Thread by @KeelTheTraveler

(1/x) Great news to see the (modified) Burma Act included in the US 2022 NDAA (Subtitle E). What does this mean for Burma? What comes next? Working on a more comprehensive piece, but wanted to give a short overview first 🧵👇:
#WhatsHappeningInMyanmar
rules.house.gov/sites/democrat…

(2/x) What is the NDAA? It's the National Defense Authorization Act, an annual piece of legislation that lays out US defense priorities and authorizes appropriations. Because it's so important, non-defense legislation is often included as amendments.
sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF1…

(3/x) Though the House of Representatives passed the BURMA Act of 2021 in April of this year, the Senate (frustratingly) never passed it. This NDAA amendment is thus a replacement for the version passed in April, though it has been modified extensively.
congress.gov/bill/117th-con…

(4/x) Is this bill final? Is it law? Not yet. Congress has not yet voted to make the NDAA law. However, this should happen in the next two weeks. The House and Senate worked to have unified language for this bill, and I do not expect the Burma language to change before passing.

(5/x) What's in the bill? Below is the US's own explanation of what is in the bill (section-by-section). I break the bill down into four sections and share an overview, pros/cons, and impacts for each:
1) Statement of Policy
2) Sanctions
3) Aid/Support
4) Accountability

(6/x) Statement of Policy - Sec. 5569: Overview. This section serves as a description of US policy towards Burma - view it as a list of goals that the US hopes the bill will help advance. This has been streamlined vs. what was passed by the House in April.

(7/x) SoP: Pros/Cons. I view this as a strong section that lays out US support for anti-junta forces. It mentions the NUG, NUCC, and CRPH by name, which is significant. It also commits the US to helping return civilian governance (though not necessarily pre-coup version) and...

(8/x) SoP: Pros/Cons. to pursuing accountability for human rights violations - suggesting US support for IIMM and ICJ case will continue/expand. It calls out China/Russia as bad actors supporting the junta and commits to holding them accountable (who knows how though?)

(9/x) SoP: Pros/Cons. Major cons are that it does not recognize the NUG as a governing entity or commit to further sanctions on military entities. Language identifying MOGE as a sanctions target was disappointingly removed, as was language specifically referencing Rohingya.

(10/x) SoP: Impact. From an impact perspective, this section is most important for messaging - there are not specific actions that the US will be required to take as a result of this section. I view the name-mention of NUG and NUCC along with mention of federalism as crucial.

(11/x) Sanctions - Sec. 5571: Overview. Codifies into law many of the authorizations from EO14014. This means if a future President ends the State of Emergency underpinning EO14014, sanctions will not be automatically removed (as happened under Obama).
home.treasury.gov/system/files/1…

(12/x) Sanctions: Overview. It calls for "mandatory" sanctions on all senior military officers, SAC officials (Deputy Minister or higher) and directors of SOEs within 180 days. It also authorizes US to target foreign (non-US) banks involved in moving money for junta (huge!).

(13/x) Sanctions: Overview. It also authorizes significant "discretionary" sanctions, specifically identifying MOGE as well as companies or individuals ("persons" should be read to include both humans and corporate entities) involved more broadly in the coup. These authorizations

(14/x) Sanctions: Overview. are extremely broad, and mean that almost any person/entity connected to the military is ELIGIBLE for sanctions. The key for advocates will (and has been) convincing the US that a given sanction action will have meaningful impact.

(15/x) Sanctions: Overview. Finally, the sanctions section requires the State Dept. Office of Sanctions Coordination to develop a comprehensive sanctions strategy. The bill also requires the US to support an arms embargo at the UN and sunsets all authorities in 8 years.

(16/x) Sanctions: Pros/Cons. I have mixed feelings about this section. Getting sanctions authorizations into law is significant, as are the substantial "mandatory" sanctions. Also happy that MOGE is recognized by name, and that the threat against foreign banks is included.

(17/x) Sanctions: Pros/Cons. However, there were significant misses as well. MOGE should be sanctioned and the ongoing refusal of the US to do so undermines its entire sanctions strategy. Further, given that all sanctions are functionally discretionary...
justsecurity.org/82572/myanmar-…

(17/x) Sanctions: Pros/Cons. I am disappointed that so many sanctions were actually separated out as "discretionary" - I think this sends a bad message that the US is not really committed to a strong sanctions strategy. I say all sanctions are functionally discretionary because

(18/x) all sanctions require a Presidential (generally made by Treasury) determination that the target entity in fact matches a sanction-able category. The administration has complete discretion with this determination, and so can stonewall any sanctions listing if they want to.

