The question will be if Chinese consumption has grown more than the reduction in the building of inventories?
3. Yes Chinese refinery capacity has increased but seeing China move from a net-importer to a net-exporter of product means that the more efficient Chinese refineries takes crude demand from non-chinese refineries. China refinery demand growth will mean lower demand elsewhere
4. China has grown its SPR/Commercial inventories of both crude and products to a much higher level than they were prior to the pandemic. Products have basically reached tank tops. Pre-COVID China was trying to build its SPR. Now it has a significant SPR
5. Geopolitically, things have changed for China in the world of oil as well. Since the Pandemic, China has significantly strengthened its relationships with most Oil producers while the US's strength of relationship has weakened.
6. It means that it will be difficult for China to be sanctioned out of the oil market. Would Saudi Arabia now refuse to sell to China its biggest buyer?
Means that China may not need to build such a big SPR and it also means they can use the current SPR to try and control price
7. How will China control price. 3 ways
1. More control over Import crude quotas. Means teapots cant go crazy forcing up prices 2. Product export quotas. Control internal Chinese refinery demand for crude oil. 3. Release from SPR as prices go up and buy when prices are low
8. The baseline demand from China has changed from pre-COVID levels. So to make comparisons with it and have expectations it will return in the same way is likely incorrect especially as the Chinese economy is not at the same growth levels.
9. Chinese demand will return but as said before is the increase in consumption greater than the reduction in the builds in inventories?
In the physical market we already have good forward looking information
10. October-December loading cargoes saw good buying from China. However those cargoes were bought between August and November. Since then Physical differentials collapsed for January and particularly February loading cargoes.
11. Feb loading programs been selling for weeks and Chinese demand has not exploded. These cargoes will arrive March-May. They will likely be run through refineries in May-July. So physical market already seeing Chinese demand 6 months ahead and has not incresed significantly
12. As I said before we need to look at China with different eyes than the past on oil demand
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1. Been hearing a lot about Russian products particularly diesel being a big problem when EU sanctions kick in
Here are a few reasons why it may not actually be the case. I think diesel maybe easier to place than crude oil. After all it is a much smaller quantity than is crude
2. There are more product importing countries than there are crude oil importing countries. Why because not all countries have refineries and partuicularly not many have refineries that can run Russian crude oil.
3. If Putin is willing to openly sell Russian crude oil at $40 below the benchmark, he will be willing to sell products 440 below the benchmark. How many developing countries would be willing to pay that?
2. the crude being transported and went via Cushing was all crude that could be blended into making WTI or as a deliverable replacement. Therefore volume was a pseudo metric for the ability to deliver WTiI
3. Now with the flow moving from North to South things have all changed. Volume at Cushing should not be a pseudo factor in price determination anymore. Why because the crude that comes down the Keystone pipeline is more or less WCS a heavy crude oil
1. Hearing so much nonsense about there being insufficient refinery capacity globally. Lets start on capacity, The BP Statistical review showed that in 2018, 83mbpd of crude oil was refined through 100mbpd of global refining capacity. That throughput is the highest recorded by BP
2. 2022, refinery throughput is less than that, Further, in 2021, BP recorded a Global refinery capacity of nearly 102mbpd. Means there is more capacity now then in 2018 and less throughput than in 2018. Crazily there was no complaints in 2018 about the lack of refinery capacity
3. Now if we look at product cracks. they are all poor apart from Middle Distillates. What does that mean? Effectively the refinery capacity is trying its hardest to produce middle distillates but in doing so it is overproducing other products.
1. The big scary clickbait is the US has only 25 days of distillate inventories there must be a crisis and everything is going to go to crap because of it. But is this really the case?
Well 4wks earlier it was 34 just because of the large fluctuations in the demand denominator
2. 25 days is the quantity if every refinery in the US stopped producing. That means losing every one of the 18mb+ will stop. Plus every non-US refiner will stop selling to the US.
3. What are the chances of losing all 18mbpd+? Well virtually nothing apart from a meteor strike. The US has refinery operations from Washington State to the GOM and from California to Pennsylvania. To take out all 18mb, would likely take out inventories and all demand as well
1. 🧵 I hate the two main metrics of financial oil industry - the 5 year average and the Days of Supply.
I despise both of them because they induce statements like energy crisis, shortages, etc. that is just not the case.
2. Lets start with Days of supply.
What does the market think it tells you? Look how much we have in tanks, lets panic when it gets lower than normal
What does it actually tell you? It tells you how much in tanks you have if the whole system goes down
3. Oil Bulls focus on US inventories
There are over 800million barrels of crude oil in SPR and Commercial storage. Therefore, there is only 40 days of cover so we are really shortage inventories. Its an existential energy crisis because it lower so much lower than in the past