In Taylor v. LeBlanc, the 5th Cir. holds it’s clearly established that prisons cannot hold people beyond their release date (more than 2 years in this case).
But the 5th Cir. creates a NEW ELEMENT of #QualifiedImmunity to let the jailer off. Wow. 1/
(1) Is there a constitutional violation? (2) Is it “clearly established”?
The clearly-established test does all the mischief because it requires an earlier decision on similar facts (e.g., pepper spray vs. taser). 2/
Though it’s premises are wrong (if not absurd), SCOTUS created the clearly-established test to determine whether an official’s acts were “objectively reasonable.” I.e., if there’s a similar case holding that an act is unconstitutional, it’s objectively unreasonable to do it. 3/
But in Taylor, the 5th Cir. separates the clearly established test from reasonableness and holds that a gov’t official can violate clearly established law AND STILL GET #QUALIFIEDIMMUNITY. This is wild and creates yet *another* way for gov’t officials to avoid accountability. 4/
Taylor cites to Hare v. City of Corinth, but the original emphasis makes clear that Hare was distinguishing b/w clearly established law at the time of its decision and the time of the act-the latter being dispositive. (So Taylor’s omission of Hare’s emphasis is crucial.) 5/
Taylor also cites Hope v. Pelzer, a uniquely anti-#QualifiedImmunity SCOTUS opinion, which created an obviousness exception to the clearly-established test. Taylor relies on Hope to argue the c-e test is not sufficient to overcome QI. But Hope held the OPPOSITE. 6/
The whole point of Hope was to explain that some things are so bad no earlier case is necessary for fair warning. The Supreme Court reiterated that recently in Taylor v. Riojas, slapping down the 5th Cir. for granting #QualifiedImmunity for horrific jail conditions. 7/
But somehow (in another prison case, no less), the 5th Cir. is using Hope for the opposite proposition: Even if something IS clearly established as unconstitutional, we can grant #QualifiedImmunity unless plaintiff somehow shows it was also objectively unreasonable. Huh? 8/
Judge Ho has been pretty good on #QualifiedImmunity in the past year. (See, e.g., Villarreal v. Laredo). But this is through the immunity looking glass.
CLARIFICATION: A commenter (who seems to have deleted her account?) pointed out that this is not a totally new test, citing Kipps v. Caillier from 1999. I agree that I was a little imprecise. So, I'd like to add a couple points: . . . a/
(1) The 3d element in Taylor is not "new," but one that has been dormant in the 5th Cir. for about 20 years. (2) It has been cited in other circuits, primarily the 1st (where it went dormant in about 10 years ago) and the 6th (which still uses it, see below). b/
(3) The 3d element seems to have been an attempt to address the specificity requirement of the c-e test (e.g., taser v. pepper spray), but that's not how the 5th Cir. uses it here. Rather, Taylor acknowledges keeping someone for 30 days past a sentence is a c-e 14A violation: c/
As I noted earlier, if a sufficiently specific precedent clearly establishes something is unconstitutional, that (per Harlow v. Fitzgerald itself) is what determines objective unreasonableness. But Taylor creates a new escape valve (or at the very least muddies the precedent): d/
Finally, and most importantly, (4) this independent 3d element is clearly inconsistent with SCOTUS precedent. The cited portion of Saucier doesn't support it. Hope v. Pelzer certainly doesn't support it. Taylor makes #QualifiedImmunity worse.
/end (for real this time)
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🧵Nearly THREE YEARS after @IJ argued the ankle-monitor case Meade v. ETOH, the 5th Cir. issued an unpublished opinion holding that a judge's private, monetary relationship with a private ankle-monitoring company does not "create an unconstitutional risk of judicial bias."
1/
New Orleans judge Paul Bonin ordered defendant's to use a specific ankle-monitoring company: ETOH.
ETOH would send the judge the outstanding bills for the $300 "service."
If defendants didn't pay, the judge would threaten to jail them or refuse to release them from monitoring.
