arbitrage.
Behavioral: a source of inefficiency as long as there are humans in markets. Unfortunately also where you can become the source of opportunity for others.
Separate facts from opinions. What does the price imply? Be mindful of sentiment, overextrapolation, pressure to conform.
Technical: "when some market participants have to buy or sell for reasons are unrelated to fundamental value."
The one area in which inefficiency might actually be *increasing* as the market becomes dominated non-fundamental players and institutional mandates.
Spin-offs were a classic example of forced or disinterested sellers. Joel Greenblatt and Seth Klarman wrote about them. This created a cottage industry of people exploiting the opportunity, making the market more efficient.
Look for odd securities that people didn't ask for. Sometimes created in mergers or reorganizations.
But also, Buffett and Munger scooped up Blue Chip shares when the Justice Department forced a sale of stock to many small retailers.
Demutualizations/thrift conversions offered opportunities for decades. How many depositors were really interested in exercising their right to become shareholders of their bank? How many knew how to value a bank?
Sometimes it's about buying from an inflexible institution. Bonds that lost their investment grade rating used to be dropped like hot potatoes. Milken and the early generations of distressed investors built their careers around this inefficiency.
It's not complicated. Savvy traders start to embody this mindset.
In HBO's Industry, Harper encounters Rishi in the garage. After parking his new Ferrari, he comments: “I bought my motor off a recently divorced dad in Chingford. Distressed seller is key.”
That's the mentality.
Instead of a large group of small and unsophisticated owners, how about one large corporation?
Private equity has long loved to buy small divisions, fixing incentives, underperformance, and removing layers of bureaucracy and internal politics.
If you like that idea, pay close attention when the government unloads assets (privatizations, merchandise acquired during bailouts..).
Some investors like @DanielSLoeb1 connect the event-driven style to macro.
"In a QE-driven world government intervention was itself an ‘event’ and this insight led us to new and profitable opportunities."
It's not a novel idea. Macro funds love to hunt for policy mistakes. @scmallaby covered it well in More Money Than God.
"Macro trading exploited a prime example of this insight: Governments and central banks were clearly not trying to maximize profits."
Paul Tudor Jones knew from the trading pit to pay attention to positioning. In the final years of the Japanese bubble, he paid close attention to the behavior of local institutional investors. Once they started shifting out of the market, it was over.
This doesn't mean everyone should try to become an event-driven investor. Complexity can be a trap with “low return on brain damage” as @BillAckman would say.
It's easy for the motivated analyst to gravitate to this because solving the puzzle is intellectually satisfying.
But in a market dominated by passive flows, factor and quant strategies, and institutional mandates, paying attention to technical inefficiencies could be a lasting edge. After all, there's a buyer of every forced ESG divestiture.
With governments and central banks very active, be mindful of their motivations, constraints, and possible mistakes.
Remember that understanding the players, most importantly the Bundesbank, was a key element of Soros's most famous trade.
I wrote about it on my substack.
“I have a friend who says, ‘The first rule of fishing is to fish where the fish are. And the second rule of fishing is to never forget the first rule.’” Charlie Munger
Buffett in 2000: "Compensation is our way of speaking to employees, generally. With a place as large as GEICO, you can’t speak to them all directly. But it speaks to them all the time. It says what the rational measurement of productivity and performance in the business is."
"Over time, that gets absorbed by thousands and thousands of people. It’s the best way to get them to buy into their goals.
It’s been a huge advantage at GEICO to have a plan that is far more rational. And I think that advantage will do nothing but grow stronger over time."
"If you use as your test what the stock market is going to do, people, I think, inherently know they got a lottery ticket. ... The market’s attitude toward tech stocks is what’s going to determine results far more than their own individual results."
Buffett on moats in 2000: "If you are evaluating a business, the number one question you want to ask yourself is whether the competitive advantage has been made stronger and more durable. That’s more important than the P&L for a given year."
On Porter's 5 Forces:
"I’ve never really read Porter. I’ve read enough about him to know that we think alike, in a general way. I think he talks about durable or sustainable competitive advantage and that is exactly the way we think"
"The best way to do it is study the people that have achieved that and ask yourself how they did it and why they did it."
Buffett in 2000: "American Express showed that it could take quite a beating and come back.
That’s one of the things we look for in businesses. You see a business take a lot of adversity and still do well. That tells you something about the underlying strength of the business."
"I’m no expert on this, but I got the impression a very significant percentage of AOL’s customers were mad at them. But the number of customers went up every month. And that’s a terrific business."
"American Express had a lot of merchant unrest and all of that. Occasionally, you will find that an interesting test of the strength of a business.
Coca-Cola had some problems in Europe. They had problems with New Coke, and they came back stronger than ever."
Lee Iacocca: "If I had to sum up in one word the qualities that make a good manager, I’d say that it all comes down to decisiveness."
"Too many managers let themselves get weighed down in their decision-making, especially those with too much education."
“The trouble is you went to Harvard. They taught you not to take action until you’ve got all the facts. You’ve got 95% of them, but it’s going to take another 6 months to get that last 5%. By the time you do, your facts will be out of date because the market has moved on you."
"That’s what life is all about—timing."
"First, even the right decision is wrong if it’s made too late.
Second, in most cases there’s no such thing as certainty."
Ray Dalio: "My most important principle that helped me build Bridgewater is 'pain plus reflection equals progress.' I learned the hard way that pain was a teacher."
"In 1980, we had inflation. ... very tight money policies. I had calculated ... we were going to have a big debt crisis. ... a depression-like economy.
I couldn’t have been more wrong. 1982 was the exact bottom. The Fed eased a lot, interest rates plunged, everything went up."
"That mistake cost me a lot of money. I had to let everybody in the company go. I was so broke, I had to borrow $4,000 from my dad to help pay family bills."
"To predict how something may evolve, work out how it transcends and includes its prior stage."
@tom_morganKCP on where we are and where it's all heading.
"There’s no end to the game, and it’s so enjoyable you wouldn’t want it to."
"Many aspects of our modern existence are increasingly at odds with information coming from the world around us. ... environmental destruction, inequality, wars, genocide, nuclear arms. The broad causes of this dynamic are excess competition, zero-sum games, “multi-polar traps.”
"This is simply the exclusive elevation of narrow interests at the cost of the whole."
"As Einstein intuited, “No problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it.” Our inability to cooperate at a global scale is at root a consciousness problem."