There are at least four significant factors to consider here:
1️⃣ Reducing density;
2️⃣ Expansion of NATO;
3️⃣ Overseas Territories and SLOCs;
4️⃣ Force composition.
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1️⃣ As the density of our armed forces reduces (via headcount reduction or deliberate formation structure*) situational awareness of a wider area must improve as does the ability to reach those areas via range or mobility.
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*deliberate formation structure is a Thing, with mass being accomplished via multiple aggregated formations.
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2️⃣ With the expansion of NATO, the UK can do less with less, focus resource and kit on what is both necessary for supporting Allies and for its own needs. The UK no longer needs to focus on specific environment equipment, it can free resource for deployment/reinforcement.
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Fortunately this Venn diagram of needs overlaps well. We can rapidly reinforce and provide both tactical and strategic redeployment with equipment and forces the UK requires to protect our civilians and secure Allied interests worldwide.
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3️⃣ The United Kingdom has dependent self-governing Overseas Territories that it has committed to protect. Many of these sit on SLOC and trade routes critical to the UK, EU and Allies and that will see conflict in future decades, if not sooner.
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4️⃣ While a smaller number of heavier, tracked, Armoured formations will remain critical for British forward deployment or follow-on forces to fight the second battle...
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...and while the British Army will rely on a backbone of Mechanised forces delivering mass of infantry dismounts via long range, long endurance fleets...
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...the British Army, along with the Royal Navy, are investing hard in SOF/SFG for to keep a lid on conflicts before they escalate and for Very High Readiness response.
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This is where we circle back around to FLRAA.
The UK is replacing a core helicopter transport fleet. The RAF Puma fleet is 40-odd years old and is being replaced with the New Medium Helicopter programme.
🟠 That 40 year number is a track record warning. Keep it in mind.
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Three entries in various forms remain for NMH: AW149, H175M and Black Hawk.
All three solid replacements with UK industry gains to differing levels.
But conventional rotorcraft in a programme being moved along quickly. Maybe too quickly.
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Without external fuel tanks, the longest published combat radius belongs to the H175M entry.
Here are the radii centred over British Overseas Territories and Global Hubs to give you an idea of reach for NMH.
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And this is the V-280 Valor's published combat radius, described as conservative by the US Army.
This is a huge, huge uplift in effect and influence for a lighter, more distributed 16AAB, Ranger Regiment and 3Cdo.
They can operate wider, or aggregate more easily.
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The aircraft can also operate with fewer FARP's. Reducing footprint, reducing operating costs and releasing precious resources for use elsewhere.
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The problem with NMH is it is aimed at a full fleet, with a full lifetime.
Remember that 40-year figure for the Puma fleet?
What will the UK will do with NMH?
Keep it until it's knackered? I won't argue with you.
Our forces will be limited to a small radius of effect.
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NMH should be altered now to be an interim solution ahead of adopting an FLRAA performant aircraft.
This will not be easy, Puma is end of life, and long-term planning / negotiation is not our forte.
Two non-exhaustive suggestions follow:
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1️⃣ Procure an NMH fleet that can be quickly divested.
This means whatever is purchased now needs to be bought with what will be attractive to second-hand buyers in 15 years in mind.
A spec they will want, with kit we will be willing to support/export.
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2️⃣ Procure a second-hand / reconditioned fleet with enough life left on it to reach FLRAA.
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Neither of these options need to leave British industry in the cold.
Non-exhaustive examples include ensuring H175M/AW149 can be converted to offshore transport fleets, or that we buy Black Hawk with a mind to selling/supporting onward into Eastern Europe.
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As for cost of FLRAA. It *must* be more expensive, right?
Perhaps. Remember FARP reduction.
Unlike V-22, V-280 is a glorified turboprop.
It has a simpler straight wing, a customer about to buy numbers in four digits and a manufacturer aggressively transitioning factories.
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Either way, NMH and UK industry is not yet aligned for the step change in rotorcraft performance that the MOD sorely needs to make its 16AAB, Ranger Regiment and 3Cdo intentions work.
With it, they are a genuine SOF/SFG force to be reckoned with.
The KNDS team very kindly provided an in-depth tour inside the RCT30 equipped Mission Module pictured below. Within was held an invaluable, and frank, discussion about both the equipment and the roadmap moving forward.
The Mission Module is currently configured for the Bundeswehr requirement. As such there is much similarity with their latest Puma S1 including turret equipment itself and the "office" where the commander and gunner sit. The uncrewed turret approach provides more room inside the cell for dismounts and equipment.
To move from Puma S1 standard to RCT30, with features such as dual land and C-SAT target engagement, the turret's modularity was intentionally matured and here's where the conversation deepened.
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Sensors
The optical and optronic sensors, together with the MUSS tower, can easily be replaced with alternatives.
At the moment, Challenger 3 and Ajax both share Thales Catherine and Orion sights. These are GVA enabled for the British AFV's and the RCT30 turret can accommodate.
