Russian army has appointed a 4th commander of the Western Military District since February as Evgeniy Nikiforov replaced Sergey Kuzovlev. This is another replacement of an officer close to Shoigu/Gerasimov with one loyal to Surovikin/Prigozhin. What is the link to Wagner? Thread:
Nikiforov is one of the officers proving the connection between Wagner and the Russian security apparatus, which I have been talking about for a long time, and that it is not Prigozhin who "owns Wagner", but the GRU.
Back in 2014, Utkin reported to GRU Colonel Oleg Ivannikov, as well as to Evgeniy Nikiforov, then chief of staff of Russia’s 58th Army. @bellingcat also confirmed a long time ago that Wagner is not just a PMC, but part of a state-run structure. bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-eu…
With @avramovok we wrote a series on this issue and why we should stop replicating the Russian narrative of the existence of a "shadowy mercenary group" while in fact, we need to speak about the Kremlin itself.
The @CSIS explained why while Wagner is frequently wrongly referred to in the media as a private company connected to the Russian oligarch Prigozhin, there are several factors indicating that the entity is closely linked to the Russian state. csis.org/blogs/post-sov…
Wagner is directly connected to the Russian state. Earlier this year, in @DFRLab we explained signals indicating that the unit was already subordinated to the Russian military during operations in Ukraine. medium.com/dfrlab/wagner-…
Given the current dynamics, there is a clear tendency for the GRU to advance at the expense of other agencies. Something we've seen over the years in different areas of operations of Russian Spetsnaz. Wagner fighters are likely to be given more prominent roles in Ukraine too.
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Russia may face a longer and deeper recession as the impact of US and European sanctions spreads, handicapping sectors that the country has relied on for years to power its economy, according to an internal report prepared for the government.
This is an important report, which is a result of months of work by Russian officials and experts trying to assess the true impact of Russia’s economic isolation. The report paints a far more dire picture than officials do in their public statements.
"Europe’s plans to stop importing Russian oil products -- about 55% of exports went there last year -- could trigger sharp cuts in production leaving the domestic market short of fuel."
Thread: In 2018, with @avramovok we started researching the so-called Russian mercenaries. In 2020, this resulted in the first book on the topic. We called it Russian Invisible Armies on purpose. Because *they are not* mercenaries in the sense that Western media describe them.👇
Today, it is even more necessary to explain why it is wrong to describe them as mercenaries and to revisit the writings. The nature and command of groups like Wagner show a deep connection with Spetsnaz, coordination with the GRU, and service to Putin's inner circle.
From Ukraine through Syria and Libya to the CAR and back to Ukraine, Wagner’s structure repeats a preceding model that was applied by the USSR as early as 1929 and 1979 in Afghanistan and by Russia in the 1990s in Bosnia.
Far from the international view, southern Syria shows the weaknesses of Russian forces. Moscow cannot hold territory; Russian forces use brute force but have trouble maintaining loyalty among the population of the occupied territories. Short thread:
The Assad regime continues to have problems because of its incompetence and despite the Russian support and advice. Russian officers have tried several times to stop local riots, although Moscow allegedly reached an agreement a few years ago.
In recent months, the Russians have again tried to mediate between rebel factions in S. Syria and Assad, but without much success. Russia has also tried to propagate a good image through Kadyrov's Chechens (soft power, cultural closeness) to the north, but again without success.
The Afghanistan refugee wave has already reached the Bulgarian (EU)-Turkish border. This also activated the heartless smuggling nets. Several hundred people a day try to enter; smugglers want €200-300 (likely will increase) per person while the local police close their eyes.
This money is for low to middle smugglers in the network; from the refugees, smugglers want 3 times more. This is the cost for transport border to border i.e. Bulgarian-Turkish border to Serbia's borders. Many are transported to Sofia and border towns.
The influx is likely to increase as many Afghans want to cross Turkey. There is coordination between smugglers in Greece and Bulgaria, and networks activation is expected in the forested areas along the border.
Thread: Yesterday, the @newlinesmag published my text on Wagner PMC and how such groups are used in the context of Putin's foreign policy. This is just an overview. Behind the scenes, the text summarizes the work of several years of tracing the topic.
Back in 2018, with @avramovok we launched a series of publications in @DefensePost related to Putin's Russia policy internationally and the footprint of Russian private military companies in Syria.
This series of publications continued with attention to the arrival of Russian mercenaries in the CAR and expanding the global footprint from Ukraine and Middle East to Africa.
The 22-year-old Syrian-Bulgarian wrestler Mohamed Abdulqader goes to court. The Bulgarian specialized prosecutor's office accuses him of “terrorist activities” with his father, who is part of Sultan Murad Division. No evidences provided. 1/
This case is part of similar suspicious arrests carried out in Bulgaria since 2017. The prosecution claims it is a “fight against terrorism”, but none of the detainees have anything to do with such activities. 2/
Mohammed Abdulqader’s father is part of Sultan Murad Division. The group was part of the Free Syrian Army supported by the Friends of Syria, an international coalition, which Bulgaria was part of. 3/