I recently returned to DC after a week spent in Taipei — a fascinating time to be on-island amid RightsCon, PLA live-fire exercises, and a seismic shift in U.S. policy toward Ukraine.
This was somehow my first visit to 🇹🇼, so I wanted to share a few high-level impressions 🧵:
1⃣ It’s one thing to read about, and quite another to experience in person:
Taiwan's democracy is an indelible feature of its society, culture, and place in the world.
In my short time there, I had pamphlets foisted upon me by @amnesty canvassers, walked through crowds of protestors gathered outside government ministries, and watched as Taiwanese gathered to observe the 78th anniversary of the 228 Massacre.
I'm leaving the U.S. government after 2 years as @StateDept's main contact with the Chinese Embassy in Washington — the most challenging and rewarding experience of my life.
More soon on what's next. But first, a few thoughts on diplomacy and America’s role in the world:
2/ I’m sad to leave what must be the most interesting job in Washington, and a team that includes some of the United States' most talented and devoted public servants.
I am and always will be grateful to countless mentors who taught me the American way of diplomacy.
3/ But these 2 years spent helping build and launch @USAsiaPacific’s “China House” have aged me a decade.
After serving as an Economic, Tech, and Political Officer — and managing nearly 300 conversations between the governments — it's time to pass the torch to someone else.
2/ @HASCRepublicans, @HASCDemocrats, @SASCGOP, and @SASCDems should use this NDAA cycle to build the Department of Commerce into a juggernaut, expand open-source intelligence collection and analysis, and/or instantiate new, flexible export control authorities within DoD.
3/ In October, we @CSETGeorgetown identified 273 companies selling AI systems and related components to the Chinese military.
At the time, only 22 — 8% — were listed in @CommerceGov's Entity List or Military End User List.
2/ Our latest report and data visualization map nearly 500 of China’s “SKLs” across varying fields and physical locations.
It's absolutely packed with findings. But I want to highlight three of our most important conclusions about the state of science and technology in China:
3/ ➡️ First, China is striving to emulate the U.S. laboratory system, but it’s not there yet.
At the top of China's lab system sit 20 National Labs—its answer to e.g. Los Alamos or PNNL.
Since 1984, 🇨🇳's gov has approved the creation of 10 new ones—but only 2 have been built.
Blinken outlines 3 lines of effort for U.S. China policy: 1. Invest to double-down on longstanding American strengths. 2. Align efforts with allies and partners. 3. Compete to defend our interests and build our vision for the future.
Extremely pleased to see Blinken call out the crucial role that Chinese students play in advancing U.S. innovation, including the tendency of so many to stay and contribute to our economy and society.
.@SecBlinken also calls on USG to address its deprecated investments in R&D.
He laments the decline in U.S. R&D spending as a % of GDP.
Specifically calls for investment in AI, biotechnology, and quantum information sciences—the 3 lodestars of U.S. leadership in advanced tech.