I’ve been seeing a lot of talk recently that it’s certain that we will fail to limit global warming to #1o5C. I don’t think the scientific evidence supports such claims and I would urge caution before drawing absolute conclusions. A thread 1/
For a start, it seems such claims are linked to the question of whether the world will half emissions by 2030. This is deemed unrealistic by some, therefore 1.5°C must be lost. Lots to say about this, but first and foremost there’s an important logical flaw here. 2/
The science on pathways to 1.5°C is not a simplistic yes/no black/white question. It’s not ‘we can achieve it’ or ‘it’s lost’ - there is a lot of grey. It’s a question of probabilities, and we are deep in the grey zone already. 3/
Pathways (or carbon budgets) linked to limiting warming to 1.5°C without overshoot commonly have a 50% chance to do so. So 1.5°C could well be exceeded even in such a pathway, as the uncertainty range is very substantial. More on this: constrain-eu.org/wp-content/upl…@CONSTRAIN_EU 4/
But uncertainty cuts both ways. If we call a 1-in-2 chance ‘achievable’ I don’t think it makes sense to say, that e.g. a 1-in-3 chance is ‘certainly lost’. A high probability would be required to have ‘certainty’ that we would exceed 1.5°C (IPCC language would require >=99%.) 5/
Clearly, only stringent reductions by 2030 will keep 1.5°C “within reach”. Without them, it’s slipping away, it’s increasingly unlikely etc. All phrases describing the ‘grey zone’. But being certain it’s lost requires a higher burden of proof. 6/
There might come a point where warming reaches 1.5°C. But we would only really be able to say this in hindsight - probably only up to a decade after. Why is that? 7/
First, the PA temperature goal refers to human-made warming. We measure this + natural variability. A single year (even a couple of years) above 1.5°C doesn’t mean the limit is breached... 8/
...It needs to be the long-term multi-decadal average or a statistical method to identify the human-made component. carbonbrief.org/guest-post-int… 9/
And the assessment of human-made warming from an ongoing temperature record is subject to uncertainties. Here is from the AR6 WG1 - uncertainty on decadal timescales of about ± 0.25°C. 10/
We’ve looked into this in a paper led by @kasia_tokarska and shows that we will only be able to say in hindsight that we have passed a temperature level. 11/
Taken together, this means that while 1.5°C will become continuously less likely with every year we fail to bend the emissions curve, and it might take well into the 2030s before we would have scientific certainty that we will or have passed that level. 12/
Communication on this matter should take this into account. 13/
This brings me to my last point, leaving the realms of climate physics: it seems to me that the judgement of whether 1.5°C is still within reach is right now more based on a personal opinion than on hard science. 14/
Everyone’s of course entitled to their opinion on whether they think halving emissions by 2030 is a realistic or plausible scenario. But it should be clear what is a personal opinion and what is scientific evidence. In particular when scientists are providing their views. 15/
And it should also be clear that it is a matter of values (desirability) as much as it is about feasible transformations towards the goal. We generally focus on feasibility, but when we decide something is desirable, the feasibility frontier can shift dramatically. 16/
If anything, the accumulating evidence on the scale and severity of climate impacts >1.5°C, including crossing potentially irreversible thresholds, make limiting warming to 1.5°C ever more ‘desirable’ - if that’s the right word to use in this context. 17/
Full disclaimer: I share everyone’s frustration about the state of global climate action to date. But this critical decade has 8 years more to go. Walking away from this ambition when we will never have a better shot at averting the worst would be an enormous moral failure. 18/
Every action that brings emissions down now, brings us closer to ‘keeping 1.5°C within reach’. end/
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(Leider) einen Tag nach der #wahl2021. Unsere Publikation @WimThiery et al. In @ScienceMagazine zu intergenerationaler Ungleichheit von Klimaextremen. Junge Menschen wissen darum nur zu gut. Unsere Studie liefert nun konkrete Zahlen. bit.ly/3AJN1Zq @FridaysforFuture 1/
Auf unserem jetzigen Pfad werden die Neugeborenen von heute in ihrem Leben siebenmal mehr Hitzewellen ausgesetzt sein als ihre Großeltern. Und mindestens doppelt so vielen Flutereignissen, Dürren, Missernten und Waldbränden. Diese Ereignisse werden darüber hinaus stärker sein. 2/
Menschen unter 40 werden in ihrem Leben mehr Extremwetter ausgesetzt sein, als es ohne Klimawandel je gegeben hätte. Die regionalen Unterschiede sind dabei substantiell. Junge Menschen in Ländern des globalen Südens sind deutlich stärker betroffen. 3/
First: Uncertainty language. The IPCC has assessed pathways "as likely as not" to limit warming to 1.5°C. Peak warming 0.34<P(1.5°C)<0.67. Claim to exceed 1.5C was "very likely" or even "virtually impossible" would require 0.9<P(1.5°C) in IPCC uncertainty language. 2/
This is not just some technical detail. It's not black-white "we can make 1.5C" or "we cannot make 1.5C". There is a huge "as likely as not" range in between due to geophysical uncertainties. A lot of grey. This is where we are in now. 3/
„Faktisch haben wir 1,5 Grad schon gerissen... Wir haben jetzt 1,2 Grad Erwärmung..., und dann gibt es noch nachlaufende Effekte. Selbst wenn wir die derzeitige CO2-Konzentration in der Atmosphäre nicht mehr erhöhen würden, bekämen wir noch wenigstens ein halbes Grad drauf.“ 2/
Check 1: Ein wissenschaftliches Konsortium hat sich der Frage nach den „nachlaufenden Effekten“ im Detail angenommen bg.copernicus.org/articles/17/29…. Das Ergebnis: Das sogenannte „Zero-Emissions Commitment von CO2“ ist vernachlässigbar. Non-CO2 pfadabhängig. 3/