โข Thomas Bropleh con 54% de sus tiros desde el triple y 36.8% acierto
โข Alex Renfroe con el 40% de sus tiros, 39.0% de acierto
โข Lluis Costa con el 49% de sus tiros, 35.7% de acierto
โข Petit Niang con 14% de rebotes ofensivos - 21% defensivos
โข Luke Maye con 9% de rebotes of. โ 25% def.
โข Cristiano Felicio con 14% de rebotes of. โ 14% def.
โข Cristiano Felicio 25.6% de uso y 1.01 pts/posesiรณn finalizada
โข Prince Ali 26.6% de uso y 0.88 pts/posesiรณn finalizada
โข Petit Niang 13.3% de uso y 1.21 pts/posesiรณn finalizada
โฌ๏ธ๐งต
๐ธ Covirรกn Granada, ACB
Siguiente anรกlisis: Casademont Zaragoza
โข โข โข
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Atamanโs three-guard concept isnโt new.
During his last season at Anadolu Efes, he flirted with a similar lineup (Larkin-Micic-Beaubois), but it only accounted for 5% of total minutes.
Fast forward to Panathinaikos:
Last season: 13% of minutes with Sloukas, Nunn, and Grant.
This season: 37% of minutes across various three-guard combinations.
Itโs no longer an experiment; itโs their identity.
๐๐งต (2/12)
2-Why the Shift?
Atamanโs philosophy is clear:
๐ก More creators = Unpredictable offense
๐ก Faster pace = Exploit defensive mismatches
In a game against Fenerbahce, he even tested a four-guard lineup.
While it only lasted a few minutes, it showcased his commitment to pushing the boundaries of positional basketball.
But does this philosophy deliver consistent results?