New thread from "Karl," the Estonian military analyst, on where we stand in Ukraine. With @holger_r:
"The amount and types of armor that Western countries have promised to send to Ukraine is noteworthy. We can presume that some countries will send a bit more than announced. It fulfills one criteria that will allow Ukraine to start a counteroffensive in the south this spring."
"The terrain there is bare, it’s a steppe. It wouldn’t be possible to advance there without armor."
"It is difficult to comprehend Germany’s (and partly America's) fears of taking the decision to send tanks. In Germany's case it must be a combination of historical fears, the Russian lobby especially inside Germany’s business sector and the indecisiveness of Scholz."
"This combination caused the delayed decision. It was evident that Germany would not escape that decision. The pressure on them was so strong. Their resistance just didn’t make sense..."
"Among other things, it deepens the wounds that the Baltic countries and especially Poland have toward them. It is regrettable that Germany’s leadership role took another serious hit in our region."
"Germany made another mistake when they announced sending the Leopards. They added a new public 'red line' about not giving Ukraine fighter jets. Why would you need to say out loud what you will not give?"
"Biden made the same mistake before the war. We have seen so many times how such 'red lines' have been erased soon afterwards."
"From a military perspective Ukraine still needs two things. First, longer-range missile systems. Russia has taken its ammunition depots further away from the frontline. They are now 90-120 km away and out of HIMARS’ range."
"Yes, it hampers their logistics but it also hinders Ukraine's countering. It is more difficult to hit the trucks carrying ammunition than to hit a depot."
"Secondly, Ukraine still needs fighter jets. If they sufficiently have all three types of weapons [tanks, long-range missiles, jets], it would allow them to break through the frontline at least in the south in late spring/early summer."
"Ukraine says they’d need 350-400 tanks, but by the time of their spring offensive they will have around 200-250 including the modernized Soviet tanks given by some European countries."
"It is a really remarkable number. Most experts agree that 1 Leopard is worth 2.5-4 Russian tanks due to superior firepower and maneuvering ability."
"The delayed announcement about sending the tanks can postpone the start of the spring offensive by some weeks. The terrain would allow the offensive to start at least in the south in early April. Now it’s difficult to see it happen before May."
"It’s worth noting that Germany has sent Ukraine 3.5 times more military aid than France but France has largely escaped similar levels of criticism. If you compare the two countries’ military capabilities, France is clearly better equipped."
"Most Western European countries are well supplied with fighter jets. It’s one of the few areas where European militaries are good. A critical issue is how much ammunition can be produced and how fast can Ukraine do maintenance and repair works."
"People are talking about an upcoming large-scale Russian offensive. I am moderately confident that Russia itself already thinks it is conducting one. It’s just that none of the others see it as large."
"I am doubtful how good a picture Putin has about the status and readiness of its units."
"Besides Bakhmut and Soledar, Russia is trying something near Vuhledar and Pavlivka about 30km southwest of Donetsk. Also, they have been conducting offensives north of Vasylivka (where the Dnipro river turns straight north and where there would be direct route to Zaporizhzhia)."
"But all of this seems to be largely resultless."
"Last time they tried in Vuhledar was 2-3 months ago and they had 2 battalions worth of their marines killed in 3 days. They are also without any success in Kreminna and, if anything, Ukraine is really slowly advancing there."
"As long as there will be no large and visible loss for Russia, Putin will try to avoid the next level of mobilization. Last time he announced it after the epic defeat in Kharkiv. Mobilization is one of the few things that actually decreases the popularity of war in Russia."
"Putin’s instinct is not to do it. Let’s hope that he keeps on delaying it."
"Ukraine has suffered a lot of casualties and their situation in Bakhmut is still very difficult. If Russia advances a few more kilometers in the south of Bakhmut, one of the most significant supply routes will be in a critical situation." /END
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"[T]o the relief of Western and Ukrainian leaders, corruption has otherwise not been a significant factor in the war." nytimes.com/2023/01/27/us/…
"Celeste Wallander, the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, said at Thursday’s hearing that the administration 'has not seen credible evidence of any diversion of U.S.-provided weapons outside of Ukraine.'"
"But U.S. officials fear that humanitarian aid, and especially direct financial aid, is more at risk of embezzlement or theft."
A helicopter crash in Kyiv has killed 17 people including Ukraine's minister of emergency affairs Denys Monastyrsky: nytimes.com/live/2023/01/1…
Full list of the dead:
▫️Minister of Internal Affairs Denys Monastyrskyi
▫️ First Deputy Minister Yevhenii Yenin
▫️State Secretary Yuriy Lubkovich
▫️Deputy Head of the Patronage Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Tetyana Shutyak
▫️ Head of the Protection Department of the Department of Internal Security of the NPU Mykhailo Pavlushko
▫️Inspector of the Department of Communication of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Mykola Anatskyi
▫️ Aircraft commander Oleksandr Vasylenko
▫️ Pilot Kostyantyn Kovalenko
End of year thread with @holger_r: Estonian military analyst "Karl" on what to expect in Ukraine in 2023:
Karl's assessment: "If current trends continue, Ukraine will have liberated close to all of its territory (including Crimea) by end of 2023."
"Let’s start with an overview of the current situation. No breakthroughs after Kherson but that was predictable. There was a slight hope that Ukraine could have success on the front in northern Luhansk but Russia has managed to hold on there due to its mobilized troops."
[Thread.] It's no secret that the U.S. wants Ukraine to signal its openness to peace talks. Or that there are elements within the White House that want the war over ASAP on terms not maximally favorable to Ukraine. msn.com/en-us/news/wor…
Biden's line is that openness is meant to persuade countries neutral or even hostile toward Ukraine (the global south) that Russia is the intransigent party here; not to force Kyiv's capitulation. Ukraine's reply to this seems to be: "Fine, let's parlay...through the UN."
Remember that Kyiv and Moscow had *direct* peace talks weeks into the war, complete with suspected poisonings of oligarchs and double or even triple agent shenanigans. Back channel discussions have been ongoing ever since: see Burns and Naryshkin in Ankara.
Clearly there is some daylight. Zelensky’s dismissal of Biden’s “just peace” formulation, which Biden tried to walk back a bit. Z wants nothing to do with Putin now or ever (who can blame him?). Also, I bet they’re not joking about long-range offensive arty when cameras are off.
Also, on the NATO unity question—up to a point, Lord Copper. Heard from one diplomat last week Scholz is “Doktor Nein” on doing very much more for Kyiv. No surprise there if you simply read Scholz’s FP pontifications.
Pats and air defense an easier sell given terror from above. Offensive capability needed to retake more terrain faster still causes hiccups among those who didn’t think (and perhaps don’t like) that Ukraine could do this well.