Every theory has its limits of applicability. "Kremlin guys are crooks" theory, too. This narrative is so successful, because it appeals to the meanest humans instincts, in particular - to the envy. Envious people tend to overuse this idea far, far beyond any reasonable limits
Like, ok, I understand that you're poor, constantly stressed about money and necessity to pay the bills. I also understand that you're envious about yachts and villas. That doesn't mean that "they're crooks" theory is all explaining. If they were, this war just wouldn't start
"They're just crooks" narrative is not successful, because it is so true. It is so successful, because people are obsessed with their unreflected envy and cannot distance from it. If this war is going on, it means they're not *just* crooks. They're something else, too
This goes far beyond Russian problem though. Much of the moral fervour induced narratives (Crooks! Corruption!) draw their strengths from the meanest human instincts. Hence their success. People are so incredibly envious, that their critical thinking just turn off at some point
Honestly I'm just tired of this constant moral fervour. If the missiles 1) take off 2) hit the target, it means "they are all about stealing" theory is false. Or rather used far beyond its limits of applicability. If the stuff works, plenty of managers steal little to nothing
I would even say that if the missiles take off, that suggests there are (not so few) administrators who are not only not crooks, but who are absolutely selfless. Who identify with their work 100% and are ready for personal self-sacrifice. That's why stuff works
Russian capacity to raise cities to the ground is not based on "crookery" (how did you come up with this insanity?). It is based on hard work, integrity and personal self-sacrifice of not so few people. Proof? Cities razed to the ground
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Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.