ok, let's do this. I've now read all 153 pages of United States vs Google filed earlier today. As I've said earlier, Google is royally screwed.
The suit is super well-written building on prior work investigating Google’s market power abuse leveraging advertising technologies. /1
Much of the suit is indeed anchored around Google's maintenance of 20% revenue share from its ad exchange. And it smartly describes Google's scale across three dimensions: publishers, ad impressions and importantly, data. /2
On the data point, which anyone who follows me knows I heavily lean into the intersection of data protection and antitrust. The third dimension includes targeting data which no doubt has informed Google's approach to privacy rules - or the lack of them. /3
One more broad point on the suit. They do an outstanding job on clear language of complex topic - including not getting lost in G's rebranding of adtech services or secret projects (Poirot, Bernanke, Jedi, Bell, Poirot 2.0!) leveraging work in Australia, Texas, EU, UK, et al. /4
They also have some good visuals that very clearly demonstrate Google's dominance on all sides of the markets as they begin to walk through what really resembles like insider trading. There might be handcuffs if it was wall street and proven. /5
Google's reactions to "header bidding" that opened up and allowed multiple parties on both sides of auctions is a focus of guts of suit. G appears to ack header bidding happened organically across industry due to G's abuse of control over market. What did they then do... /6
The suit walks through how Google allegedly and systematically worked to "dry out" header bidding in the occasions it couldn't block it altogether. This includes the Jedi Blue claims of its deal with Facebook. And first time I've seen an approach to Amazon which was rejected. /7
Let me now take a moment to break down the alleged anticompetitive conduct as they do very deep in the report. I'll give you eight examples of broad conduct that the United States will work to prove was illegal. /8
(1) Google acquired DoubleClick in order to obtain not only a dominant publisher ad server (50% now 90%+), DFP, but also a nascent ad exchange, AdX (now 50%+), in order to pursue its goal of dominance across the entire ad tech stack /9
(2) Google then restricted all of its Google Ads’ advertiser demand exclusively to AdX. Basically, if you wanted any of the dominant ad$ flowing through Google then you had to use its adtech. /10
(3) They also allegedly provided AdX a bunch of exclusive features for Google's publisher customers using DFP (dynamic allocation, "last look," effective real-time access). Again, "drying out..." header bidding. /11
(4) Interestingly, despite a # of cited problematic adtech acquisitions, they seem to focus on Google’s acquisition of AdMeld (Hi Ben!) in order to stop AdMeld's "multi-homing across ad exchanges" as being key to Google. /12
(5) They walk through Google’s use of Project Bell, which "lowered, without advertisers’ permission or knowledge, bids to publishers who dared partner with Google’s competitors." Angry face emoji from me. /13
(6) Google’s deployment of sell-side "Dynamic Revenue Share" to manipulate auction bids—without publishers’ knowledge -- and to advantage AdX. Basically cutting share to win bids for Google's systems making up for it on less competitive auctions. /14
(7) Feels like bid rigging. "Google’s use of Project Poirot to thwart competitive threat of header bidding by secretly and artificially manipulating DV360’s advertiser bids on rival ad exchanges using header bidding in order to ensure transactions were won by Google’s AdX." /15
Still on (7), taking Project Poirot as the example, the lawsuit also includes internal messages at Google which show the "whopping" effects on the competitive advertising exchanges. Haven't seen this data previously. Again, smells like bid rigging to me. /16
the last anticompetitive conduct allegation - Google’s veiled introduction of so-called Unified Pricing Rules that took away publishers’ power to transact with rival ad exchanges at preferred prices. This was to deal with Google's "flooring problem." /17
The lawsuit also names names in terms of impacted competition. If you worked at or owned shares in AppNexus/Xandr, Rubicon, OpenX, Pubmatic among others, you may not be terribly happy with Google. Of course, they all were supposed to be working for publishers' revenues. /18
For the AMP haters. We also see internal messages where an engineer makes clear Google's real AMP motivations were justified by business needs rather than architecture and users. Remember this example when you considering trusting Google on its decisions around 3P cookies. /19
Ultimately, on the publisher side, Google's control over the publisher ad server market allegedly allowed it to do a long list of shady things to maintain an average 20% rake on the intermediation and the data. "Average" is important as it could manipulate to get there. /20
