Yevgeny Nuzhin was a Russian prison inmate who enlisted into the Wagner mercenary group to fight in Ukraine. After being captured by Ukrainians he expressed his desire to fight against Putin. He was exchanged and then executed with sledgehammer according to Wagner traditions.
Wagner is led by Yevgeny Prigozhin who himself had spent 10 years in prison for violent crimes. Upon release he launched a catering business and eventually became known as "Putin's cook". In this capacity he established a Wagner mercenary group fighting colonial wars for Russia
Wagner mercenaries ironically style themselves as "ихтамнеты" ("they are not there"). It means that they are fighting in many countries where Russia has no official presence. If questioned, Russia will deny Wagners being there/connection of Wagner to Kremlin. Hence the nickname
Wagner's mythology and iconography is based on glorification of ultraviolence. Consider this Wagner merch. Execution with sledgehammer is the most recognisable symbol of the Wagner group.
We see guys beating someone with sledgehammer -> We think of Wagner
"Sledgehammer" symbol refers to this case. In Syria one of Assad's Syrian soldiers tried to desert. Wagner mercenaries captured him. They beat him with sledgehammer, cut off his hands and head with a saw and burnt the rest. This execution became the proudest symbol of Wagner
See video of Wagner mercenaries executing a Syrian here. Much of it is blurred, but it is still pretty graphic
What is interesting about this execution is that it wasn't prosecuted or even condemned. Instead it was endorsed and became the proud symbol and the trademark of the Wagner group. Modern Russia tends to endorse ultra violence rather than to condemn it
Initially they executed a Syrian deserter this way. Now they did it with one of their own. You can see a video here on their Telegram channel. Warning, it's graphic t.me/grey_zone/15767
Prigozhin and the Wagner social media accounts endorsed this new execution of course
Ultraviolet execution of a deserter is perfectly rational. Many prison recruits etc have low morals. With this execution Wagner tells:
1. You can't escape from us 2. After we get you back, you'll die in a terrible way
Ultraviolence is necessary to keep the unmotivated in line
At this point Wagner grew into a massive fighting force. They have infantry, artillery, tanks, air defence, even fighter jets. So pretty much everything that the regular army has except for navy, ballistic missiles, etc. The Wagner became an army in their own right
While being largely independent from the regular army, Wagner uses the same infrastructure. Most importantly, they train their recruits on the same training ground - @RheinmetallAG built Mulino. The only modern training center that Russia has
While the @RheinmetallAG officially "left" the project after Crimea, that is a verifiable lie. Customs declaration show them supplying the "Garnison" company that was building Mulino with components for assembling the simulation equipment even in 2019
In other words, @RheinmetallAG declaration in August 2022 is a verifiable lie. Russian customs declarations (see details in a thread quoted in a previous tweet) show that Rheinmetall was supplying Garnison with components for assembling simulation equipment even in 2019
TL;DR Russian ultraviolet mercenary Wagner group is being trained on @RheinmetallAG built training ground. It is the only training center in Russia that has modern simulation equipment. Rheimetall was shipping them components as late as in 2019
Thank you, Rheinmetall!
The end
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In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum
I have always found this list a bit dubious, not to say self-contradictory:
You know what does this Huntingtonian classification remind to me? A fictional “Chinese Encyclopaedia” by an Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges:
Classification above sounds comical. Now why would that be? That it because it lacks a consistent classification basis. The rules of formal logic prescribe us to choose a principle (e.g. size) and hold to it.
If Jorge Borges breaks this principle, so does Samuel P. Huntington.
Literacy rates in European Russia, 1897. Obviously, the data is imperfect. Still, it represents one crucial pattern for understanding the late Russian Empire. That is the wide gap in human capital between the core of empire and its Western borderland.
The most literate regions of Empire are its Lutheran provinces, including Finland, Estonia & Latvia
Then goes, roughly speaking, Poland-Lithuania
Russia proper has only two clusters of high literacy: Moscow & St Petersburg. Surrounded by the vast ocean of illiterate peasantry
This map shows how thin was the civilisation of Russia proper comparatively speaking. We tend to imagine old Russia, as the world of nobility, palaces, balls, and duels. And that is not wrong, because this world really existed, and produced some great works of art and literature