A few thoughts on the Russian winter offensive, which began 3+ weeks ago, and has so far yielded little progress for RU forces. Poor force quality, loss of junior officers, ammunition, and equipment constraints limit Russian offensive potential. Thread. 1/
The RU offensive consists of about 5-6 axes of attack focused on the Donbas. Rather than a major push along one part of the front, it is instead a series of distributed battles running north-south from Luhansk, to Bakhmut, and southern Donetsk. 2/
Russian forces are attacking at Vuhledar, Marinka, Adviivka, Bakhmut (and Bilohorivka), Kreminna -> Lyman, with attempts to advance near Kupyansk. The offensive began in the last week of January with a Russian assault on Vuhledar. 3/
The battle for Vuhledar involves two NI brigades (155th, 40th), and has not gone well for the Russian military. RU units refilled with mobilized personnel seem to have lost a fair bit of their offensive edge, but I’m not sure this is a ‘failure to learn.’ 4/
The terrain outside of Vuhledar is very open, heavily mined, and covered by UA ATGM teams. It leaves RU forces few options for an assault. I also wonder if the Russian military may be short on specialized equipment for tasks like mine clearing. 5/
At Kreminna RU VDV seems to have made some incremental gains against UA positions. Depending on how that battle plays out it may force UA to abandon the Kreminna campaign or lead to see-saw battles in the forest west of the city. 6/
There’s a growing likelihood that UA will withdraw from Bakhmut to another defensive line east of Slovyansk/Kramatorsk. The Russian military may then turn north and try to consolidate control up to the Donets river (including Bilohorivka). 7/
RU forces have not had much success at Avdiivka or Marinka. This is another area that’s seen months of fighting. The Russian offensive doesn’t look like much of an offensive because it is playing out in areas that have previously seen unsuccessful Russian attacks. 8/
At this stage it doesn’t seem that RU has employed reserves, and is likely using those units to replace casualties, or perhaps waiting for a breakthrough to exploit. That said, there’s not much evidence of a larger additional RU force in the waiting. 9/
I’ve been skeptical that there is an additional ‘spring offensive’ looming. To conduct such an operation RU would likely need a second mobilization wave, in advance, which never took place. Predictions that 500k troops would be mobilized mid-January proved incorrect. 10/
Senior US and NATO military officials have begun saying much the same in recent days. There’s a relative consensus that the Russian offensive to take the Donbas began some time ago, and its going about as expected given the state of the force. 11/ defense.gov/News/Transcrip…
My best guess is Moscow will wait to see what comes of this offensive before proceeding with a second mobilization wave. I would not discount anything, but right now the RU offensive looks to yield mostly incremental gains that come at the expense of equipment and ammunition. 12/
One possibility is that after UA launches an offensive in the spring, RU will then choose to mobilize in the summer, an attempt another operation later. Given UA no longer enjoys a manpower advantage, RU strategy in 2023 could be to grind away at UA manpower. 13/
Russian forces are expending artillery ammunition in this offensive which they will miss in the spring. The coming months will reveal the real situation in RU artillery ammo availability, which I expect is quite problematic, forcing them to ration. 14/
That said, Ukrainian forces may also have issues with artillery ammo and barrels. This remains a near to medium term challenge. Rosy assessments of Western ammo production potential over the long-term might not align well with UA requirements for the coming 6-12 months. 15/
UA is better served absorbing the RU attack & exhausting RU offensive potential, then taking the initiative later this spring. Having expended ammunition, better troops, and equipment it could leave RU defense overall weaker. 16/
My impression is that Surovkin, who stabilized RU lines, preferred a defensive strategy, rebuilding the force, and preferring to defend against a Ukrainian offensive in the south. Then have RU forces launch an offensive later in the summer to try and capture the Donbas. 17/
Instead, Gerasimov is exhausting the Russian armed forces with a feckless series of offensive operations, which may yield some gains, like Bakhmut, but unlikely to change the strategic picture. The second battle for the Donbas may once again leave RU forces vulnerable. 18/
A spring offensive will still prove a difficult operation for UA. Russian mil now has enough manpower & reserves to avoid a depleted frontline as in Kharkiv. Kherson is an imperfect, but probably a better guide for how a future UA offensive may unfold. 19/
Whether Western AFVs make much of a difference depends on employment and the timing of the UA offensive. Its possible, if UA waits for the force to absorb it in quantity, but I suspect this equipment will mostly serve to backfill losses from the next operation. 20/