and for the antitrust wonks and Google defenders, the relevant markets in the lawsuit are threefold: the publisher ad servers, advertising exchanges and advertiser networks. Google's market shares are crazy-large as long documented. /21
I'm going to stop there. Bottom-line, I think this is a masterpiece. Any interesting perspectives or reports, please do send my way. And a reminder, the bipartisan state AGs lawsuit is already passed dismissal and moving forward in SDNY. /22
Sorry shame on me, here is a link to the full 153 pages for those who also want to read it. I would welcome anything I missed or different reads on it. Also... /23 storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.usco…
And lastly, I should link to the video clips I did from the announcement. As I've been saying since I had the very first meetings with enforcers probably five years ago, they've seriously ramped up at enforcement offices. Popcorn. /24
woah, I've now read Google and DOJ's proposed remedies for Google's 3rd antitrust defeat (adtech). I threaded Friday's hearing but this full doc is nothing short of beautiful. Best stuff may be missed so hear me out. This is a huge deal - 10yrs, "lifeblood of the Internet." /1
A reminder on the four objectives of antitrust remedies. In court on Friday and in Google's proposal, Google just seems to ignore the third and fourth as if they don't matter. That's a major problem for them. Judge Brinkema will be all over it. She gets this case wonderfully. /2
For instance, on Friday she labeled Google's ad demand, AdWords, the "golden goose." Now here is how DOJ describes it: "unique advertising demand." Notably, they don't flag that the demand also connects back to Google's other illegal monopoly loss for "search text ads." /3
A few more nuggets of delight for you. First, Tim Apple has had his halo bent. He's arguably had the best reputation of the big tech CEOs until today. He ordered the code red. /1
Alex Roman had a super bad day. If anyone directed him on this testimony cited by the Court, heads will roll. either way, Apple Inc also has big problems. /2
Day 2. A few comments after 2nd day of testimony from Mark Zuckerberg. FTC began with impeachment as Zuckerberg had said yesterday friends & family were only about 25% of Stories shared when instead it appears more in 63-73% range. I would hammer him on these, it's a pattern. /1
Remember, we've learned from MZ's deposition to SEC and many trips to Congress, he may say too much and seems to talk his way through problems. Speaking of... USvGoogle on the weight of contemporaneous statements is already a massive shadow over MZ. /2
I think MZ has a tell. He often says, "Well that is an interesting question" when asked about his prior contemporaneous statements on fairly obvious questions such as "Is it true that Facebook users like less ads in their feeds?" /3
with FTC's opening statement slides (109 of them over 86 minutes IYKYK)) now posting, I want to flag just a few of them worth amplifying. /1
These two statements from Judge Boasberg his denial of Meta's motion to dismiss last November will weigh heavily on Facebook imho. The evidence from both the Instagram deal and WhatsApp deal are damning considering just these two bullets. /2
This slide (and the next one) were interesting in getting internal reflections of Meta/Facebook forcing more ads into the Instagram experience. /3
FTC v Meta Day 1. Opening arguments for FTC laid out its case. As predicted, Meta tried to blow hole into market definition. This actually comes later in trial so not dwelling but will add some context at end. But first witness 1 was CEO Zuckerberg. Dead to rights on conduct. /1
Internal Facebook employee messages (some we've previously seen plus plenty more) make the Instagram deal clearly anticompetitive conduct imho. Exhibits may not post until Wed so my quotes are my best snapshots from messages in exhibits on screens. Relay with care. I tried. /2
Zuckerberg has testified for only 3 hrs of FTC's estimated 7hrs so he's back on stand tomorrow at 9:30am ET (remember, Careless People book said he hates mornings). FTC has been systematically laying out timeline of Facebook shift to mobile and acquisition of Instagram. /3
As Meta’s Andy Stone works overnight criticizing whistleblower testimony today on their role in China, let’s not forget Meta worked furiously thru billions in settlements to keep sealed it provided data access to 86,961 developers in China unsealed after court sanctions in 2023.
That slide is from their own internal audit. The one they promised the public and Congress in testimony then buried it including fighting to keep the forensic clean up artists aka auditors under seal, too, until an attorney said it in open courtroom. storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.usco…
Here is Stone’s statement this morning. He has a track record burying for his bosses so just think it’s important context when he tries to brush aside China. Thank you @HawleyMO for accountability here. nbcnews.com/tech/social-me…