This interview illustrates some key fallacies, shortcomings and outright intellectual dishonesty associated with Mearsheimer's realist approach. And since his authority is instrumental in legitimising the appeasement advocacy, I will discuss it in detail🧵
Let's start with dishonesty. Mearsheimer denies that Putin hold any intention to conquer Ukraine before this war. He even quotes Putin's article of July 2021 as an evidence of Putin "recognising the Ukrainian sovereignty". This is a highly inaccurate representation of its content
Putin argued that modern borders of Ukraine are illegitimate. They had more territory leaving the USSR in 1991 than they had joining it in 1922. Justice would require Ukraine to give it all away [to Russia]
Already in July 2021 Putin portrayed Ukrainian borders as fundamentally unjust. Tolerating this "new geopolitical reality" is our concession. There's no "recognition of sovereignty" here, rather the opposite. Ukrainian border is illegitimate, we just had been merciful to them
So here is the first Mearsheimer's shortcoming - he misrepresented the content of a key source he was referring to. Putin didn't "recognise that Ukraine was a sovereign state" as Mearsheimer claims. To the contrary, he questioned the legitimacy of its national borders
Ok, but what does Putin write about Ukrainian sovereignty in this article?
1. Ukraine is not sovereign now (explicitly) 2. It can be sovereign only in partnership with Russia (explicitly) 3. It's apparently up to Russia to decide whether Ukraine is sovereign or not (implicitly)
That's a very important point. It brings us to another problem - the meaning of words. As we can see here, Putin's understanding of Ukrainian sovereignty (=partnership with Russia) is opposite to what we conventionally understand by sovereignty (=choosing your own road)
If Putin talks about "Ukrainian sovereignty", you can't conclude "Oh yes, he respects Ukrainian sovereignty very much". Nope. What Putin understands by "Ukrainian sovereignty" has nothing in common with what most people would understand by it. It's rather the opposite
"Putin talks about Ukrainian sovereignty -> He recognises it!" - It's not an analysis. It's not a research. It's a neuron activation. Research would require an analysis of what exactly Putin understands by "Ukrainian sovereignty". Because he may mean a different thing. As he does
This brings us to a second major shortcoming of Mearsheimer: the lack of basic empathy. And I don't mean the emotional empathy with Ukrainians, God forbid. I mean the cognitive empathy with Putin. You must empathise with Putin to get what he's doing and why
Mearsheimer refuses to analyse what we know of Putin's worldview. Look how he casually dismisses Putin comparing himself with Peter I. Meanwhile, this is the key to understanding Putin's motivation. He doesn't see himself as a conqueror. Not at all. He thinks he is a REconqueror
Why did Putin even bring up Peter I? Well, to make a parallel between what Peter I did back then and what Putin is doing now. In Putin's interpretation Peter I didn't conquer anything. He just retuned back what had once rightfully belong to Russia. Just like Putin is doing now
Putin in July 2021: "Ukrainian border is illegitimate"
Putin in June 2022: "I'm returning to Russia what had once belonged to it. Just like Peter I"
Mearsheimer ignores the first statement and dismisses the second. Considered together they break his entire line of argumentation
Contrary to what Mearsheimer claims, there was no sudden U-turn in Putin's mindset or actions in 2022. To the contrary, we see a very consistent policy based on his deep conviction that Ukrainian borders are unjust. If they are unjust, they need to be renegotiated. Simple as that
There's nothing unexpected about Putin wanting to renegotiate the Ukrainian border. Remember him quoting his old boss Sobchak? That is Sobchak's interview of 1992. We see exactly the same argumentation as Putin is using now
Ergo, it's not about Putin. It's collective mindset
It's not about Putin, it's about collective mindset. Russian politicians have been talking about Crimea for decades. Consider a mayor of Moscow Luzhkov. He started talking about Crimea being rightfully Russian back in in 1990s. In 2008 Ukraine prohibited him entering the country
Invasion of Ukraine is not some random, capricious move of Putin. Plenty of politicians had been talking of what Putin did for decades. They had been using the same arguments which Putin would use later. Ignoring this fact reflects total disinterest in Russian public imagination
