2: The paper focuses on the corporate communication strategies of three Chinese state firms involved in two flagship rail projects in Africa: the Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya, constructed by CRBC, and the Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway in Ethiopia, constructed by CCECC and CREC.
3: Drawing on fieldwork they argue that these Chinese state firms exhibited divergent paths. CRBC has learned and adapted, largely because of Kenya's vibrant media environment and watchdog journalism; CCECC and CREC didn't because Ethiopia lacks naming and shaming by local media.
4: By looking at comparative adaptiveness in two places, they show that openness and pluralism do matter. African non-state actors, such as the media, can have a considerable influence in shaping certain behaviors of Chinese actors within the asymmetric China-Africa relationship.
5: They argue that Chinese firms need better local engagement but also that it is vital to strengthen the capacity of local journalists to improve quality and accuracy in reporting and ensure the triumph of watchdog journalism norms, not state-connected developmental journalism.
6: #ChinaLocalGlobal is a seven-region initiative at @CarnegieEndow supported by @FordFoundation. It explores how China extends its global influence not just by exporting a putative "China model" but by adapting to local forms, norms, and practices while leveraging local actors.
8: In Turkey (and in an interesting comparative contrast to the new Kenya/Ethiopia paper), @CagdasUngor from @marmara1883 explores how Beijing and its proxies have adapted to the highly localized rules, styles, and norms of the Turkish mediasphere. carnegieendowment.org/2022/11/09/chi…
10: In three West African countries, Abdoulkadre Ado digs into Chinese firms' assimilation of local managerial practices in three countries: Ghana, Niger, and Nigeria. carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/27/wha…
12: Guanie Lim and Keng Khoon Ng explored how Chinese investors in Malaysian real estate are learning hard lessons about how to navigate local turf wars and the risks of Malaysian politics. carnegieendowment.org/2022/06/08/how…
14: In a fantastic, cross-regional, and comparative read to the aforementioned Indonesia paper, @TinhinanEl from @ChathamHouse likewise explores how China's telecoms champion Huawei adapted to Algerian and Egyptian demands for localization. carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/14/how…
15: In another deeply researched study, @gongxuegxgx from @RSIS_NTU traces the interactive dynamics between Chinese players and a wide array of local civic actors in Myanmar around the Letpadaung copper mine. carnegieendowment.org/2022/01/25/chi…
16: Back in Latin America, @julianagj explored how national, provincial, and corporate players in Argentina pushed Chinese investors to support the country's energy transition and help revitalize their grid. carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/22/how…
17: In another paper that complements both the new paper and Üngör's on Turkey, @RYellinek explored how Chinese players, to bolster their influence in Israel, have leveraged local Hebrew language media to calibrate their messages for Israeli audiences. carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/27/how…
18: In a pathbreaking and notably counter-consensus paper, @dvanderkley and @nivayau show how China's economic profile in Central Asia increasingly means investments in value-added industry, local hires, and upskilling. Locals are driving this shift. carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/15/how…
19: In Ecuador, @cquiliconi and Pablo Rodriguez Vasco explore how Chinese miners' efforts to leverage local players undercut and divided Indigenous opposition in unsustainable ways. Ultimately, this backfired on them. carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/20/chi…
20: In the Philippines, @alvincamba showed how Chinese players accommodated Philippine ruling elites concerned with political expediency in sidestepping social and environmental safeguards on infrastructure projects. carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/15/how…
21: In Pakistan, @KatAdeney and @FilippoBoni1 explored bilateral negotiating records to show how Pakistani actors have wielded agency in important ways, while Chinese actors at times have accommodated key Pakistani demands. carnegieendowment.org/2021/05/24/how…
22: Also in Brazil, @AAbdenur, @mafolly, and @msantoro1978 show how Chinese-funded railway projects in the Amazon were profoundly shaped by dynamic institutional learning on both sides and sharp public debates in Brazil about environmental sustainability. carnegieendowment.org/2021/08/04/wha…
23: In Pakistan again, Muhammad Tayyab Safdar shows how Chinese inroads have been built on the diversification of ties to *local* stakeholders, notably in the education, media, and energy sectors. carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/02/loc…
24: And in Chile, @FranciscoUrdin explored how medical and equipment supplies during the pandemic have come from a diverse cast of Chinese players with local experience in Chile. They adapted to Chile’s unique system of emergency and disaster management. carnegieendowment.org/2021/04/06/chi…
25: One of the most exciting things about this initiative is the ability to draw cross-regional comparative insights. So in January, for example, I moderated this conversation among authors from Latin America, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia. carnegieendowment.org/2022/01/27/how…
26: And we do this topically too. For instance, in October, I moderated a discussion between @TinhinanEl on Algeria and Egypt and @B_Herscovitch on Indonesia, where Chinese telecoms firms have adapted and localized - with mixed results for local economies. carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/06/loc…
27: And here's a conversation from March among different project authors from South Asia, Latin America, and Southeast Asia about how Chinese players adapt to local conditions outside national capitals. carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/10/chi…
28: But that's not all. A project that purports to be about the connections between what's "local" and what's "global" needs to reach *local* audiences. So we translate every paper into local languages and also do local language multimedia products, subtitled into English.
