New thread from "Karl," the Estonian military analyst, on where we stand in Ukraine. With @holger_r:
"The amount and types of armor that Western countries have promised to send to Ukraine is noteworthy. We can presume that some countries will send a bit more than announced. It fulfills one criteria that will allow Ukraine to start a counteroffensive in the south this spring."
"The terrain there is bare, it’s a steppe. It wouldn’t be possible to advance there without armor."
"It is difficult to comprehend Germany’s (and partly America's) fears of taking the decision to send tanks. In Germany's case it must be a combination of historical fears, the Russian lobby especially inside Germany’s business sector and the indecisiveness of Scholz."
"This combination caused the delayed decision. It was evident that Germany would not escape that decision. The pressure on them was so strong. Their resistance just didn’t make sense..."
"Among other things, it deepens the wounds that the Baltic countries and especially Poland have toward them. It is regrettable that Germany’s leadership role took another serious hit in our region."
"Germany made another mistake when they announced sending the Leopards. They added a new public 'red line' about not giving Ukraine fighter jets. Why would you need to say out loud what you will not give?"
"Biden made the same mistake before the war. We have seen so many times how such 'red lines' have been erased soon afterwards."
"From a military perspective Ukraine still needs two things. First, longer-range missile systems. Russia has taken its ammunition depots further away from the frontline. They are now 90-120 km away and out of HIMARS’ range."
"Yes, it hampers their logistics but it also hinders Ukraine's countering. It is more difficult to hit the trucks carrying ammunition than to hit a depot."
"Secondly, Ukraine still needs fighter jets. If they sufficiently have all three types of weapons [tanks, long-range missiles, jets], it would allow them to break through the frontline at least in the south in late spring/early summer."
"Ukraine says they’d need 350-400 tanks, but by the time of their spring offensive they will have around 200-250 including the modernized Soviet tanks given by some European countries."
"It is a really remarkable number. Most experts agree that 1 Leopard is worth 2.5-4 Russian tanks due to superior firepower and maneuvering ability."
"The delayed announcement about sending the tanks can postpone the start of the spring offensive by some weeks. The terrain would allow the offensive to start at least in the south in early April. Now it’s difficult to see it happen before May."
"It’s worth noting that Germany has sent Ukraine 3.5 times more military aid than France but France has largely escaped similar levels of criticism. If you compare the two countries’ military capabilities, France is clearly better equipped."
"Most Western European countries are well supplied with fighter jets. It’s one of the few areas where European militaries are good. A critical issue is how much ammunition can be produced and how fast can Ukraine do maintenance and repair works."
"People are talking about an upcoming large-scale Russian offensive. I am moderately confident that Russia itself already thinks it is conducting one. It’s just that none of the others see it as large."
"I am doubtful how good a picture Putin has about the status and readiness of its units."
"Besides Bakhmut and Soledar, Russia is trying something near Vuhledar and Pavlivka about 30km southwest of Donetsk. Also, they have been conducting offensives north of Vasylivka (where the Dnipro river turns straight north and where there would be direct route to Zaporizhzhia)."
"But all of this seems to be largely resultless."
"Last time they tried in Vuhledar was 2-3 months ago and they had 2 battalions worth of their marines killed in 3 days. They are also without any success in Kreminna and, if anything, Ukraine is really slowly advancing there."
"As long as there will be no large and visible loss for Russia, Putin will try to avoid the next level of mobilization. Last time he announced it after the epic defeat in Kharkiv. Mobilization is one of the few things that actually decreases the popularity of war in Russia."
"Putin’s instinct is not to do it. Let’s hope that he keeps on delaying it."
"Ukraine has suffered a lot of casualties and their situation in Bakhmut is still very difficult. If Russia advances a few more kilometers in the south of Bakhmut, one of the most significant supply routes will be in a critical situation." /END
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"The situation on the frontlines has not significantly changed in the last month. For UA, the most difficult area remains the southern part of the eastern front—Pokrovsk and Kurakhove. RU continues to advance there, but very slowly and at the cost of heavy losses."
"Some bloggers claim that Kurakhove has already fallen into RU's hands, but it seems that this is not yet the case. UA continues to resist, but after some time, RU will take the town. Pokrovsk is farther away, and urban battles there could last a long time. There is no real threat of RU capturing it within a couple of months."
Breaking: The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has released an unclassified report into the IC and its work on Havana Syndrome, or Anomalous Health Incidents. From the first lines of the executive summary: "It appears increasingly likely that a foreign adversary is behind some AHIs."
Last March @InsiderEng and @60Minutes concluded a yearlong investigation pointing at evidence that Russian military intelligence -- specifically GRU Unit 29155 -- was likely behind AHI. You can read that here: theins.ru/en/politics/27…
Rare opportunity for the Tukrs here. IRGC/proxies are a busted flush. Russia is busy elsewhere, in a battle space where Erdogan has quietly armed the opposing side to rather impressive result (while not antagonizing VVP as other NATO allies have). Erdogan and Fidan are thoroughly and utterly fed up with Assad's BS on normalization.
Moreover, Erdogan sees the incoming Trump administration as far more malleable and accommodating than the outgoing Biden one. Brett McGurk ain't coming back this time. If the U.S. withdraws from Syria, the previous plan of handing the American-PKK protectorate in the Jazira over to Russia is now a dead letter. With what fucking army? Prigozhin's Conoco contracts seem a distant memory now, too.
New: Remember "Pablo Gonzalez," the GRU illegal traded back to Russia in August? He posed for years as a Spanish journalist. A #FreePablo campaign was undertaken by various press freedom organizations when he was arrested in Poland on charges of espionage. Well, guess who gave him a big old hug at Vnukovo Airport when Pablo touched down? This guy.👇
Oleg Sotnikov is a GRU officer and team member of Unit 26165, or "Fancy Bear," which is responsible for the 2016 DNC hack. He helped with the close access hacking of the OPCW in The Hague, and also anti-doping organizations, including USADA, for which he was indicted in District Court in PA. Sotnikov was consul in Rio during the Brazil Olympics in 2016, when over a hundred Russian athletes were caught cheating with performance enhancing drugs. Our story below: theins.ru/en/politics/27…
Rather odd for a Spanish correspondent to immediately recognize and embrace an internationally wanted member of Russian military intelligence, isn't it. But there it is (at left), live on Russian TV, right behind you-know-who. We ran facial recognition software to ID Sotnikov.
New "Karl" thread, the first since the U.S. election, with @holger_r:
"RU is pushing hard on 2-3 fronts. On the Kursk front, they have managed to gain control over a third of the territory occupied by UA. I don’t see RU being able to push UA out of Kursk within this year or by the time Trump takes office on Jan 20. Their pace of progress is slow everywhere on the front."
"The second front where UA continues to struggle is the southern part of the eastern front, from Pokrovsk to Vuhledar. There, UA’s progress is happening continuously, even if it is slow."
New insights from "Karl," the Estonian military analyst, as told to @holger_r and me: 🧵
"Last time, we discussed that the situation near Vuhledar had become critical for UA. By now, it has been abandoned. In summary, RU's offensive toward Vuhledar began a year ago with an attack on Novomykhailivka. The situation in Vuhledar itself started to become uncomfortable a few months ago."
"The main reason RU is advancing there—like along the entire eastern front—is that it's hard to defend against Russian bombs. If RU bombers get close and drop glide bombs, sooner or later UA positions are destroyed, and they must retreat."