2/
But the judge never disclosed ETOH was run by his former law partner, who (along with the other owner of ETOH) repeatedly made monetary contributions to the judge.
The 5th Cir. held that this wasn't enough to violate due process.
4/7: In JJG v. Trump, SCOTUS held that the D.C. District Court lacked habeas jurisdiction.
Still, SCOTUS held that Alien Enemy detainees are entitled to notice “in such a manner as will allow them to actually seek habeas relief.”
1/
4/14: AG Bondi promulgated a memo to all federal police.
Directly contradicting SCOTUS, Bondi ordered police to falsely tell all AEA detainees they are “not entitled to a hearing, appeal, or judicial review of the apprehension and removal warrant.”
This memo stayed secret.
2/
4/23: The gov’t opposed a TRO in another AEA case, JAV v. Trump.
There it said the gov’t “developed procedures for aliens” subject to the AEA per SCOTUS in JJG.
It cited a SEALED decl., claiming each detainee is served an English form that’s read and explained in Spanish.
The Supreme Court just struck down Boasberg’s TRO in Trump v. JJG - the Alien Enemies Act, case.
The decision is disappointing in its application to people the gov’t already renditioned without due process (and seems to encourages the gov’t to evade judicial review), but… 1/
SCOTUS confirms, contrary to what demagogues like @StephenM and @mrddmia have been screaming, that illegal aliens get due process and that the Alien Enemies Act requires notice and an opportunity to be heard *before* removal. This means habeas in the district of confinement. 2/
@StephenM @mrddmia JJG also confirms that the gov’t violated the constitutional rights of every person on the planes to CECOT, but they’re effectively outlaws because of prospective application.
Kavanaugh concurs to say, in large part b/c of War on Terror excesses, the decision isn’t novel. 3/
Because the 14th Amendment was, of course, passed as a result of the Civil War.
If citizenship turned on allegiance, that would have opened a Pandora’s box of questions pertaining to the citizenship status of, at least, confederate leaders, and, at most, all southerners. 2/3
If the issue is allegiance, the child of Honduran immigrant who permanently (albeit illegally) moved to the U.S. for a better life surely has more allegiance to U.S. law than Winnie Davis, who was born while her dad was the president of the CSA and waging war against the U.S. 3/3
🧵As we await decisions on the #SCOTUS relists of @IJ’s #WrongHouseRaid cert. petitions, I want to highlight how these cases expose a judicial hypocrisy.
Factually, they’re similar.
SWAT teams raided the wrong house without checking the address.
Legally, they’re distinct. 1/8
Despite the cases involving different statutes (1983 v FTCA), immunities (qualified v sovereign), types of cops (city PD v FBI), circuits (5th v 11th), the outcomes were identical.
Even though SWAT raided the wrong addresses, innocent families were left to bear the costs. 2/8
So here’s the judicial hypocrisy.
In 2022’s Egbert v. Boule, SCOTUS eviscerated Bivens’ cause of action for constitutional claims against federal officials.
Its justification was separation of powers:
Providing a damages action is the role of Congress, not the judiciary. 3/8
🧵 @IJ's been fighting hard against #FirstAmendment retaliation - litigating a dozen cases in the past few years. But people don't realize that #SCOTUS has all but killed retaliatory *arrest* claims. It's wild. Let me tell you about it (and our case👇). 1/ ij.org/case/castle-hi…
While #SCOTUS is very protective of prior restraint on @USConst_Amend_I and kinda protective of non-arrest retaliation (but see #QualifiedImmunity), it's openly hostile to retaliatory arrest claims. See Nieves v. Bartlett. 2/
Worse still, the reason #SCOTUS immunizes police from retaliatory arrest claims? Pure *policy* (AKA judicial activism). You can't enforce the #FirstAmendment because police have a tough job. Seriously. Justice Gorsuch points this out in his concurrence in Nieves. 3/