In 1976, the California Newspaper Service Bureau, a mutually-owned public notice ad sales agency, settled a restraint-of-trade lawsuit. The settlement terms required that they (a) pay the plaintiff $1.5M and (b) sell their 100% interest in the Daily Journal Corp ("DJCO").
Munger's New America Fund ("NAF") bought the DJCO for $2.2M in 1977. DJCO had circulation of 18,000 and $4M of revenues, making it:
- The US's largest legal publisher
- SoCal's dominant legal daily
In 1971, Munger's Blue Chip Stamps ("BCS") agreed to buy CE for $29M. That purchase price was a big commitment for BCS, amounting to:
- 30% of liquid assets
- 80% of shareholders' equity
Here's the story…
CE was Cincinnati's largest newspaper. Scripps, a newspaper chain, bought the paper in 1956. But there was a problem: Cincinnati was one of the last "two-newspaper towns," and Scripps controlled both papers. This led to an antitrust suit and DOJ-imposed sale of CE to Munger.
Why'd Munger bid on CE?
Consider the newspaper economics:
→ More content → More readers
→ More readers → More advertisers
→ More advertisers → Higher ad rates
→ Higher ad rates → More content
This feedback loop led to what Buffett called "survival of the fattest."
In 1972, Jerry Kohlberg, Henry Kravis and George Roberts bought Vapor for Bear Stearns. Despite closing on the eve of a recession, the deal worked so well that they used it as a template for future buyouts.
See below to learn why...
Bear bought Vapor from Singer Corp (sewing). The company had three divisions:
- Mass transit equipment
- Oil & gas valves and pumps
- Industrial process control parts
Think these were low-return cyclical businesses? They weren't.
Vapor:
- Earned +20% ROIC
- Grew every year
Why was Vapor such a good business?
Vapor's products:
- Were proprietary
- Had high aftermarket sales
Vapor, for example, sold mass-transit bus systems that:
- Ran under harsh conditions
- Required sole-source replacement parts
Rank was a cheap way to buy Xerox. It owned a 50% interest in Rank-Xerox, which controlled the non-US rights to xerography. Berkshire paid just ~15x for Rank. Xerox Corp, on the other hand, traded at a ~60x multiple.
Rank invested $1.7 million into Rank-Xerox. Yet by the time of Berkshire's investment in late 1966, Rank-Xerox:
- Grew revenues to $125 million
- Produced 40% operating margins
- Earned a 30% return on equity
Rank-Xerox accounted for 60% of Rank's 1966 consolidated net profits.
How'd Berkshire's Rank investment turn out? Over the next few years, Rank-Xerox grew revenues by ~35% a year and increased profits by 3x. Rank Organization's multiple also increased from 15x to 30x.
The result: Berkshire's two-year investment produced a 3.6x MOIC and 90% IRR.
That's right. In 1960 Buffett invested $60K (20% of his net worth) into Data Documents.
Data Documents:
- Started by Buffett's friend in 1959
- Made IBM tabcards
- Grew by +70% a year
- Produced a 1-year payback on capex
Buffett held his investment and remained chairman of the board for over 14 years. Over that time, Data Documents:
- Grew sales by ~30% a year
- Increased profits from $4K to $3M
- Earned +20% ROEs
The result: Buffett's Data Documents investment returned 170x (33% a year)
Buffett remained chairman of Data Documents' board for 18 years. Also on the board:
- Bill Ruane — Sequoia Fund
- Fred Stanback — Buffett's longtime friend
- Robert Malott — CEO of FMC
[Note: FMC was the only outside investor Buffett agreed to manage money for post-BPL]