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Cannons
KNDS themselves are in deep discussion as to which cannon would best suit the British Army in a Cavalry or an IFV configuration, whether Mechanised or Armoured.
Three cannons dominate the conversation:
The Rheinmetall MK30-2/ABM is the most seen on Puma and RCT30 (PuBo). It has a growing user base with German Puma's and Boxers being joined by Australian and now Netherland Boxers. It is considered proven the most accurate of the three. Compatible ammunition is made solely by Rheinmetall for now, but UK selection would also see cannon, barrel and ammunition production licenses.
It is not widely known but the Mk44 Bushmaster II has been confirmed as already integrated with the RCT30. Bushmasters advantage is it can fire a range of 30x173mm including the MK30-2/ABM natures.
Finally CT40 is also a possibility though would take longer, the RCT40 not being as mature as the RCT30. Ammunition (below) is produced in the UK and France.
At DVD this week we learned more about the official Build Configurations for the Boxer's Mission Modules that will plug into the Boxer Drive Module (currently A3 standard) via the Boxer Strategic Pipeline.
The penny-wise pound-foolish Apache/JAGM saga continues.
The UK is now buying 3,000 JAGM missiles for $957.4M.
That equates to $319,000 per missile for a system already integrated onto our AH-64E's, that the UK has already trained on, which the UK has already paid for and received examples of for handling, from an Ally who is supposedly covering all extra costs of development, leaving little to no NRE expectations for the UK to bear.
Even if we go with the highest Brimstone 3 cost of £175,000 per missile which is meant to include Brimstone 3 R&D amortisation, even if we go with double the integration cost the UK was meant to "save" at £150M, the UK would have saved £110M by sticking with our own developed and proven system.
This does not even go into details such as re-investment in industry via procurement, tax recovery to Treasury or potential for exports (Poland's own AH-64E purchase is a vast missed opportunity). The UK already knows how to use and handle Brimstone eliminating most of the NRE with the system, and we have heard from defence ministers on the record in Parliament of the superior and battleproven hit rate of the Brimstone in active Operations compared to Hellfire based systems such as JAGM repeatedly over the years.
If we do take the lower of the purchase price per missile that is known for Brimstone and the £70M quoted as being "saved" by not integrating Brimstone on Apache, then for integration and purchase of 3,000 Brimstone on British AH-64E's we would expect to see a lower end cost, using DE&S own figures, of around £385M, saving almost £400M on this purchase compared to JAGM.
Even the £110M saving at the higher prices is desirable right now and would lead to further savings in future.
It is quite clear that the promised JAGM price reduction has not occurred.
BS was called at the time of the claims and these calls have clearly, demonstrably, been borne out.
This huge expense on an unproven foreign supplied missile with variations in reliability of supply, when a higher performing and perception-busting lower cost British missile exists and is in production, does not meet the claims at the time that JAGM would save the taxpayer money and should be both questioned and investigated.
Meanwhile the Army is at great pains to show us WOLFRAM and the Mounted Close Combat Overwatch (MCCO) money being spent on Brimstone 3 integration onto their ground vehicles. With so much effort in Brimstone on Ajax, Boxer and Coyote, it is reasonable to expect the AAC to follow.
With the first of the planned 16 Protectors arriving, the RAF already has faith in the Brimstone missile and has not signalled that they do not intend to use it.
As an aside, Protector aircraft cost "just" £15M a piece based on the last contract, again with NRE mostly paid for now. By saving money integrating Brimstone on AH-64E instead of JAGM, the RAF could have the funds to double the number of Protector aircraft and integrate more equipment onto them while still having cash to spare.
⚙️ An approach to improving both Fleet Husbandry and Industrial Capability Husbandry for Army.
⏺️ Low Rate Production
⏺️ RESET Programme
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⚙️ It is no secret that the Army's fleets have not received adequate TLC. Vehicles left outside in the British climate, insufficient spares ordered, vehicles cannibalised routinely.
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⚙️ Similarly, it is no great secret that the very industrial base that the Army relies on has withered due to lack of engagement and orders. Infrastructure, sites, facilities, plant and skills have been allowed to erode.
⚙️ How the US Army's RESET program interacts with the M2A3 Upgrade and M2A4 Acquisition Programmes.
Oversimplified for illustration:
RESET rebuilds an M2 to pre-combat condition.
M2A3 upgrade takes rebuilt subsystems/parts and assembles/integrates them with new subsystems.
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Red River Army Depot handles most of the RESET program for Bradley.
RESET restores to pre-combat condition, the work does not extend to zero-mile.
A Bradley is stripped into parts bins. Parts are refurbished and only replaced if defective or overly worn.
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These parts are then passed to BAES in Pennsylvania where they go through Final Assembly, Integration and Testing before being returned to inventory in a pre-combat condition.