I see why many would want to pressure Ukraine to "negotiations" (=concessions). At the same time, I think proponents of appeasement do not understand Russian motives at all. The Russian invasion is motivated by *domestic* policy concerns. Which are still valid -> war can't stop
The early Putin's era was marked by the quickly rising oil prices. Russia was showered in oil revenues and the standards of life were objectively improving with every year. Incomes and quality of life improving, boosted Putin's legitimacy greatly
So early Putinism mostly operated with:
Economy rising -> More legitimacy
That wasn't the sole mechanism of regime legitimisation (wars also played a part), it was just an objectively more important part of the mix. People attributed their rising standards of life to Putin
After 2011 this gradually stopped working. First, oil prices stopped rising -> economic boom finished. Second and most importantly, Kremlin saw that the mechanisms of attribution don't work anymore. People attribute their relative prosperity to his good graces less and less
I think this 2011 Emelianenko-Monson fight could be the turning point. Putin visited the stadium and once the Russian fighter won over an American won, Putin took the microphone to make a speech. He was booed by the 22 000 stadium and had to leave
First, Putin doesn't go out much. Most of his public appearances are fake. It is the same group of FSO officers posing as "fishermen", "church visitors", etc. He doesn't go outside very often
Second, why did he even go to stadium? Most likely he assumed: the rotten intelligentsia may be against me, but at least my core audience, "the real men" remain true. So I need to rally them around the flag. Sounds good, doesn't work
Since around 2011 the legitimacy mix of the Putin's regime starts changing quickly. The role of economic boom as the source of legitimacy declines (well, there is no more boom anymore) and the role of foreign policy making increases quickly
Escalation = main source of legitimacy
What I find utterly absurd about much of the Putinology is that it tends to attribute Putin's decisions to foreign policy concerns, while ignoring the domestic policy almost completely. It's always about "geopolitics", "geosecurity". Never about keeping power at home
Don't get me wrong, that's not about Putin being some evil genius who controls everything. It is the other way around. He follows the public opinion, not in a sense what people say explicitly (nobody cares), but in a sense what they desire implicitly. And the people desire war
Peaceful Putin who doesn't start wars for too long -> Laughable and pathetic
Warlike Putin who does global escalation and "fights NATO" -> Genuinely popular
And he wants to be popular. Ergo, he must launch wars, because that it was people desire and how they want to see him
Let's sum up:
It is not the evil genius of Putin that is the main driver of this war. It is the Russian public opinion. Putin must follow the popular sentiments if he wants to stay in power. People desire war and escalation
This war can't end with peace. Ofc, Kremlin may sign whatever the "treaties" you want: buying time to regroup. But why on earth would it honour them? As Sergey Kirienko pointed out:
"Russian state is not based on treaties"
People will hate the treaty and cheer when it's broken
Many Americans perceive the war in Ukraine as some regional conflict far off from the US borders. But that's not how it looks from Russian perspective. From the Russian perspective it is the global war with the US. If Russia gets concessions -> we have won (the first round)
In other words, making peace with Russia will make it far more aggressive. Once again, from Russian perspective it is the global war against the US. When the war started many in Russia were hesitant "that's too risky". Now they'll see there's no risk at all. Just keep on
Last but not least. It's not "Putin's war". It is more of a "Russian war", where Putin has to follow the public sentiments just to stay in power. It is waged under the public pressure. And *any* of his successors be it "liberal" or "patriotic" will be subject to the same pressure
The end
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Great question. Long story short: USSR organised competition artificially. We never have only one producer of e.g. bombers, we always have at least two rival structures. Let them fight
After 2000 Putin eliminated this competition, merging previously rivalling structure together
Russian export structure is simple. You just need to:
1. Take few key industries under yr direct control (oil, gas) 2. Enforce compliance of the oligarchs controlling smaller industries (e.g. metallurgy) 3. Prevent any independent fortunes emerging in other industries
No independent fortunes -> No one can challenge the supreme power
Now compare Russian export structure with Turkish. Its economy is way more complicated and allows for independent fortunes to emerge. That makes regime less stable. Controlling Turkey is much harder than Russia
Russia has major exports revenues generated by a few extractive corporations -> Leader has an option of destroying independent fortunes or preventing them from emerging -> He'll do it
If regime can sacrifice economic progress for political stability, it will do it. Russia can
NYT seems to be so desperate to find some "saviour figure" in Russia that they don't care about their credibility anymore. Sobchak is not a "socialite" or a "critic of regime". She may be the highest born aristocrat of Russia, flesh of the flesh of the ruling St Petersburg gang
Modern Russian elite was not created by Putin. It was casted in the corridors of the St Petersburg city government during the mayorship of Anatoly Sobchak, Xenia's father
Sobchak's team included:
Putin, Medvedev, Chubais, Kudrin, Miller, Sechin, Churov, Gref, Zubkov, Kozak, Zubkov, Naryshkin and many others. After Putin inherited the throne, he appointed his all St Petersburg pals at pretty much all positions of importance
I don't see any indication that China would see the Russian Far East as a preferable direction of expansion. What I see is the wishful thinking of too many US journalists/analysts who would love to see Moscow and Being clashing over Siberia. I think that's highly improbable
Russia is shrinking. And it is shrinking southwestward. Sunbelt around Krasnodar is the fastest growing region in Russia, while much of the Far East is turning into the empty desert. Economic and demographic centres of Russia are shifting to Europe, towards the Black Sea
War with Ukraine makes total sense
War with Turkey makes total sense
War with China makes no sense
Russia is shifting to the southwest. The East is turning to desert that Moscow won't fight over. It's Moscow that tries to attract Beijing to Siberia, while Beijing hesitates
I didn't like this cartoon. It misses the key element: outrageously high monetary compensations for soldiers KIA. For the most of Russian history, compensations were minuscule (if any). So draft was viewed as a tax. Now they're unprecedentedly high. So it is seen as an investment
This is largely a Ponzi scheme though. For it to work you need first few investors to get lavish returns on their investments. Once you do this, plenty of greedy and gullible folk will flock to you from everywhere. It's them whom you gonna cheat
Special Operation is a typical Ponzi. First families get outrageously high returns on their investments (relatives KIA). Their profits are advertised on TV 24/7. That's how you attract more investors willing to send their sons/husbands to the war. They will be disappointed though
Krasovsky's suggestion to burn Ukrainian kids alarmed many. And yet, it fits organically into the Russian internal discourse. This is a telegram channel of a neo-Nazi "Rusich" group fighting in Ukraine for Russia. They suggest exterminating girls over 10 and boys over 5 years old
See an interview of "Rusich" leader Milchakov with the editor of "Sputnik and Pogrom" Prosvirnin. Sputnik and Pogrom was probably the most influential Russian nationalist media of the recent decades and played enormous role in shaping Russian internal debates
Milchakov first got prominence in 2011 when he recorded killing and eating a puppy and uploaded the video on internet. That's how he became a niche micro-celebrity. Once the war in Ukraine started in 2014 he assembled co-thinkers and went to Donbass to fight for Russia