1: We’ve added a whopping 11 new scholars to our Washington-based @CarnegieEndow Asia programs over the last three years - six full-time and five nonresident scholars. They are brilliant, innovative, and disruptive to conventional wisdom. If you don’t read their work, you should!
3: We've also done a major buildout in our work on Asian technology futures, not least by welcoming @mattsheehan88, who deeply understands China's tech ecosystem. He studies China’s AI ecosystem - and the role of technology in China’s political economy. carnegieendowment.org/experts/2116
4: The brilliant @kenjikushida leads our work on Japan, which we've pivoted from security to technology. He is perhaps the world's leading expert on Japan's tech ecosystems, Japan in Silicon Valley, and the role of startups in Japan's political economy. carnegieendowment.org/experts/2165
5: An Aussie, @ashleytownshend drives our work on US security alliances, regional defense policies, deterrence and statecraft, and collective approaches to Indo-Pacific strategy against the backdrop not just of growing Chinese power but also multipolarity. carnegieendowment.org/experts/2185
6: One of the most dynamic scholars of Chinese security policy, @IBKardon leads our work on China’s development of maritime power, with research on China’s maritime disputes and law of the sea issues, global port development, and PLA overseas basing. carnegieendowment.org/experts/2273
7: And we are about to welcome the fabulous @elinanoor to lead our work on Southeast Asia, including the role of technology in shaping institutions and governance structures, nation-building, and community cohesion across Southeast Asian countries.
8: Our work on Southeast Asia now includes a new focus on politics and cohesion in Indonesia. For that work, we've leaned on our fabulous nonresident scholar @sdjaffrey. She studies state-building, democratic politics, and patterns of order and disorder. carnegieendowment.org/experts/1750
9: A bank economist by day but also our #CarnegieAsia nonresident scholar, @Trinhnomics leverages data to explore emerging economic patterns in Asia. She has a particular focus on Southeast Asia too and dig deeply into industries, markets, and policies. carnegieendowment.org/experts/1741
10: Another nonresident scholar, Robert Greene, also works in the private sector but helps drive a stream of #CarnegieAsia work on mobile payments, digital currencies, and topics at the nexus of cyberspace governance, global finance, and national security. carnegieendowment.org/experts/1832
12: And to help drive a conversation about Chinese military dynamics and security policies with too much conventional wisdom in it, we're pleased to have @LTG_CHooper. He works on topics like lessons the PLA is learning from Russia's war in Ukraine. carnegieendowment.org/experts/1948
13: These six full-time hires and five nonresident scholars have significantly shifted #CarnegieAsia programming over the last three years. And we're not done changing - we have a few more hires to make and several more new strategic initiatives in the works. Stay tuned! Read us!
14: Our Asia work, which was once disproportionately focused on security and stovepiped into sub-regional chunks, is now more multifaceted, more cross-regional, more collaborative and more comparative. Many projects are multi-scholar, multi-program, multi-Carnegie center efforts.
15: In addition to the work of individual scholars, we now have a matrix approach. We work in three verticals - security, technology, and governance - and across nearly every meaningful Asian country and sub-regional geography: China, Japan, Korea, India, Taiwan, Southeast Asia.
16: From AI governance to maritime security, cross-border data access and transfers to nuclear stability, deterrence and military strategy to the role of startups in driving innovation, we have an amazing, robust and multidimensional stream of work on Asia. Truly innovative work.
1: Blasts from my past. Have spent 15 years writing on (1) why "US vs. China" bipolarity is the wrong frame for the future of Asia; (2) the collision of economics and security; and (3) why pan-Asian ideas and institutions aren't "made in China." Here are some of my favorites.
2: From 2011, when Xi Jinping was barely out of the provinces and two years before China proposed the Belt and Road: Asia is being reconnected after a multicentury hiatus; the US is losing the plot and risks being marginalized; China isn't the only actor. csis.org/analysis/twq-w…
3: From 2012, written with my friend @Rmanning4: Security Asia and Economic Asia are diverging; the US is essential to the former but risks fading in the latter; China isn't the only actor. foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/31/a-t…
1: No, it really isn't fine. For one, it infantilizes third countries. And it doesn't reflect the complex experience many of them have had with China. BRI is not "a debt and confiscation program," although there are indeed very troubling cases. Above all, whining isn't competing.
2: The irony is that the US doesn't need to do this. There is plenty of suspicion of Chinese intent across the world today, including the Global South. Experience is an good teacher, so governments are learning and bargaining differently with China while mass publics demand more.
3: We have an entire initiative at @CarnegieEndow digging into complex lessons from around the world. And one of these is that local players are learning how to compel or persuade Chinese players to adapt to local ways, not simply accepting "Chinese" ways. carnegieendowment.org/specialproject…
1: Some background from me for the Xi trip to Moscow, where I expect Beijing to reinforce an entente that is both unsentimental and directed largely at shared ambivalence about (1) US foreign policy, (2) tools of US statecraft, e.g., sanctions, and (3) backfooting Washington.
2: A piece I wrote on Day 1 of Putin's war in Ukraine. I argued that Beijing faced irreconcilable interests and therefore had to choose among them or tack back and forth under the glare of international scrutiny. carnegieendowment.org/2022/02/24/chi…
3: This piece drew in part on personal experience with Beijing's response to Putin's aggression in Georgia in 2008, when I had only recently been the senior US official for Central Asia. Comparing 2022 to 2008 is instructive for seeing the evolution of Beijing's lean into Moscow.
2: The paper focuses on the corporate communication strategies of three Chinese state firms involved in two flagship rail projects in Africa: the Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya, constructed by CRBC, and the Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway in Ethiopia, constructed by CCECC and CREC.
3: Drawing on fieldwork they argue that these Chinese state firms exhibited divergent paths. CRBC has learned and adapted, largely because of Kenya's vibrant media environment and watchdog journalism; CCECC and CREC didn't because Ethiopia lacks naming and shaming by local media.
1: A few folks asked me to elaborate on this. I'll try. And please note that I don't mean to pick on the Kahl speech per se, since his speech isn't really about China. But the way China is framed there is (1) endemic in US rhetoric but (2) spectacularly ineffective, in my view.
2: To be blunt, experience and intuition tell me that Washington is delusional if thinks this kind of stark, binary message on China is going to work in most regions of the world - inclusive of, but not limited to, the Middle East and North Africa.
3: Of course, one problem is that big powers are self evidently self-interested. So calling China “transactional and opportunistic” while presenting the US as purely “altruistic” will presumably be laughed out of the room in most global capitals.
1: Two things jump out at me immediately from the US readout: The first is the reference to joint working groups - suggests a basis for (modest) progress and that there was some Chinese give on the suspension of various dialogues after the Pelosi visit. whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…
2: The second is the repeat of the language @Bundeskanzler extracted from Xi on Russia's nuclear threats. Includes the boilerplate about "should never be fought and can never be won" but also the "opposition to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine" specifically.
3: Unlike most things in the US readout, which are framed as unilateral statements by Biden, this one is framed jointly: "President Biden and President Xi reiterated their agreement." There's only party threatening nuclear use in Ukraine, so for once Beijing didn't both-sides it.