So, how many of the people ranting about Israel's judicial reform know what it actually contains?
Thankfully, I'm here to help. The reform contains five different measures: (1/16)
1. Ministers will be able to choose who represents them in court and which line of argumentation to use.
This is meant to correct a situation where legal advisors (appointed not by ministers but by jurists' committees on tender)... (2/16)
... are deemed by jurisprudence to have the right to give instructions to ministers (talk about separation of powers), are the only ones who can represent them in courts... and can refuse to do so, leaving them with no representation at all. (3/16)
The reform does not change the way legal advisors are appointed.
2. Judges will still be able to assess a governmental decision's "reasonable" character (over and beyond its actual legality), but they won't be able to strike it down on that basis alone. (4/16)
In order to do that, they'll need, y'know, some kind of law they can rely on.
3. Appointment committees for judges will not anymore have a majority of legal professionals, with a veto power for the judicial block. (5/16)
They will still include judges, but politicians will have a majority. However, that majority can only be reached when including a member of the opposition who will have a place reserved in these committees. (6/16)
4. Judges won't be able to strike down Basic Laws.
In a country without a Constitution, Basic Laws are adopted in the same way as simple laws and concern institutional arrangements and human rights. (7/16)
In a landmark 1995 decision (Mizrahi Bank), the Supreme Court decided it could strike down simple laws which did not comply with Basic Laws - thus jurisprudentially giving the latter constitutional force. (8/16)
Since no democracy anywhere allows judges to strike down the Constitution, that part of the reform is nothing more than a common sense consequence of the Mizrahi decision. (9/16)
5. The right of the Supreme Court to strike down laws, which until now was purely jurisprudential, will be enshrined into law. However, these decisions will need to be taken in a formation of 15 judges with a majority of 12. (10/16)
Furthermore, the Knesset may then overrule the Supreme Court if it finds a majority of 61 legislators out of 120 to vote in that way. (11/16)
It should be pointed out that Basic Laws, which the Supreme Court turned into Israel's Constitution, do not require a majority of 61 and can be changed by a simple majority of voters. Overturning the judicial annulment of a law... (12/16)
... will therefore be more difficult than changing the legal basis of that decision, which has the same result in practice.
That's it. No end of democracy, no end of Zionism, not even an end to the principle of checks and balances. (13/16)
Quite the contrary, in fact: checks and balances on the government and Parliament are preserved, and some are added to the, until now, unrestrained powers of the only branch of government that has no democratic legitimacy. (14/16)
Could that reform be improved? Sure, like every other reform. Does it justify the hysteric announcements, the road blockings, the international slander campaign against Israel by former Israeli officials? Based on the text, I don't think so. (15/16)
There is something deeply unhealthy in a political culture that replaces cold-headed analysis by crowd hysteria and end-of-the-world rhetoric each time one side doesn't get exactly what it wants. (16/16)
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Ou veulent-ils paraître plus malins que les autres, les gens à qui on ne la fait pas ? (1/4)
Il y a des gens si attachés à leur relativisme moral qu'ils ne voient pas le mal absolu même quand il s'invite dans leur salon en montrant ouvertement toutes ses actions. (2/4)
Les Russes se vantent littéralement de viser des civils, de torturer, de violer, d'enlever des enfants, de préparer un génocide. Ils menacent tous les jours de nucléariser une capitale européenne. (3/4)
Why I am not terrified by the Israeli judicial reform proposal.
Overly heated rhetoric is common in Israeli political life on both sides and should always be taken with a grain of salt. (1/14)
No matter how many times it is repeated, the judicial reforms proposed by Israel's new coalition are not "the end of democracy" or "of Zionism", or whatever. (2/14)
They are significant, but will still leave Israel with a more powerful judiciary than it had in, er, 1995 - a time when no one in their right mind doubted Israel's democratic nature. (3/14)
I sometimes get the reproach of generalising too much about members of different cultures - saying that Germans are like this, Russians like that, Muslims like this again, and let's not even speak of US Democrats. (1/17)
I've learnt during these exchanges the funny word "culturalism," which is supposed to mirror "racism" and is used to shame people who use these generalisations.
Well, guilty as charged. I feel no shame at all. (2/17)
I am a culturalist for a very simple reason: it explains reality pretty well. And behind this lies an interesting phenomenological fact. (3/17)
Possibly the most important outcome to be expected from the Russian defeat - and what will make it fundamentally different from previous defeats against Japan (1905), Poland (1920), Finland (1940) and Afghanistan (1989)... (1/15)
... is that this time, it is the very claim of Russian intrinsic superiority, and the natural inferiority of neighbouring cultures, which is about to be shattered. (2/15)
This claim is so ingrained in Russia's self-image that it survived the fall of the Soviet Union almost unscathed. Even as it was sent fully dressed into third world status, Russia kept seeing itself as the great culture, the great warrior country... (3/15)
Superficial similarities vs. essential difference.
Many Westerners see mostly the similarities between Russian and Ukrainian culture: closely related languages; ... (1/16)
... a visible influence of Ukrainian architecture on Russian churches and palaces (built half a millennium later); a majority identification with the Orthodox church; some aspects of a common Soviet heritage such as the excessive role of oligarchs in the economy. (2/16)
All this is true, but misses an essential difference, which also happens to be the core fault line between Western civilisation and its enemies: the nature of the relationship between society and political power. (3/16)