1/25
So, another day, another thread, also on task-organised assault detachments but this time placing current Russian developments in their historical context. Which elements of their new assault detachments are genuinely new? #UkraineRussiaWar#Military
3/25
Contrary to popular belief, the Russians and Soviets before them have a long history of task-organising units for operations in complex terrain, particularly urban terrain which I will be focussing on here.
4/25
The story of task organised units could be traced back to the 1920s but it is easiest to begin, as so many aspects of Soviet thought begin, in the Second World War, specifically in the battle of Stalingrad with the relatively small assault teams.
5/25
Based on a platoon sized unit armed almost entirely with sub-machine guns, the Assault Team in Stalingrad was the first instance of the use of dedicated urban assault units by the Red Army.
6/25
Despite this, they already show a number of features which would go on define future assault units. These features are small, agile units of infantry supported by lots of direct fire (provided by tanks and an anti-tank gun in the above example) and flamethrowers.
7/25
In Stalingrad, these small teams were not, for the most part, used for large assaults to reclaim whole streets. Instead, they were used to launch local counter-attacks and keep the Germans off-balance with raids.
8/25
However, from the battle of Kursk onwards, the Red Army was on the offensive for most of the remainder of the war. Consequently, small platoon sized assault teams were no longer sufficient for their needs.
9/25
They required larger formations of assault troops, able to storm entire streets and cities. Enter the Assault Engineer Brigade.
10/25
At the heart of the Assault Engineer Brigade was the Assault Engineer Battalion. Like the preceding assault team, the assault engineer battalion's 33 man sapper platoons were near universally equipped with sub-machine guns, with only a couple of LMGs.
11/25
They were also light on indirect fire support and heavy machine guns, although many sapper platoon's brought anti-tank rifles along for direct fire support. Similarly, sapper companies were often reinforced with flamethrowers.
12/25
Likewise, the brigade they were part of was devoid of much in the way of artillery to reduce the areas they would assault through to rubble, as a western imagining would often characterise the Soviet approach.
13/25
This isn't to say they always lacked artillery, but it wasn't a standard piece of the support organic to the brigade. Again, the Soviet solution to urban warfare being aggression and direct firepower is on display.
14/ 25
In 1944 some Assault Engineer brigades were reinforced with a tank regiment and dedicated flamethrower battalions. The tank regiment was equipped with a mix of flamethrower armed tanks and tanks with flails and other engineering equipment mounted on them.
15/25
Whilst strange to western eyes, the Red Army's assault engineer brigades were highly effective formations. They led the way in many Red Army urban assaults from 1943-45 and ended the war by storming Königsberg (modern day Kaliningrad) in a matter of days.
16/25
Whilst in NATO armies it's become common to think of urban warfare as a slow, methodical process, the assault engineer brigades continued to favour speed and violence of action by small units supported with large amounts of direct firepower.
17/25
This continued to be the case in Soviet task organisation of units for urban assaults into the Cold War. Whilst the example below shows the Storm Group's sub-units as being small platoons,
18/25
a Storm Detachment around a Motor Rifle Battalion could comprise anywhere from three to six Storm Groups, so it's possible many sub-groups were closer to the size we're seeing in modern Russian units in Ukraine (around 12-15 men).
19/25
Like its predecessors in the assault team and assault engineer brigades, the Storm Detachment is notably lacking in indirect fire for a Soviet unit.
20/25
I haven't been able to find any reference to them keeping their mortar batteries, but I also couldn't find any reference to the mortar batteries actively being pulled up to a higher echelon so I left it in.
21/25
One thing to note is that whilst it's not wholly engineers like assault engineer battalions, they're still very heavily represented, as they would be in any NATO battlegroup given the same task.
22/25
What's more interesting is that, where the NATO approach to urban warfare is very people intensive and relatively light on machines, the Soviets went the other way.
23/25
The Storm Detachment has lots of direct fire support from MBTs, SPGs, AGLs and HMGs in support of relatively small assault units who are meant to act quickly and with violence.
24/25
All the traditional hallmarks of a Soviet assault unit are there, small units of well-equipped infantry trusted to act on their own initiative supported by lots of metal. Which brings us to the modern assault detachment, as seen recently in Ukraine.
25/25
With this history, it looks less remarkable and more an old playbook being dusted off for a new war. The key differences seem to be more indirect fire, fewer engineers and, of course, integration of UAVs.
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Based on Tatarigami's excellent thread on the subject, below is an OOB of the Assault Unit/Detachment which has become the Russian's have been using in their recent offensive operations in Ukraine. #RussianUkrainianWar#Military
2/15
The lack of infantry, heavy losses in vehicles and reliance on artillery for firepower that have thus far characterised much of Russia's approach in Ukraine are on display for all to say. However, there are others better qualified to discuss what this is likely to mean
3/15
moving forwards into the rest of 2023. So, I will try to stay in my lane, such as it is, and talk about aspects of this OOB that strike me and the lessons they can teach other armies, specifically although not only the British, moving forwards.