D.D.C. assumes w/o deciding that Google geofence is a "search," holds that J6 warrant for logged in accounts at capitol from 2pm to 6:30pm on 1/6/21 was sufficiently particular.
As I understand the opinion, there are two parts: 1st, was the geofence sufficiently narrow that there was PC to think the accounts picked up would be evidence? And here, there was.
2nd, defendant makes a claim that the warrant vested too much discretionary power in the government that gets labeled a claim about particularity. I don't know what that argument has to do with warrant particularity, but in any event, the court rejects the claim.
I confess I find these geofence warrant cases odd; the kind of analysis they are conducting seems quirky, and not directly about the traditional kinds of warrant legality. But then I am skeptical that they involve searches at all, too, an issue that hasn't been reached.
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For law profs, "doctrinal" scholarship gets a bad rap. But sometimes there's a difficult area of doctrine that judges struggle with, and that has high practical stakes. Writing that helps judges resolve those hard cases may be "doctrinal," but it can be pretty useful.
I would guess this is underappreciated b/c a lot of law profs write in areas where the doctrine is well known & there's a clear ideological valance to how the uncertainty should be resolved. Writing about doctrine in those areas looks like an appellate brief for a side.
But that isn't true in many cases, so today the legal academic world tends to underproduce a certain kind of scholarship that could be pretty helpful. (Being helpful to courts isn't everything, obviously; but it's not nothing, either.)
The Supreme Court has posted a 23-page "STATEMENT OF THE COURT CONCERNING THE LEAK INVESTIGATION." I'm going to read it now and post thoughts below. supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/pre…
In the 2-page summary from the Court, they say that the Marshal conducted an investigation but could not, by a preponderance of the evidence, identify who leaked the draft. Former 3d Cir. Judge Michael Chertoff was asked to review the investigation and assessed it, too.
My overall take is that they did a very comprehensive investigation inside the building, but that, being only the Marshal, it appears to me that they didn't take some investigative steps that the FBI or an outside law enforcement agency could have taken.
From 1969-'71, @kpfaradio's Dan McClosky interviewed jazz musicians for his radio show. The interviews haven't been heard since then, but he he's quietly posting his interviews over at Youtube. No on has noticed—yet.
Putting aside whether there should be a Supreme Court Historical Society and what its role should be — more on that below — is it really true that some stone with the Supreme Court seal is "a unique status symbol" in DC? That seems weird to me. nytimes.com/2022/12/30/us/…
As for the SCT Historical Society, I have always thought of it as a club for Supreme Court nerds to put on some lectures, run the gift shop, and put out a magazine. tIt didn't occur to me until the Shenk story that someone would try to use it as a way to influence the court.
I suspect, after the Shenk allegations, that the Justices will stop going to the group's events, which I would guess most Justices would be rather happy about.
A person has a reasonable of expectation of privacy in the contents of a password-protected Dropbox account, Wisconsin Court of Appeals holds. It's a closed container for 4th Amendment purposes —remote, but closed. (Yes, definitely right, in my view.) wicourts.gov/ca/opinion/Dis…#N
It's surprising how little caselaw there is on this. That's partly because lawyers for Internet providers generally require a warrant before they'll turn over account contents, and investigators can't practically sue the providers over that if they disagree (it takes too long).
If the providers are requiring a warrant, you end up with a warrant requirement in practice but little or no caselaw on whether it's required. So having caselaw on this is actually pretty useful.
Cal SCT, over dissent of Liu, J., holds that police shining a spotlight on a parked car at night is a factor in whether the driver was seized (whether a reas person in that situation would feel free to leave), but isn't an automatic seizure. courts.ca.gov/opinions/docum…#N
Liu, dissenting, would treat spotlight as imparting a message that you are not free to leave.
Liu's dissent has lots of cites to law review articles on how the Supreme Court has misapplied its own doctrine on seizures — most people wouldn't feel free to leave when the Supreme Court says a reasonable person would. Majority says, well, we are bound by SCOTUS, not articles.