29: From Spanish to Burmese, Hebrew to Portuguese, Arabic to Russian, and French to Malay, you can read *every* paper in this project in both English and the language of the case country. Illustratively, here's a link to @TinhinanEl's paper in Arabic: carnegieendowment.org/files/El_Kadi_…
30: And we try to reach local audiences through local language video projects too, such as @julianagj's video in subtitled Spanish on Chinese investments in Argentina's renewables sector:
32: We're working across seven regions: Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia—exploring adaptive Chinese strategies that work within local realities. Papers and multimedia here: carnegieendowment.org/specialproject…
33: Stay tuned for more exciting papers, events and multimedia products in coming months on adaptive local and Chinese strategies and interactions in all seven regions, including case studies of places as far afield as Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Peru, and Papua New Guinea.
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1: We’ve added a whopping 11 new scholars to our Washington-based @CarnegieEndow Asia programs over the last three years - six full-time and five nonresident scholars. They are brilliant, innovative, and disruptive to conventional wisdom. If you don’t read their work, you should!
3: We've also done a major buildout in our work on Asian technology futures, not least by welcoming @mattsheehan88, who deeply understands China's tech ecosystem. He studies China’s AI ecosystem - and the role of technology in China’s political economy. carnegieendowment.org/experts/2116
1: A few folks asked me to elaborate on this. I'll try. And please note that I don't mean to pick on the Kahl speech per se, since his speech isn't really about China. But the way China is framed there is (1) endemic in US rhetoric but (2) spectacularly ineffective, in my view.
2: To be blunt, experience and intuition tell me that Washington is delusional if thinks this kind of stark, binary message on China is going to work in most regions of the world - inclusive of, but not limited to, the Middle East and North Africa.
3: Of course, one problem is that big powers are self evidently self-interested. So calling China “transactional and opportunistic” while presenting the US as purely “altruistic” will presumably be laughed out of the room in most global capitals.
1: Two things jump out at me immediately from the US readout: The first is the reference to joint working groups - suggests a basis for (modest) progress and that there was some Chinese give on the suspension of various dialogues after the Pelosi visit. whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…
2: The second is the repeat of the language @Bundeskanzler extracted from Xi on Russia's nuclear threats. Includes the boilerplate about "should never be fought and can never be won" but also the "opposition to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine" specifically.
3: Unlike most things in the US readout, which are framed as unilateral statements by Biden, this one is framed jointly: "President Biden and President Xi reiterated their agreement." There's only party threatening nuclear use in Ukraine, so for once Beijing didn't both-sides it.
1: The US and China are seriously talking past each other. This is not just about Pelosi. The US thinks this is about Chinese coercion. The Chinese think this is about a drift from “one China” to "one China, one Taiwan." That disconnect will lead to a very unstable new baseline.
2: The US line, reflected in comments by Blinken, Sullivan, and Kirby is that everything is normal, "routine," consistent with precedent, nothing to see here, and that the principal issue here is that Beijing is throwing a tantrum over a nothingburger and should knock it off.
3: Beijing, meanwhile, has been signaling from Xi, Wang, and others for 2+ years that “the US has misperceived and miscalculated China’s strategic intent” (Xi), “we want a real one China policy, not a fake one China policy” (Wang), and so on. All this predates Pelosi’s trip.
1/4 The US and Japan have had a security alliance for decades. But they now aim to layer a deepened technology and innovation alliance atop this enduring security and economic alliance. In important twinned essays, my #CarnegieAsia teammate @kenjikushida explores what this means.
2/4 For one, while official Washington and Tokyo have committed to make technology collaboration a centerpiece of US-Japan relations, the critical step will be to enhance *private* sector–led innovation, not least in Silicon Valley. carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/09/how…
3/4 For another, both sides need to better understand the business and industry logic, not just high-minded strategic and political logic, of how and where the private sector creates value. This means cultivating enhanced ties between startup ecosystems. carnegieendowment.org/2022/06/07/how…
1: Thread ... Today, the US launched a new economic initiative with Taiwan. Good news. The US benefits from robust economic ties with Asia’s seventh- largest economy, America’s tenth-largest trading partner in goods, and an important link in global high-technology supply chains.
2: And Taiwan benefits too from robust economic ties to the United States—one of its top five export markets and an essential technology partner. Taiwan, incidentally, discovered Silicon Valley decades before much of the rest of the world did, driving entrepreneurial growth.
3: For years, debate about a bilateral trade agreement has sucked the oxygen out of this dialogue. Taiwan's goals were mismatched with US priorities, which emphasized longstanding market access barriers in Taiwan and a reluctance to divert focus from higher priority negotiations.