The necessary and sufficient conditions for Fed tightening within our 2019 #FloorGLI framework remain satisfied, but the goals shouldn’t be to increase unemployment and the case for rapid 75bp rate hikes is diminishing…
In May 2019, we released our Fed framework. Prioritizes a robust trajectory for gross labor income (GLI) (job growth & wage growth).
If expecting GLI to fall short of "floor" growth trajectory. ease.
If expecting above floor & inflation > target, tighten employamerica.org/researchreport…
In January 2020, we offered a more operational revision to the framework. National accounts measures of labor income are heavily revised; suboptimal for real-time policymaking. CPS employment and Employment Cost Index are better suited (no revision issues) medium.com/@skanda_97974/…
Threshold for revising/deviating from any pre-specified framework should be high; no strong reason to do so here.
Income growth remains strong, and inflation pressures remain. Given that, Fed is justified (within limits) to tighten financial cond'ns for sake of lower inflation
Moreover, labor income levels already "caught up" to the pre-pandemic "floor" in 2022Q1 itself.
We specified in 2019 that if the Fed was constrained from conventional easing (@ Zero Lower Bound) & incomes were falling short of "floor", condition liftoff on catch-up
Where we most firmly depart from Fed is on their perverse 'optimal policy' projections: Engineering recessionary unemployment increases involve more persistent economic damage.
GLI growth (job growth & wage growth) can slow w/o resorting to sharply higher unemployment rates
We noted this point in our piece "Beyond The Phillips Curve":
Declining labor utilization rates tend to predict *further declines.*
The exceptions to this rule of thumb tend to involve policy interventions to actively stabilize employment
The persistence of labor utilization declines is also not the kind of easily reversible phenomenon that textbook might suggest. Prime-age male employment systematically fails to recover from recessionary declines (while surging inflation can revert w/o recessions)
At tomorrow's Fed meeting, it is all but given that the Fed will be hiking 75bps. While the direction of tightening can be justified under current macroeconomic conditions, the case for such rapid tightening is diminishing.
Rate hikes are not a neatly linear policy tool
Two countervailing dynamics that raise uncertainty around "how much much more to tighten" (and elude "r-star" models): 1. Financial conditions tightening >>> Fed hikes 2. Real economy ex-housing is showing less sensitivity to rate hikes
#2 could just be a f'n of longer lag
Our preferred framework endorses a "change rule" approach to setting rates; celebrated r-star estimates are heavily backward-looking.
Better to take it meeting by meeting, see how macro cond'ns evolve, and support acceleration/deceleration accordingly
The macro conditions tell us that we're still seeing an outlook for strong income growth along with high inflation. But also, income growth is more clearly decelerating, both in terms of job growth and wage growth (likely for its own reasons, not b/c Fed)
Having won back the key jobs lost to the pandemic (e.g. see chart), the case for slowing labor income growth from elevated rates is not as costly now. But given that deceleration is underway, financial conditions tightening so much already, & l/r costs of overtightening high...
the case is strengthening for taking it slower on its tightening efforts.
This wouldn't foreclose where it might ultimately take its policy rate, but @ current pace, Fed isnt giving itself much time to evaluate economic effects from realized financial conditions tightening /END
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Their announced rulemaking unlocks potentially game-changing policy tools for Dept of Energy. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve can now use fixed-price forward contracts to more flexibly promote energy security. whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…
We noted in early March that the futures curve was (still is!) deeply backwardated: the price for spot crude (bad for consumers) was much higher than future price (more relevant for producers).
SPR could release today, buy back in the future (make $ too)
By engaging in a "timespread trade" that makes current supply readily available but buys back through forward contracts, that alone would send a stronger price signal to producers (and avoid the investment-dampening effects of just doing an SPR release).
Gasoline commands the headlines, but Americans' energy cost burdens extend to utility and electricity bills. Climate goals warrant more energy investment and diversification, but also...
*What exactly is the plan for taming the inflationary effect of higher LNG export capacity?*
CPI forecasters understandably track oil and gasoline prices, but energy services inflation has been the constant driver of headline inflation surprises.
The cost of utility gas services is up 60% since June 2020. Nearly 20% for electricity CPI!
Global inflation comparisons have been in the spotlight for the last 12 months, with many claiming that the differential between US and Eurozone inflation reveals causal impacts of policy or war.
But there are many sources of cross-sectional variation, not just fiscal policy...
US didn't just pursue more aggressive fiscal policy, it also followed a faster reopening trajectory. Meanwhile, inflation has subsequently surged in other countries, including many within the Eurozone. There's more to the story...
Some commentators say to look only at "core inflation" comparisons, itself an admission that non-core inflation (food and energy) also reflects *local* supply and demand dynamics.
Otherwise global commodity price effects should easily net out in cross country comparisons
As a follow up to our piece on using the Exchange Stabilization Fund to support commodity investment, we lay out a holistic framework on how Congress and the White House can best complement the Fed's efforts to tame inflation while avoiding recession.
One big problem that comes up when solutions are suggested: they are either not politically feasible or they have very attenuated effects on inflation / root causes. Often it veers into ideologically convenient stances that will have little (or even counterproductive) effect
Right now there is (understandable) uncertainty and borderline panic about the trajectory of the US and global economy, particularly whether supply can catch up in time.
We're seeing higher financing costs, an appreciating dollar, and growing balance of payments crises.
While the Fed attempts to solve inflation through the demand-side, there are serious supply-side pressures that need to be addressed. If the WH leans exclusively on the Fed to offset such shocks, not only will it mean recession, but supply-side responses will also be weaker
By now it should be obvious the Fed is hiking 75bps tmrw. I would expect the dots to signal a much higher terminal rate (*at least* 100bps above their projected 'neutral' rate of 2.375%).
That will amplify some existing recession risk channels
The ability for the Fed to impact both the labor mkt & inflation run *through financial conditions*. Vague hand-waving about 'credibility' and its impact on price-setting behavior remains under-identified and wishful thinking; anticipatory effects still require a real mechanism
Financial conditions are currently tightening across the board, especially since the May meeting. Even interest rate volatility, which was in decline prior to last week, is set to make new highs.
The question for the Fed is "Will it know enough is enough before it's too late"?