First, a UK government command paper which summarises and defends the package
3/ next, a joint declaration of the EU Commission and the UK, which summarises the main points. Includes reciprocal commitments to drop NI protocol bill on one side and legal proceedings on the other. Joint Committee will meet soon to adopt legal texts.
4/ A statement of the UK government legal position. Unilateral, not binding, but interesting. Pours an ocean full of cold water on the NI protocol bill
5/ we pause for the thoughts of John Redwood
6/ There are thirteen more documents, mostly soft law non-binding declarations.
But the key to the package is a draft Joint Committee decision, which will be binding and will *amend the protocol*. It uses the Joint Committee powers to amend the withdrawal agreement (see para 3)
7/ The amendments to the protocol start with a new bit added to its Article on UK internal trade
8/ next, the protocol is amended to add the "Stormont brake" on amended or replaced EU law. Note the threshold of "significant impact on everyday life" etc
9/ I've summarised this new procedure in a gif
10/ VAT. The protocol is amended, not to drop requirements on VAT fully, but to add more flexibility for the UK (re NI) in an Annex
11/ A similar approach is taken with excise tax. A specific exemption including "alcoholic beverages packaged in large draught containers served for immediate consumption in hospitality venues". The drafters are clearly party animals.
12/ the drafting is full of complex cross-references to EU tax law, so what can I say except "Tax Lawyers Assemble!"
13/ the biggest bit of the Joint Committee decision will replace a previous Joint Committee decision. This is the part that will reduce checks on goods going from GB to NI. (I am not screenshotting all of it)
14/ more on the Stormont brake - a unilateral declaration by the UK, but added as an annex to the Joint Committee decision. Bit of a soft/hard law hybrid. Note the condition that the NI executive is operational, assembly members act in good faith, and the minority veto
15/ moving on to the soft law. Joint declaration: the whole protocol should be called the "Windsor Framework" from now on. Renaming things always works well. Just ask Brandon!
16/ next, a joint committee recommendation on what happens if the UK pulls the Stormont brake and the arbitrators rule that the UK has abused it. (Not quite as sexy as I've made it sound)
17/ a joint declaration, also on the Stormont brake
18/ the next thing is binding: a change to the rules of procedure of a working group, so NI stakeholders are more involved
19/ similarly, a joint declaration on involving stakeholders in the work of the committees
Unilateral UK declaration on review of the consent mechanism, ie the possibility of a majority of members of the NI assembly to vote to end most of the protocol - the consent mechanism isn't changed though
21/ a couple of soft law measures on the possibility of cross border smuggling
22/ unilateral UK declaration on goods moving from NI to GB - when export rules of EU law will apply
23/ unilateral UK declaration on parcels *until* the new Joint Committee decision takes effect - that decision will simplify parcels moving between GB and NI
24/ Joint declaration on possibly agreeing further amendments to VAT rules in future
25/ State aid: EU State aid law *continues to apply to NI* - despite UK government implying otherwise. The protocol is *not amended* on this point, but there is a joint declaration interpreting it.
26/ note also parallel proposals for EU legislation and other measures on medicine and food checks (SPS) etc commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-p…
27/ the SPS proposal includes rules on the movement of pets from GB to NI, although tbh it looks a little more complicated than putting doggo on the back seat and driving onto the ferry
28/ on the CJEU, there is *no change*, even in soft law - see the Commission Q and A. This refers to the general commitment to try to settle disputes politically (see the joint declaration in tweet 3)
29) any interest in a blog post version of all this?
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1/ Imagine taking this guy seriously as a source of interpretation of EU law. In my field, the ultimate example of the Dunning-Kruger effect. Let's look at the claim in more detail.
2/ "illegal": Digital Services Act expressly provides for the possible negotiation of commitments from the platform
"Secret": Art 80 DSA expressly requires publication of those commitments
"Other platforms did a deal": according to the Commission, all other cases are pending
2/ "illegal": Digital Services Act expressly provides for the possible negotiation of commitments from the platform
"Secret": Art 80 DSA expressly requires publication of those commitments
"Other platforms did a deal": according to the Commission, all other cases are pending
2/ EU/UK youth mobility treaty proposal - questions and answers
Note equal treatment in tuition fees, points re traineeships, visa fees, health surcharges, application to all Member States - would UK government accept all this? (Also a question to ask Labour)
3/ EU/UK proposed youth mobility treaty - text of proposed Council decision and explanatory memo
Note it would also include family reunion (not further detailed at this point). Dispute settlement system of the Brexit deal would apply (not the CJEU) commission.europa.eu/publications/c…
2/ The context of the bill is the recently agreed Rwanda treaty. The issues in clause 1.3 *might* be enough to convince courts to change their mind on the safety of Rwanda since the Supreme Court judgment, but as we'll see it's a moot point: the bill dispenses with courts anyway.
3/ clause 1.4.b is correct: an Act of Parliament that breaches international law is still valid *domestic* law. BUT it will remain a breach of international law.
(We are likely to hear from people who do not understand these basic points)
2/ The spiel in the link confuses the two EU courts, which is not impressive. In fact the applicants in this case lost earlier in the EU General Court, then lost their appeal this year to the CJEU. And this omits to point out that the CJEU had ruled on the substance in June 2022.
3/ My comments on the previous judgment: '.
Because the Court ruled here that Brits lost EU citizenship because UK left the EU, it said this year that Brits had no legal interest to sue the EU to challenge the withdrawal agreement to get it back.eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2022/06/its-en…
Profoundly ignorant on both points. A) the Good Friday Agreement requires compliance with the ECHR. That necessarily entails the Strasbourg Court. There's no legal route to saying that it applies but to the peace process only. 1/
2/ And the idea that it applies to the "peace process" but not "foreign nationals" is confused - for the obvious reason that some of those covered by the former ground may be Irish citizens.
3/ The Strasbourg Court jurisdiction is relevant to Northern Ireland for a very, very obvious reason: it had ruled that the UK had breached the ECHR in Northern Ireland after British courts had ruled that it had not. "Just rely on British courts" therefore misses the point.