For a bit more on this I would suggest tuning into this WOTR podcast from yesterday. We talk about the Russian offensive, key battles to watch, and how it could shape Ukraine’s plans for the spring. warontherocks.com/2023/02/russia…
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A few thoughts on the current course of the war. Although winter has proven a transitional phase, with both sides focusing on force reconstitution and positional fighting. The outlines of the coming months & likely offensive operations are steadily becoming clearer. Thread. 1/
After Kharkiv & Kherson, the Russian military was at its most vulnerable going into the winter. Mobilization helped stabilize Russian lines, raise manning levels, and establish reserves. Consequently, Ukraine no longer enjoys a significant manpower advantage. 2/
RU adopted a largely defensive strategy under Surovikin focused on force reconstitution, entrenchment, and a strike campaign against UA critical infrastructure. Bakhmut was not an exception, largely fought by Wagner PMCs from RU prison system. 3/
Good thread by @Tatarigami_UA, but important to parse questions of logistics disruption & RU adjustment, with assessments of fire rate, available stocks, and production rates. Several factors can be relevant, making it difficult to discern which is more causal. 1/
So, are we conflating Russian logistics disruption with RU running out of ammo? My sense is that RU adjustment to logistics disruption has probably been more successful than commonly discussed, but that ammo depletion remains an important factor to watch for 2023. 2/
You can debate which is more causal of a decline in Russian fire rates: 1. rationing due to dwindling stocks, 2. lower intensity of fighting and a reduced frontline, 3. logistics disruption - or assume it is multi-causal and all of the above are important factors. 3/
Good piece by Jack. I find the tank discussion somewhat talismanic, but agree that it represents an important political decision point on whether to take the better kit from current fleets to support UA, as opposed to relying on older equipment in storage. 1/
That said, IFVs are probably more important in what they offer UA overall. ADS, arty, barrels, and ammunition, remain the more significant issues. Tanks are often being used in an indirect fire role, though that could be particularly characteristic of fighting over the winter. 2/
I've been very much on 'team tank' in terms of their utility, and don't subscribe to the recurring post-1973 claims about tanks being obsolete, etc. That said, this war raises two distinct sets of questions: are tanks being used effectively & has maneuver warfare been viable? 3/
Understand US is trying to find ways to improve outcomes and reduce UA dependence on high rates of arty fire. Less attrition, more maneuver. Training to do combined arms at company/battalion level is good in and of itself, but it won’t necessarily solve this problem. 1/
I have no doubt UA can learn combined arms maneuver, and saw elements of this at Kharkiv. However, without USAF air superiority, US logistics, C4ISR, etc it’s a bit hard to ‘fight like Americans.’ How well would we do without airpower? 2/
More importantly, it misses that attrition is what enabled maneuver in UA offensives. Against a well prepared defense, with sufficient density of forces, it wasn’t nearly as successful and casualties were high. This is why Kherson was so difficult compared to Kharkiv/Lyman. 3/
There's a lot of goodness in this piece by Steve Biddle. It's balanced, and well written, pouring cold water over some of the tech fetishism, and tendentious takes that have proliferated since this war began. A few comments. 1/ warontherocks.com/2022/11/ukrain…
From my point of view most technology is offense-defense agnostic, and this is largely a moribund lens for viewing war. I agree with Biddle that force employment is much more deterministic, but I would add force design, which has a structural effect on employment. 2/
This war reveals that good theory + capability doesn't translate into successful practice when you've not made the organizational adaptations, matured the concepts, or trained the force to effect them. All of this can come apart quickly when a military tries to scale. 3/
A few thoughts on the current course of the war, and some impressions after a recent visit to Ukraine with several colleagues from the mil analysis community, including areas near the front in Kherson. /1
The general sense one gets is that Ukraine is winning the war & morale is high, but like any military operation, you see friction up close that you can’t from a distance. A fair bit of the UA effort is ground up, based on horizontal linkages, volunteers, apps, etc. 2/
Russia’s military appears at its most vulnerable going into the winter, but UA has seen some modest impact from RU mobilization. Troops are being deployed to try and stabilize Russian lines, and increase force density relative to terrain. 3/