The recent-ish procurement by 🇫🇷 and the 🇳🇱 of Hirtenberger's M6C-640 Mk1 60 mm commando mortar, examplifies, I think, why NATO standardisation in ammunition is often less straight forward in practice than in concept. A little🧵:
It took the 🇳🇱 almost 4 years to qualify the M6C, with deliveries of 155 weapons having taken place in 2015. Ammunition qualification was completed in 2018, with the DMO granting full qualification for use with the Army, Marines and SF in early 2019. Why so long ?
Well, in 2016 two 🇳🇱 service members were killed, and another injured in Mali when a 60 mm mortar bomb suffered an in-bore premature detonation during a training excersive in Kidal 🇲🇱. The investigation found that the fuze malfunctioned due to heat and moisture exposure
The mortar in question was a 🇫🇷 Hotchkiss-Brandt Commando, and the bomb is stated as an 'HE-80' produced by Arsenal of 🇧🇬. This would be what is known as the HE 60MA, a copy of the 🇦🇹 HE-80, fitted with an MN-6 (AF621) fuze. Note the weapon compatibility listed the product page.
Aside from issues with the storage of the bombs, the investigation also found issues with the procurement process of said ammunition. Acquired under UOR via an 🇺🇸 FMS procedure, the 🇳🇱 would not conduct necessary QA and safety tests on the ammuition, assuming these had be covered
by the fact that they were being acquired via the 🇺🇸, and therefore by extension, that the US Army had done all of that work them. In fact, the 🇺🇸 did not use these bombs and stipulated they could not guarantee their safety and reliability. Purchased in 2006 for 🇦🇫, by 2016
some of the checks still had not been conducted. So to resume, a 🇧🇬 mortar bomb, a copy of an 🇦🇹 design, and acquired via the 🇺🇸, suffered an in-bore premature in an old 🇫🇷 mortar. All of which, on the surface, would all be compatible with each other.
As a result, the 🇳🇱 have now been extra careful with the qualification of the 60 mm mortar system that would eventually replace their old Hotchkiss-Brandt Commandos. Investigation paper can be found here: onderzoeksraad.nl/en/media/attac…
🇫🇷 signed a contract in 2020 to procure 120 M6C-640 Mk1s and several thousand mortar bombs of different natures. The contract covers of 45 month period, of which 2/3 will be dedicated to the qualification of the system (weapon and ammo) alone. 🇩🇪, too is looking into a new 60 mm
mortar system, and there as well the process is quite long. Despite NATO standardisation, most countries have their own safety and QC procedures, especially when it comes to ammunition, and for good reason, as exampflified by the 🇳🇱 accident. But that also means that despite
this supposed inter-operability of NATO calibres, especially in the artillery domain, most countries are reluctant to simply "plug and play" ammunition they have not qualified themselves. Which as we can see, is often an expensive and time consuming process.
Now 🇺🇦 is showing that the theory works in practice, so I'm not saying that STANAGs are irrelevant, this war has absolutely shown their worth. If anything, it has helped take some pressure off the already Kafkaesque 🇺🇦 logistic situation
But its also undeniable that the 🇺🇦s are taking increased risks. With so many varied sources of ammunition, combined with the intense wear and tear these systems are sustaining, it increases the chance of something going horribly wrong (below is simply illustrative).
And that's why I think the whole 'NATO standard' argument, especially in the domain of ordnance, should be understood that its not quite a simple black and white process.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Wanted to do a follow-up on the SPO Varna 'flamethrower' as there isn't much written about in either English or Russian. Introduced circa 2005, it was designed to compliment the RPO Schmel' and RPO PDM-A Priz line of launchers. Its RKhBZ code is MO.1.09.00
The launcher is the same as the RPO-A (marked with a red cross on the end caps), but inside, they are very different. The RPO fires a fin stabilised projectile filled with thermobaric, incendiary or smoke producing mixtures. The SPO houses a canister with a fixed launch motor.
The actual 'projectile' is a sausage like mesh 'bag' containing an incendiary mixture. In this case, 2.5 kg of OM-12 pyrogel, the same as used in the RPO-Z. The rear of the mesh container is fitted with some kind of igniter compound, which is itself ignited at launch.
Been pouring over some Sig patents for the their LMG, and thought I'd highlight some minor design changes from the production MX250 compared to the first prototype I saw in 2019. These are external changes of course, not much has been publicly disclosed about the internals so far
The production model (left) now has a continuous length M-LOK interface on the underside, and the profile of the upper portion has been tweaked. The prodution XM250 has lost its side folding stock capability, due to the necessesity of a battery pack for the powered rail.
Aside to some minor profile tweaks here and there, it doesn't appear to have changed all that much. Of course there is the 'rail on a rail' to properly accomodate the XM157, without interferring with the feed cover. Kinda validates the FN Evolys' design in that department.
The recently published @RUSI_org co-published by @Jack_Watling & Nick Reynolds is very much worth a read. I wanted to highlight some passages of the first chapter, focussing on the battle of Kiev, as these snippets do provide some worthwhile insights 1/x
Especially in the context of the Ukrainian experience of the battle, viewed through Twitter, something we don't to get a lot of. So first, caveats: Twitter is an echo chamber, like all social media. A lot of commentators are pro-Ukrainian, and a lot of the media coming out 2/x
of this conflict have put emphasis on Ukrainian successes, something which the Russians have difficulty in countering, from an 'information warfare' point of view. To me at least, a prevailing percpetion of how the battle was going went a little something like this: 3/x