(19/x) Sanctions: Impacts. Given this, I have mixed feelings about impacts. I expect that we will see more senior military officers and SAC officials sanctioned in the near future. Unfortunately, aviation fuel and MOGE sanctions will not happen as a direct result of this...

(20/x) Sanctions: Impacts. As policy advocates, we will need to continue to push the US government to take these actions. The bill gives us a new platform from which to do this, however, which is one of its most important features. Finally, will the US make a sanctions strategy?

(21/x) Sanctions: Impacts. The administration has had almost two years to put together an effective sanctions strategy, but has yet to do so. So I am skeptical. Still, overall I think this section sends a good message and expands policy options, even if there are serious flaws.

(22/x) Aid/Support - Sec. 5575/5576: Overview. These sections lay out what US support can be used for, as well as what it cannot be used for. It authorizes funding from 2023-2027, although it does not actually authorize specific $ amounts (unlike House version passed in April).

(23/x) Aid/Support: Pros/Cons. Overall I think this is a relatively strong section. The bill authorizes support for strengthening of Federalism (a key part of the Spring Revolution). It also allows the US to provide aid to / engage with EAOs and PDFs (although no weapons).

(24/x) Aid/Support: Pros/Cons. It also authorizes support for civil society, defectors, and political prisoners. Two major cons are that it does not authorize specific $ amounts (unlike House bill), and does not specifically mention humanitarian aid (which is surprising).

(25/35) Aid/Support: Pros/Cons. Finally, the bill is very clear that no aid can be provided via the SAC or any organization/entity controlled by the SAC. Huge win for those pushing for direct cross-border aid.

(26/35) Aid/Support: Impacts. Because of the lack of appropriated $$ amounts, advocates will need to work through the normal appropriations process. Advocates should begin to prepare for next year's appropriations process to make sure we can maximize the amount going to Burma.

(27/35) Accountability - Sec. 5578: Overview. In the original bill, this section was focused on pushing the administration to officially recognize the Rohingya genocide. Because the State Department did that earlier this year, the section had to change.
state.gov/burma-genocide/

(28/35) Accountability: Overview. However, instead of strengthening this section, the NDAA bill simply shortens it. This section commits the US to provide support to entities/institutions seeking justice for war crimes and crimes against humanity (and genocide) committed in Burma

(29/35) Accountability: Pros/Cons. Positively, this sections suggests continued support for the ICJ case and IIMM, as well as other legal actions now or in the future. It's also broad, so it gives latitude to support many different types of justice & accountability.

(30/35) Accountability: Pros/Cons. Negatively, the bill does not mention the Rohingya or commit to supporting the Rohingya in Bangladesh as well. This is part of a larger erasure of the Rohingya from the NDAA overall, as they are not mentioned anywhere in the NDAA.

(31/35) Accountability: Impacts: It remains to be seen what the actual impacts of this section will be, as advocates will need to continue to bring criminal cases and document atrocities where they can.

(32/35) REVIEW. Overall, this is a bill that, while not perfect, is a big step forward for the US. I think we should expect to see some new sanctions, and the bill signals publicly US willingness to engage with EROs and PDFs while also providing rhetorical support for the NUG

(33/35) REVIEW. However, the bill leaves a lot in the hands of activists/advocates. It is up to us to push the US to adopt a real sanctions strategy, to ensure US funding for Burmese civil society and humanitarian needs continues, and that the US supports justice initiatives.

(34/35). Congratulations to those who worked on this bill, esp. @RepGregoryMeeks for supporting it even as colleagues in the Senate refused to move forward. I will be writing an FAQ in the coming days, so please leave questions you would like to see addressed in the comments.

(35/35) While this bill is not enough, I sincerely hope that it will make a difference for the people of Burma, who inspire us daily with their commitment to making a better future for themselves and their children. To the Spring Revolution #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar

@threadreaderapp unroll

(36/35). One addendum on the sanctions section. The bill has also written in a new exception to sanctions: "Exception Relating to the Wind-down of Projects" (Sec. 5571(f)(4), which excepts investment projects that entered into before May 21, 1997 from sanctions.

(37/35). From my perspective, this appears to be an exception to allow Chevron to divest from the Yadana gas field should the US finally sanction MOGE. It is broader though - the date is tied to EO13047, which the Clinton admin passed on May 20, 1997...
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WC…

(38/35) and which prohibited all NEW US investment in Burma. Essentially this is the US saying sanctions would not apply to projects from before the Clinton EO. On impact, I am not sure what US investments exist in Burma from pre-1997 beyond Yadana, so impact could be limited.

(39/35) Unfortunate to give Chevron this waiver after their year+ of lobbying against MOGE sanctions. At the same time, Chevron is a non-operating partner in Yadana and does not make direct payments to MOGE, so their presence is mostly irrelevant from "junta funding" perspective.