Thread by @BrynnTannehill

Pro-Russian US politicians is that they're "tired of giving Ukraine a blank check," or would rather spend it on our own national defense. These are also the same pols who would boost spending to deter Chinese aggression. Supporting Ukraine does just this, however. A 🧵 1/n

Behind closed doors, one very senior analyst of Russia described Ukraine as being used as "NATO's crumple zone." Pretty close to the truth. But another truth is that Ukraine is bleeding Russia dry of both manpower and material. 2/n

Russia's supply of Iskander ballistic missiles is almost gone. Their cruise missile supplies are critically low. This is why they're going to Iran for re-supply. Same reason why they're acquiring North Korean artillery shells. 3/n thedrive.com/the-war-zone/u…

Russia is also stripping the Belarussian puppet state of tanks and armored personnel carriers, along with medical supplies. They're throwing museum pieces like T-62s and D-1 artillery into the fray because they're running out of modern equipment. 4/n euromaidanpress.com/2022/10/13/rus…

Russia may be creating combat experienced troops. But they're also losing experienced professional troops at a horrific rate. One estimate I saw was that 2/3rds of the original troops sent to Ukraine ended up killed or wounded. 5/n

These were Russia's best troops. Now, what remains of them are (mostly) south in the Kherson region. Numerous units were effectively shattered and broken (like VDV units at Hostomel). 6/n oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/destin…

Russia's offensive capability now appears limited to poorly planned human wave attacks using mobiks, conscripts, and prisoners as fodder. Russia may also be using their best troops in the rear as blocking units. 7/n yahoo.com/video/battalio…

The upshot of this is that Russia is blunting itself. Every loss it takes sets it back years to recovery. In 2015 war games showed that a determined Russian assault on the Baltics was essentially a fait accompli. 8/n rand.org/pubs/research_…

Now, it will take years for Russia to reconstitute. The scenario above is now laughable given Russia's diminished state. If Ukraine succeed in ejecting Russia, it pushes out how long Russia will take to recover at least a generation. This aids US NDS several ways. 9/n

First, if Russia ceases to be a land war threat, it allows the US to (finally) make a full pivot to the Pacific both in manpower and material. The weapons needed for a war in the Pacific are very different than a War in Europe due to the vast distances involved. 10/n

If Russia ceases to be a significant conventional threat for 20+ years the US can fully invest in systems designed from the ground up in the INDOPACOM theater. This creates economies of scale. It also means troops get training and equipment better suited to this theater. 11/n

As it is now, the US has been (inefficiently) trying to prepare for both EUCOM and PACOM scenarios. Our near peer adversaries only have to prepare for one. Supporting Ukraine all the way to the finish wipes out one of China's biggest inherent, asymmetric, advantages. 12/n

But what about cost? I would argue that support for Ukraine is cost efficient compared to the alternative of allowing Russia to remain a near-peer threat, or to reconstitute quickly. Let's talk procurement costs. 13/n

First, the rule of thumb for Life Cycle Cost Estimation (LCCE) is that 10% of total cost is R&D, 30% is procurement (unit cost), and 60% of total cost is for operations, support, and disposal. With weapons the US sends Ukraine, R&D is a sunk cost. 14/n

Once these weapons leave US custody, that's it for operations, support, and disposal. In short, 70% of the Life Cycle costs of weapons sent to Ukraine are either sunk cost, or costs that we don't have to pay for later. 15/n

Then there's the defense budget. 20% of the budget goes to procurement of all types, which works out to $141B in FY 21 dollars out of a total defense budget of $718B. So far, the US has supplied $18.2B in military assistance to Ukraine, a fraction of total annual procurement 16/n

The ROI on this so far is that the Russian military will take at least a decade to be a conventional threat again to the Baltics. Every dollar we give pushes that time horizon out even further. Push it out further, and the ROI gets better. 17/n defense.gov/News/Releases/….

If the time horizon gets pushed out past 20 years, the US can effectively limit funding on systems that have little or no value in the INDOPACOM region, while achieving economies of scale and narrowing the focus of R&D efforts. This is a massive windfall to budget planners. 18/n

It's also going to strengthen the US position in the Pacific when we need it most. If you amortize the US investment in Ukrainian defense over 20+ years, and look at the saving in major systems we DON'T have to develop, field, and maintain, this is cheap. 19/n

Far from being a drain on US, support for Ukraine is a long term investment that's already paying off as the Russian military crumbles. Rather than being a national security risk, it allows the US to provide more credible deterrence against aggression in the Pacific. 20/n

I wish someone would put this out there. I know I'm preaching to the choir, and I'm just some worker bee in the think-tank complex. And both the far right and far left are immune to logic. But geez, this seems really basic: 21/n

Supporting Ukraine all the way to the finish is in US, and global interests. If we don't want a war in PACOM, one major piece of our long term deterrence strategy has to be full continued support for Ukraine. Period. 22/n