If anything, adding a verified badge to accounts pushing disinformation on a large scale on behalf of state actors makes $8 per account extremely good value for money.
In 2018 Twitter identified 3800 bots run by Russia's Internet Research Agency pushing election disinformation. The would be $30400 a month, along with a nice verified badge, which Musk has said will make the tweets from those accounts more visible. techcrunch.com/2018/01/19/twi…
To give you a sense of the Internet Research Agency's budget, here's the the DoJ stated was their year by year expenses at that period. $30400 a month would be a fraction of their budget, with lots of added benefits provided by Twitter itself. qz.com/1430642/russia…
Russia uses footage claiming the bodies on the road in Bucha were laid out as journalists arrived in April, even though the bodies are clearly visible on satellite imagery from March. The usual shameless propaganda from the most shameless government on the planet.
This is something that was clearly debunked way back in April by the New York Times, if anyone says the bodies were placed they're naked lying obvious liars nytimes.com/2022/04/04/wor…
At least they still aren't claiming a rain drop is the moving hand of someone pretending to be a corpse, progress of sorts.
Ever wonder how Russian cruise missiles find their way into Ukrainian playgrounds, power stations, and apartment buildings? Well thanks to @bellingcat’s @christogrozev wonder no more. It’s time to meet the team behind the targeting of Russian missiles on civilian infrastructure.
Scourge of the Russian intelligence services, Christo Grozev, has spent the last several months piecing together the team responsible for programming Russian cruise missiles launched at targets in Ukraine, frequently hitting civilian infrastructure.
The missile programmers are part of the Russian Armed Forces’ vast Main Computation Centre of the General Staff (GVC), and working with @the_ins_ru and @derspiegel we’ve identified the 33 military engineers involved with cruise missile attacks in Ukraine. bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-eu…
So to give you a sense of how full of shit the Russians are, the top left image on the first slide is from a Syrian film production of a movie about the White Helmets faking chemical attacks, stills from which Russia previously used in their propaganda. bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018…
Back in 2018 Russia 1 used production stills from the movie as evidence of the White Helmets faking attacks on civilians. You can find the production stills on the film's own Facebook page facebook.com/99314651083244…
That's 2022 Russian propaganda using stills from a 2018 Syrian anti-White Helmets propaganda film, which Russian media in 2018 used as direct evidence of the White Helmets creating propaganda.
To build on this, my personal belief is most counter-disinformation work fails to address the fundamental issues that lead to the creation of disinformation, and generally misunderstands the source of disinformation in the first place.
The focus is often on outside actors (ie Russia) influencing communities through disinformation, when the reality is its more often communities themselves who create disinformation through their own efforts to counter what they see as disinformation.
That's then amplified by state actors when it suits their needs, so to truly address disinformation we need to understand why those communities create disinformation, and look at how to address that.