Within the next year Russia will spiral into a deep political crisis. There is a nonzero chance that it may scale up existing separatist tendencies leading to the breakup of the empire. In this thread I will outline a model of how this process could look like🧵
Russia is the last European colonial empire that remains largely intact. It was a relatively small polity whose enormous territorial expansion started for real only in the 16th c. This time frame largely overlaps with the establishment of the first European overseas empires
Those who doubt colonial nature of Russia point out to how different it was from what is now seen as the epitome of British colonialism - the British empire. Indeed, Russian colonialism was very dissimilar from the Anglo one, but often strikingly similar to the Iberoamerican
We can understand Russia easier if we see it as an Iberoamerican-type empire that didn't break up yet. Russian Federation holding Siberia is not unlike Spain holding Mexico or Portugal holding Brazil
(You can get Eurasianism better if you see it as the Russian Lusotropicalism)
Parallels with Spain and Portugal can be helpful for modelling a potential breakup of Russia. As the inner structure of these empires are not dissimilar, the mechanism of their breakup may go in a similar way, too - starting from their trigger (a military defeat by a third power)
I would argue that a defeat by Ukraine would have greater effect on Russia than any defeat by France could inflict on Spain/Portugal. Ukraine was never seen within Russia as an independent power, only as a separatist province populated by the inferior (if related) bumpkins
Russian empire is held not only by force, but also by mythos. Which is:
1. Russia is a superior military power -> You won't beat it off anyway 2. There is no salvation for provinces except within Russia -> Without Russia, you will fall into the Stone Age, figuratively speaking
From the Russian perspective Ukraine is a rebel province. Therefore, the war with Ukraine is a test for the imperial mythos (= seceding province will fall into the Stone Age). If that doesn't happen, well, then we must throw you into the Stone Age to maintain the mythos
Territorial integrity of Russia is kept by the Imperial Mythos:
1. You can't survive without us 2. We can destroy you at any moment
These two assumptions keep the empire together. Both of them are being tested in Ukraine
(That's why Russia *must* destroy the infrastructure)
At this point belief in the assumption 2 is very much weakened. Ukraine did not only stand its ground (which very few believed in back in Feb), but is currently bringing war into Russia, making strikes on the Russian strategic bombers located very far away from the border
That makes any potential ceasefire a point bifurcation. It opens two scenarios:
1. Russia regroups, restocks, reattacks and wins -> Assumptions 1,2 are true 2. Russia fails to do so -> Assumptions 1,2 are false
The empire's fate depends on whether it can crash a rebel province
Now let's assume Russia failed to crash Ukraine and could not persuade its population it would be able to do so in the future. That can be enough to shake the faith in both assumptions of the imperial mythos thus triggering the process of disintegration
Now let's discuss a probable scenario of how the National Divorce could look like:
1. Most likely it will not be launched by any sort of oppositionaries/activists but by the already existing regional interest groups whose character may vary enormously from region to region
2. Most likely the National Divorce will not start in the ethic republics. People think ethnic separatism is likely to destroy Russia, therefore, it is very unlikely to happen. This is too obvious -> precautions are taken. It's more likely to start in unlikely "Russian" regions
3. Most likely the process will start de facto and then formalised legally much later, perhaps very much later. It will likely proceed in the form of local interest groups taking more power, pursuing more regional protectionism, etc. than making some open declarations
4. Where could it all start? Three most likely candidates
- All predominantly "Russian" -> few precautions are taken
- Independently rich -> They effectively pay others' regions bills rather than live on the handouts
- Strong regional elites only partially cleansed by Moscow
5. The process of disintegration is likely to happen in a few iterations. The less regions keep obeying to Moscow and paying taxes to it, the less motivation the other will have cost-benefit wise. Richer regions have more motivation to launch it than the poorer ones
6. Contrary to the popular opinion, the disintegration and the formation of new states is likely to happen on the regional, rather than "ethnic" or "racial" basis. It's highly unlikely that the disintegration goes along the ethnic lines
7. Historically speaking, instruments tend to evolve into the institutions. In particular, administrative borders tend to evolve into the national ones. Much like in the Latin America, the disintegration will go along the administrative, rather than ethnic borders
8. New states will likely look as a collection of N (N≥1) former Russian regions. Former administrative demarkation between provinces will turn into the national borders
Administrative borders becoming the national ones is Lindy
9. Ethnicity, race and culture is *not* enough for the new states to work out. For them to succeed they must be able to pay their bills. Ergo, the principle of economic clusters will be at least as important for defining their borders as the ethnic or cultural one
10. The key question is not the Caucasus or even Volga question. It is the question of Siberia. Siberia is the jewel in the Russian crown that pays the bills of the empire. Should it keep control over Siberia, it can easily win back everything else. Should it lose it, it is done
That should be enough to introduce the idea. I will elaborate on details in separate materials. End of 🧵
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I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.