@albats First, @navalny did not technically "call" anyone cockroaches. When making an argument about "too big cockroaches" he illustrated it with a photo of Chechen rebels. This can and will be understood as a reference to generalised Muslims, but (technically) not to "Gastarbeiters"
Second, @albats framed it as an occasional verbal remark, almost accidental "called somewhere". But there was nothing accidental about it. Verbal narrative, visuals, a TV tune, everything was intentionally dehumanising
@albats not only framed the cockroaches as an occasional remark, she also (intentionally?) left @navalny an easy way out, by describing the video slightly inaccurately. Navalny did not technically say anything about Gastarbeiters in *this* video
@navalny could say "no, I never called Gastarbeiters cockroaches" and still be *technically* right. Why? Because of the way @albats formulated her question. She (intentionally?) left Navalny a way out. He could've denied an inaccurate accusation and technically be right. Did he?
Best thing @navalny could've done would be to narrow down to an inaccurate Gastarbeiters = cockroaches description by @albats and just deny it. She left him a loophole to save his face. He didn't use it. He attacked his critic comparing him with Putin's propagandists instead
Best thing @navalny could've down is to stick to original incorrect description and deny it. That would not technically make him a liar. Instead he starts passionately denying ever using this metaphor at all. He chooses to lie
"Or may be someone [saw] something like this. So you are sure that in no video clip, nowhere..."
Notice she is narrowing down her original question, talking about a "video clip", which @navalny had produced very few by then
I think she saw it
@albats@navalny@navalny respond with another ad hominem attack against a critic who pointed out to a verifiable fact. @albats left him a loophole to deny it, while saving his face - the inaccurate description. But Navalny resorts to lies and ad hominem slander
Why is this video is even important? Well, because it illustrates a typical reaction of @navalny and his followers to *any* sort of criticism. And pointing out to their past words & actions counts as criticism:
1. Ad hominem attack against a critic 2. Make up some lie about him
Honestly, I cannot comprehend why @navalny@leonidvolkov etc. propagate so many *factual* lies. Navalny's Chief of Staff could attack me with some opinion statement ("He's a liar!"). Smarter people do. But he makes a verifiable statement - that I'm paid by Tatarstan President
Let me be clear: I see nothing wrong with working for Tatarstan. I just cannot comprehend why @leonidvolkov is randomly making up verifiable factual statements requiring the burden of proof?
My answer: Because these fellows have never been called out
That is almost amusing. I understand these "oppositionaries" strategy: when facing criticism, always respond with ad hominem against the critic. I'm ok with that. But why are you making *factual* verifiably false statements, I can't get this?
That's just childish
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum
I have always found this list a bit dubious, not to say self-contradictory:
You know what does this Huntingtonian classification remind to me? A fictional “Chinese Encyclopaedia” by an Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges:
Classification above sounds comical. Now why would that be? That it because it lacks a consistent classification basis. The rules of formal logic prescribe us to choose a principle (e.g. size) and hold to it.
If Jorge Borges breaks this principle, so does Samuel P. Huntington.
Literacy rates in European Russia, 1897. Obviously, the data is imperfect. Still, it represents one crucial pattern for understanding the late Russian Empire. That is the wide gap in human capital between the core of empire and its Western borderland.
The most literate regions of Empire are its Lutheran provinces, including Finland, Estonia & Latvia
Then goes, roughly speaking, Poland-Lithuania
Russia proper has only two clusters of high literacy: Moscow & St Petersburg. Surrounded by the vast ocean of illiterate peasantry
This map shows how thin was the civilisation of Russia proper comparatively speaking. We tend to imagine old Russia, as the world of nobility, palaces, balls, and duels. And that is not wrong, because this world really existed, and produced some great works of art and literature