I would even argue that the incredible contempt towards the public imagination of non-Western countries is a major (or perhaps *the* major) factor that hampers prognosing the actions of Russia, China, etc. They make their moves based on their imagination. Which you largely ignore
And the final Mearsheimer's shortcoming may be the most impressive of all. He claims that Putin did not intend to conquer Ukraine, because he sent too few troops to proceed with the conquest. Ergo, he must have wanted something else
That's literally the worst mistake of retrospective thinking one could have made. We now know that upon invading Ukraine Putin engaged into a bloody and protracted war. That's what we know now. But we could not have possibly known that before. We could only hypothesise
Putin couldn't have known for sure how his invasion would turn out. He could only hypothesise based on the information he got. And we have the evidence that the information he got had been misleading. Or at least he believes it had been misleading
On February 24 Putin invaded Ukraine. On March 11 he purged the 5th department of FSB: the foreign intelligence branch of the Russian state security. Dozens of officers were arrested, including the generals. Why? Most probably, they misinformed him about the situation in Ukraine
It was the 5th Department of FSB that monitored political situation in Ukraine and informed Putin. Two weeks after the invasion started, they were purged. It is highly likely that Putin found information they had provided him with to be false. Hence, punishments
Most probably, 5th Department just told Putin what he wanted to hear. Much (most?) of Ukraine hates the regime and Kyiv and secretly adores the Tsar in Moscow. Basing on this information, Putin decided to invade. That is why he didn't make proper war preparations
If most of Ukraine is actually Russian and waiting for Russian liberators, there will be no war. They just gonna drop their weapons or switch to our side. That what Putin probably expected and that is why he sent so few soldiers. He expected there would be very few resistants
This would explain why Russian army of invasion was relatively small. They just did not prepare for war. This would also explain purges against the 5th Department - they misinformed Putin and became the scapegoats for the failed invasion. Putin didn't and couldn't know the future
That is why Mearsheimer's logic (Putin sent few soldiers -> He didn't plan for conquest!) is technically correct and still false. Yes, he didn't plan a conquest. Conquest implies resistance and Putin expected no resistance. He can't see the future after all
Mearsheimer's fallacy is quite impressive but honestly very typical. We tend to underestimate how much the present differs from the past. In February most believed Russia would crush Ukraine in no time. That was considered as an almost self-obvious truth. Now we forgot about it
Nowadays we know that Russia didn't crush Ukraine. We know that Ukraine fought back and did it highly effectively. And we extrapolate current knowledge to the past. We know it now -> We've always known that. But that's not true. We did not
We underestimate how quickly and how drastically our mental models and systems of assumptions change over time. That is a major obstacle hampering our ability both to reconstruct the past and to prognoses the future. The end of 🧵
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In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum
I have always found this list a bit dubious, not to say self-contradictory:
You know what does this Huntingtonian classification remind to me? A fictional “Chinese Encyclopaedia” by an Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges:
Classification above sounds comical. Now why would that be? That it because it lacks a consistent classification basis. The rules of formal logic prescribe us to choose a principle (e.g. size) and hold to it.
If Jorge Borges breaks this principle, so does Samuel P. Huntington.
Literacy rates in European Russia, 1897. Obviously, the data is imperfect. Still, it represents one crucial pattern for understanding the late Russian Empire. That is the wide gap in human capital between the core of empire and its Western borderland.
The most literate regions of Empire are its Lutheran provinces, including Finland, Estonia & Latvia
Then goes, roughly speaking, Poland-Lithuania
Russia proper has only two clusters of high literacy: Moscow & St Petersburg. Surrounded by the vast ocean of illiterate peasantry
This map shows how thin was the civilisation of Russia proper comparatively speaking. We tend to imagine old Russia, as the world of nobility, palaces, balls, and duels. And that is not wrong, because this world really existed, and produced some great works of art and literature