Although the specifics of viral evolution are not predictable, its role in the trajectory of the pandemic has been very predictable, unfortunately. In the fall of '20, we posted a preprint predicting the virus would rapidly evolve to evade Abs: (2) journals.plos.org/plosone/articl…
In the spring of '21, we posted a preprint predicting that reopening after having partially vaccinated the population would lead to a massive variant-fueled rebound in cases (this was in the same week as the CDC said you can vax & relax): journals.plos.org/plosone/articl… (3)
Around the same time, we posted another preprint that said that long-term evolution in immunocompromised patients was likely to be an engine of viral evolution going forward & limiting onward transmission from these cases would be crucial: nature.com/articles/s4159… (4)
So yeah, while evolution is not predictable in the details, the consequences of evolution for the current pandemic have sadly been only too predictable. It's best to think of evolution in terms of risks to the future trajectory of the pandemic. (5)
When we say that there is a risk of something happening in our day-to-day lives, we mitigate against those risks instead of debating how certain those risks are to come to pass. It's why we use fire extinguishers, condoms and seatbelts (hopefully not at the same time). (6)
Arguing that we might get lucky when it comes to viral evolution has been a hallmark of the public health response to the ongoing pandemic- it's the reason we've done so poorly. Anticipating what could go wrong is much more useful than anticipating what could go right.(7)
So what are the risks posed to us by viral evolution at this point? First, it's worth pointing out that the more the transmission, the greater the evolution. We & others have made this point in the literature (eg. the paper mentioned in tweet #2 of this thread). (8)
Large standing populations of virus help only the virus. And vaccines alone cannot slow viral evolution, because the transmission rate of intermediate SARS-CoV-2 mutants are what will impact the rate at which novel variants appear: medrxiv.org/content/10.110… (9)
As vaccines have only a limited impact on transmission, they aren't likely to be able to slow this evolutionary rate down. There's papers out there that show that the rate of viral evolution has increased after the rollout of vaccines, which is what you'd expect. (10)
Vaccines are still an important part of the overall solution, but vaccinating widely and then relaxing, in hopes of “hybrid immunity", only means more transmission, which means more evolution. (11)
There's no reason to expect this evolution to result in more benign outcomes- we showed in a recent paper that the virus could kill almost everyone it infects with minimal impact on its fitness (ability to succeed evolutionarily): mdpi.com/2673-8112/2/12… (12)
The narrative that endemicity will lead to a more benign virus is provably false, with many counterexamples from real life. Endemicity is not a victory, a point made by others (h/t ariskatzourakis) as well. (13)
So what's going to happen next? A point made by us and others at this point (h/t @tvrb) is that cross-immunity (of one viral variant against the next) is likely to be a driving force for viral evolution at this point, which is bad news for vaccines: medrxiv.org/content/10.110… (14)
and therapeutics. Whatever we do to update the vaccines and mAbs, the virus will work to defeat quickly. And letting the population of the virus swell ("let er rip") means that there's a quadrillion monkeys on typewriters banging away at that problem at all times. (15)
It's not a winning strategy! Sure, we can't predict exactly when it will all go to hell in a handbasket, but playing chicken with a virus like this is quite certain to end badly. The house always wins with Russian Roulette, if you play enough times. (16)
And it's important to keep in mind that this virus may have other nasty "surprises" up its sleeve. Just because a certain thing hasn't happened already doesn't mean it's not a risk. By now it should be clear that a reactive strategy does very poorly in a situation like this. (17)
One such risk is the emergence of serotypes (groups of sequences within a virus species that share a similar structure). Some diseases, such as dengue, have split into serotypes- meaning that these virus sequence families don't compete with each other and can coexist. (18)
o, for example, if you get infected by one serotype of dengue today, you can get infected by a different one *at the same time*. Serotypes are, at a minimum, a huge public health nuisance, because it means that you have 2+ pandemics running simultaneously. (19)
Serotypes for SARS-CoV-2 would increase disease burden, complicate control (need to match tests, vaccines & mAbs to serotypes). They also raise the potential for increases in viral virulence through antibody-dependent enhancement (ADE). (20)
ADE occurs in dengue, for example- when Abs from a 1st infection bind to an infecting viral particle during a 2nd infection with a different serotype, they can't neutralize the virus, but instead, help the virus infect immune cells more efficiently. Leads to severe disease. (21)
