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▪️Title: #AfghanistanTheBearTrap
▪️Genre:History
▪️Published:1992
▪️Author:M Yousaf &Mark Adkin
▪️Print:Kindle
▪️Description:Memoir of brigadier Yousaf who masterminded training of Afghan mujahideen in their struggle against Soviets in 1980s.

Content

Book makes a number of points. First, hardiness of the Afghans were matched by a style of warfare with almost as many drawbacks as strengths. Second, the Soviet military was poorly disciplined, demoralized, badly led, and unimaginative for most of war.

foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsul…

Once a Jehad was declared by religious leaders it was duty of all to fight,to save faith,to defend their honour, to protect their independence, & to guard their land & families. Age was of no importance in joining a Jehad. Boys of 13 or 14 & men in their 70s, fought side by side.

Commanders would never report that they had had so many killed in an operation, but rather that, "God be praised, we had five Shaheed". The Mujahideen"s willingness to die in battle stems from the promise by Allah that Shaheeds go immediately to Paradise.

An Afghan man rarely goes unarmed, even in peacetime. To him his rifle is a part of his body, a piece of clothing without which he feels uncomfortable. A weapon to a man is like jewellery to a Western woman he is rarely seen without it. It is a symbol of manhood.

To defeat a superpower they needed four things: to sink their differences for the sake of Jehad; an unassailable base area, which President Zia provided in Pakistan; adequate supplies of effective arms to wage the war; and proper training and advice on how to conduct operations.

Zia intervened. Further meetings were convened and, after protracted talks had failed to reach agreement, Zia"s patience snapped, and he issued a directive at 2.00 am the Parties were to form a Seven-Party Alliance and issue a joint announcement to that effect within 72 hours.

The average Soviet had no motivation to fight in Afghanistan other than to survive and go home. He was not defending his homeland, he was the invader, detested by most Afghans, allies or enemy, and badly trained, fed and accommodated.

A high proportion of CIA aid was in form of cash. For every dollar supplied by US, another was added by Saudi Arabian. The combined funds, running into several hundred million dollars a year, were transferred by the CIA to special accounts in Pakistan under the control of ISI.

Bulk came from China, Egypt,& later on from Israel. I had no idea that Israel was a source until quite recently, as, had it been known, there would have been considerable trouble with Arab nations. It would not have been acceptable to wage a Jehad with weapons bought from Israel.

A lot of money was wasted, & probably still is, on war in Afghanistan. Some of it was undoubtedly due to corruption or mistakes in Pakistan & 🇦🇫 , but I believe a larger proportion has disappeared into pockets of unscrupulous governments, arms dealers, politicians & CIA agents.

In the early days a Commander would arrive in 🇵🇰 with his own🐎 , perhaps a hundred, to collect his weapons, but as quantity of stores multiplied & horses were lost, this system became totally inadequate.
Thousands of animals were needed, & they became casualties like the men.

I must admit that when I first took over I was not in favour of Pakistanis being involved in actual operations in Afghanistan. I felt risk of capture was too high and that, should it happen, damage it would do to Pakistan, and therefore to Jehad, outweighed tactical advantages.

I recall several heated discussions with General Akhtar on this, but I was overruled. I had to accept that it was a part of my duty to organize these teams, so I resolved to do so to the utmost of my ability; in fact I set about increasing the number.

At the end of 1983 we were operating two camps in Pakistan, each with a capacity of 200 trainees. By mid-1984 we were putting over 1000 a month through the system, and by 1987 we had seven camps operating simultaneously-four near Peshawar and three around Quetta.

Asmat then turned his attention to our Pakistani government vehicles travelling on Quetta to Kandahar road,demanding that arms supplies to him be resumed,or his men would kidnap embassy staff. This created panic in Foreign Office & they turned to ISI for assurances of protection+

General Akhtar summoned Asmat to Islamabad, where he apologized, professed ignorance of what his men were up to and promised such things would not recur.

Every four months or so I would receive a message that a “Grand Bonanza" was to be held on such and such a date. In our language of double talk this meant President Zia would be holding his quarterly conference with the seven Party Leaders. +

Also in attendance would be General Akhtar, the Foreign Minister (usually), myself, and an interpreter.