End of year thread with @holger_r: Estonian military analyst "Karl" on what to expect in Ukraine in 2023:
Karl's assessment: "If current trends continue, Ukraine will have liberated close to all of its territory (including Crimea) by end of 2023."
"Let’s start with an overview of the current situation. No breakthroughs after Kherson but that was predictable. There was a slight hope that Ukraine could have success on the front in northern Luhansk but Russia has managed to hold on there due to its mobilized troops."
"Ukraine is slowly advancing towards Kreminna. The highway to the east of the town is under Ukrainian artillery range but Russian troops can still pass (though at a risk). If Ukraine could pull Kreminna at least halfway into a sack, it would force Russia to retreat."
"On the southern frontline Ukraine has been systematically destroying Russian logistics and supply routes. It’s similar to what they did with the western bank of the Dnipro river in Kherson this summer. But the area in the south is much larger and supply lines are better."
"Railroad connection has been cut off by Ukraine but highways are still open. One truck can carry a tank or at max two armored vehicles. And with all the bumps and conditions on the road, such equipment is already getting worn out while only transported."
"This means the lifetime in the frontline will be smaller. Ukraine’s breakthrough in the south will not happen in the next few weeks but likely late winter/early spring. That’s provided that western help to Ukraine continues at the current level or increases."
"Most of all Ukraine needs armor, tanks and missiles with longer range to hit specific targets. Of course also fighter jets are needed but it takes longer to make them operational."
"Russia's efforts are still concentrated around Bakhmut but their success there is even more limited than that of Ukraine in Kreminna. Occasionally they advance a few kilometers and then lose that ground. It’s positional warfare."
"The only realistic development over the next weeks can be in Kreminna. If Ukraine takes control of it, it will open up the way to the triple towns of Rubizhne, Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk."
"Ukraine is also very close to Lysychansk from the south. The frontline there is between the villages of Verkhnokamyanske (under Ukrainian control) & Verkhnokamyanka (under Russian control). When Ukraine gets control of that village, Lysychansk will be just 10 km away."
"Ukraine has all prerequisites to achieve success both in the south and in northern Luhansk in the next 6 months, maybe even sooner. Getting the three towns would mean being very close to Feb. 24 lines in Luhansk."
"Russia is numbering between 600-700 KIAs a day, the same in wounded. Without mobilization they’d already been broken. Such losses equal 2 BTGs per day."
"In 1-2 months they will run out of troops and will need to run another wave of mobilization or change the law and mobilize all under conscription."
"It’s not in any way realistic to compose a larger strike force from the first mobilization wave. It is not possible that they’d still have 150k mobilized troops in training."
"The max number that they managed to mobilize was 250k and more than 150k out of them have already been deployed in Ukraine. Their max reserve is 50-75k men."
"If the U.S. supplies Ukraine with some heavily needed things -- tanks and missiles -- Kyiv will be able to liberate close to all of its territory by end of next year. That includes Crimea. Only some areas of Donbass might stay under Russian control."
"The U.S. is very close to supplying Ukraine with Bradley fighting vehicles. They're not ultra powerful, but modern, fast and effective. They would open up a way to provide heavier equipment."
"The U.S. is really cautious in taking next steps but that cautiousness also means the prolonging of the war."
"It doesn’t seem like Ukraine itself will be militarily in a critical situation. They might run another mobilization wave but only to recruit for very specific tasks/jobs. Ukraine hasn’t sent all of the reserves that became vacant from Kherson into battle again."
"They are rotating their units quicker than Russia and can allow them to have rest. The strategic risk for Ukraine is when the frontline really freezes; they won’t have another breakthrough for months to come. Then the pressure for talks (from the West) will increase again."
"Right now everyone understands that there will be no talks. Putin has lost more than half of the territory that Russia gained in the beginning of the war but they still have under their control much more than before Feb. 24. Peace talks now would mean a win for Russia." /END
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[Thread.] It's no secret that the U.S. wants Ukraine to signal its openness to peace talks. Or that there are elements within the White House that want the war over ASAP on terms not maximally favorable to Ukraine. msn.com/en-us/news/wor…
Biden's line is that openness is meant to persuade countries neutral or even hostile toward Ukraine (the global south) that Russia is the intransigent party here; not to force Kyiv's capitulation. Ukraine's reply to this seems to be: "Fine, let's parlay...through the UN."
Remember that Kyiv and Moscow had *direct* peace talks weeks into the war, complete with suspected poisonings of oligarchs and double or even triple agent shenanigans. Back channel discussions have been ongoing ever since: see Burns and Naryshkin in Ankara.
Clearly there is some daylight. Zelensky’s dismissal of Biden’s “just peace” formulation, which Biden tried to walk back a bit. Z wants nothing to do with Putin now or ever (who can blame him?). Also, I bet they’re not joking about long-range offensive arty when cameras are off.
Also, on the NATO unity question—up to a point, Lord Copper. Heard from one diplomat last week Scholz is “Doktor Nein” on doing very much more for Kyiv. No surprise there if you simply read Scholz’s FP pontifications.
Pats and air defense an easier sell given terror from above. Offensive capability needed to retake more terrain faster still causes hiccups among those who didn’t think (and perhaps don’t like) that Ukraine could do this well.
Less than a year ago the U.S. was talking of Ukraine devolving into partisan warfare and worried that maybe even Javelins were too high an investment to make. Now... Ukraine is approaching having a NATO-standardized military that isn't even in NATO.
One aspect of this (very significant )development that merits attention: Bolstering Ukraine's air defense capability is more urgent for NATO/EU now given the number of NATO/EU diplomats living under constant Russian bombardment by Iranian drones and Russian cruise missiles.
A better question is why the U.S. felt compelled to disable HIMARS from firing ATACMS when any third party providing these missiles to Ukraine would require U.S. consent, as per the end-user agreement. The UK MLRS (M-270B1) given to Kyiv can fire ATACMS. Does D.C. trust London?
The U.S line is: Help Ukraine take back terrain Russia seized since Feb. 24 (ish). That excludes Crimea and the LDNR/Donbas. What the U.S. should clarify--but won't, obviously--is whether it's worried other countries providing military aid to Ukraine have a different agenda.
Yet another possibility is the U.S. is going out of its way to telegraph to Moscow (and interested other parties) that anything that goes boom in the night outside of Feb. 24 parameters adheres to the Eddie Murphy Cheating Boyfriend Excuse: "Wasn't me."
Why won’t the mainstream media report on the thing we won’t give them?
“The New York Times requested copies of the documents from Mr. Musk, but did not receive a response.” nytimes.com/2022/12/04/bus…
Maybe there were “conditions.” Maybe the Times would have to tweet its reporting and agree not to redact the email addresses of Twitter employees named in the docs. I mean, no one said the future of totally transparent journalism wasn’t gonna get our hair mussed a little bit.
Here is the New York Post on the Times’ failure to cover what they asked Elon Musk to give them so they might publish a story. nypost.com/2022/12/03/elo…