In a recent preprint, we examine the risk of serotype formation for SC2& show it's not off the table. We built a 2-strain epi model (SEIRS) to understand the role of immune evasion in inter-strain competition & dynamics under endemic conditions: medrxiv.org/content/10.110… (22)
Our modeling shows that there are a wide range of situations where strains can be expected to coexist. Basically, as long as the cross-immunity against the invading strain is low enough, we can expect coexistence. We haven't seen this yet in the pandemic, of course. (23)
But that's not to say we won't see it going forward. Serotype formation (and ADE) is one way in which the virus could access a dramatic increase in mortality rates. There are others (more on this later). That it hasn't happened yet doesn't mean the risk doesn't exist. (24)
The point being, viral evolution is proceeding at a rapid clip at this point, thanks to 'let er rip'. Even small changes in IFR could lead to really bad outcomes & there are multiple ways in which things could go sideways at this point. Hope is not a strategy. (25)
TL;DR dosing existing vaccines more often could lead to ⬇️ in both disease severity & infection risk. If that pans out, you could use the vaccines to better protect both populations & individuals . (2/)
The point is not to say that the @CDCgov should immediately recommend 4 boosters a year for everyone. The point is that we haven't explored our options fully yet. We know more about vax efficacy than we did 2yrs ago (neutralizing antibodies & not T-cells are the key) (3/)
Flipping the "personal freedom" argument on its head by allowing people the freedom to avoid covid will not end the pandemic overnight. But it provides a start, because it will reduce the cost to individuals for avoiding covid. (26/)
There are many other things that can and should be done (improved indoor air quality, access to antiviral prophylactics, cheap testing, subsidies for vaccinations) to actively manage the burden of covid. (27/)
These things can be done without trying to change the minds of those who don't think covid is a risk. (28/)
Last week, the FDA advisory panel met to discuss a simplified COVID vaccine strategy going forward. The plan is to offer updated boosters to the general population 1x/yr.
Was this the right choice? A preprint posted by us today explores that question. A (long) 🧵follows (1/):
We were interested in understanding the impact of vaccination frequency on protection against severe disease and infection. To examine this, we used an agent-based modeling framework coupled with the outputs of a population pharmacokinetic model (2/)
In simple terms, we fitted a model to a date set consisting the rate of neutralizing antibody waning following vaccination, and coupled that model to a simulation where agents (think Sims) were free to interact and be infected. We accounted for both natural & vax immunity (3/)
We hear a lot about public health being a personal thing these days. “If you’re vulnerable, shield and stay up to date on your vaccines” is what PH advocates for now. So, how well will this work? Our latest preprint explores this question ( 🧵 follows, details 👇👇) (1/:)
TL; DR is that shielding is *very* challenging to pull off under current conditions. We have all “volunteered” for a mass infection experiment that is difficult if not impossible to opt out of (2/)
And for most people, this will come with very real costs: “At an individual level, people who are vaccinated & not taking measures to reduce their contact rate can expect to spend an average of 6 days/yr acutely sick with COVID-19 and also incur a 12% risk of long covid “ (3/)
The T cell cavalry ain't coming: a 🧵 on the lack of evidence for a protective role for T cell immunity for SARS-CoV-2. (Summary of this longer 'mini-review' with refs: docs.google.com/document/d/1Nv…) (1/)
Much ink has been spilled about the importance of the T cell response in limiting death & severe outcomes from COVID-19. T cell durability (or not) is a practical issue, so let's talk a bit about how strong the evidence is (or isn't) for that point of view. (2/)
Early in the pandemic, a body of studies convincingly showed that T cell response is durable after infection & vaccination - led to widely held perception that T cells would protect against severe disease & viral evo. (3/)
By fall 2020, it was clear in-school transmission was a major risk. (We & others published it at the time). PH officials lied outright about it- one was unlucky enough to get caught.
Incisive reporting by @SrushtiGangdev- wish we had reporters like this south of the border (1/)
Public health official in question is (no surprises) Bonnie Henry... it’s always the slowest zebra in the herd ;>
Here’s our paper (preprint posted oct 2020) predicting that school reopening would seed community spread (2/): journals.plos.org/plosone/articl…
In fact, a large part of the argument that transmission was not happening in schools was based on flawed metrics that would have been incapable of detecting spread *even if it was rampant*. We showed this in Spring 2021 (3/): pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33948609/