Germany's exit explained – as requested – #JdPMiniThread
I. Background
Since the 2014 World Cup Trophy, Germany's legacy has become forgettable. The 2016 Euros didn't convince many, and 2018 became the last straw for Joachim Löw – losing against South Korea in the process.
The Old Guard had to retire, change was coming.
After the Champions League victory with Bayern, Hansi Flick was hired by the DFB as the national team coach.
His job? Ensure the transition be smooth, with new talents with likes of Kai Havertz, Jamal Musiala, Bella-Kotchap, Joshua Kimmich and Sané + Gnabry making their names.
II. Problems
In this new generation, Germany face(d) major replacement problems. World-class Klose was never replaced, and Müller isn't precisely a #9 – A Raumdeuter.
Someone else retired, of major importance. His name? Kroos, Toni Kroos.
And furthermore, centre-backs.
II.A) Penalty box
Out of Germany's centre-back, only Rüdiger actually is a proper box defender – with that said, finding weaknesses between the lines v Germany isn't much work.
If anything, teams have shown it's pretty easy, notably by drawing markers, lacking references.
II.B) Lacking references.
Because of Germany's major depth in quite a few positions, Hansi Flick has found himself in major doubt for many positions, abnormal for a country of Germany's magnitude.
The right-back, midfield and attack have suffered heavy rotations.
II.C) Unforced rotations
These rotations, unlike one might suggest, we not forced by injuries. They were by choice – Kimmich, Gündogan, Goretzka, or Musiala/Sané/Gnabry – and a Müller/Havertz that find it hard to cement a place due to their specific roles – no #9.
II.D) Lack of control
With all the said profiles, Germany can create chances, without any doubt.
But what it can't do, it control – what's often referred to as possession control, which is Spain's major brand above all.
Additionally, Germany lacks proper defending coordination.
II.E) High variance.
As such, Germany is a team that could score but was not certain to, that couldn't defend in the best way and that was likely to concede in transition.
Added to that, there are little mechanisms of the team to rely on, due to regular rotations.
III) Criticisms of Hansi Flick
Certain player profiles were barely used in the World Cup, and major questions float today as to 'why'. An example is Moukoko, or even, Adayemi. These are profiles Germany would've benefited of instead of Müller.
III.A) Trained mechanisms
How come that, in 2022, when the transitions should almost be complete, there's no regular XI, with no certainty of potential starters.
There's no control, and no *regular*, trained mechanisms because the players aren't used to play together.
IV) Final words
This doesn't mean Hansi Flick's tenure should end right here. There just need to be realization around Germany's problems, that, through better personnel selection and more consistency, can be fixed as Germany's core is more than apt to improve and perform.
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Find the argument interesting, but I don't think I necessarily agree.
For one, I don't think John (or for the record, a majority of “us” — those that enjoy positionism”) suggest/ed “This is the perfect way football should be played.”
There's a concept, an ideal.
And there's a reality.
Those two a different. When me, John or any “positionist” for instance has watched a structurally similar space distribution on the basis of a passmap, and called it perfect, it doesn't mean it's infallible. In no way.
Instead, it means perfect with regards to our/my ideal — space occupation.
It's indeed true it leads to an ideation of ideas that might seemed rigid to me, for some, over-rationalized.
Let's compare it to another common situation. Scripts.
“I think it’s important that every club has a philosophy about the way they want to play. But what is also important for me as a coach: Here in Salzburg are guardrails – but within these guardrails, each coach can bring his own signature.”
We often forget to differentiate club culture from individual coaching philosophy. With clubs that focus on home-grown talents, it's important that certain basics remain visible across all categories — but with different footprints from each manager to have player learning.
On the different ways to press the opponent:
“I prefer the ball-oriented pressing in a swarm. Because I believe that you can achieve more when everyone from the team is involved. The goal is to create a surplus near the ball very fast.
Always find the 'No Premier League experience' argument lazy, unfounded and perhaps even a myth.
Countless players have marked the PL w/o former experience — in an era where scouting has become the norm, one would expect a change in mentality.
The likes of Pedri, Vinicius Jr, Alphonso Davies or Romero were not 'proven', and it's a risk — “the biggest risk one could take is to never take risks”.
It's a result of socio-cultural factors & it requires a shift in mentality to let football flow & evolve in Europe.
Many write players off to early.
Whilst having talent & experience is the perfect formula on paper to success, it is often unaffordable for most; scouting therefore has enabled the discovery and development of some phenomenal players & it should continue that way.
"At F.C Barcelona, what we really do is to train players so they can play to the highest level, and for that, cognitive training is essential."
We often talk about physical re-integration of an injured player. But what about the mental side of the game?
"It is necessary that during a recovery, the player continues to visualize, that he keeps the capacity to react, to anticipate, the focus he needs during the games, the reflexes..."
Perhaps the best example to illustrate that is Samuel Umtiti, who changed for the worse.
Not only did his physical pace/attributed worsen post-injury; much worse, and what's always been more worrying, is that post-injury Umtiti never had the anticipation and reactivity his ancestor had.
That most likely is the best example of what recovery should be about.
Eintracht Frankfurt – F.C Barcelona:
When doubt arises from uncomfortable circumstances leading to regular, silly errors: Or how Frankfurt surprised Barcelona.
Barcelona's structure was composed of the usual elements, originally intending a 2atb (Slight alteration following Piqué's forced substitution), nonetheless including the usual positioning of the frontline + interiors. Araujo, as expected, remained reluctant to advance forwards.
Furthermore, Eintracht matched numbers: Adama's isolation was *too much*, as FFT always had the CB + FB on him, his threat was mostly nullified as the space he'd attack were covered. Pedri's man intercepted his lane & Araujo was also match in the 1v1.
Barcelona were stuck.
1/ Barcelona's structure was similar to what was seen v Galatsaray or other opponents. Where FdJ/Pedri did not interact much, they both progressed dynamically following ball receptions on either side of the pitch. Important to note García's connection with Pedri.
2/ Barcelona's structure saw Alba finding the midfield easily, given the double option the double-option he always could find (i.e wide to Ferran or centrally w/ Busquets & sometimes w/ Pedri). A result of simple overloads that allowed everyone to push up from the start.