Thread by @KKriegeBlog

A firepower-Friday thread. Did eighteenth-century soldiers run out of ammunition? TL;DR, ammunition problems marked 18th cent. warfare, and even helped to decide the course of battles. The Continental army, for example, was chronically short of small arms ammunition.

In the era of Frederick II, the Prussian army developed new strategies for the rapid consumption of ammunition. At the Battle of Mollwitz in 1741, the Prussian troops quickly fired away their 30 issued rounds, and attempted to gather ammunition from wounded men nearby.

After the battle, the standard ammunition load in the Prussian army was increased from 30 to 60 rounds, but even this proved insufficient. Two independent sources affirm that the Prussian infantry used all of their ammunition at Lobositz in 1756

An individual soldier reports that in the "heat and excitement, I fired away nearly all my sixty rounds." The personal secretary of the Duke of Bevern, Herr Kistenmacher, who observed his master at the battle, recorded the following:

"The greatest difficulties had to be overcome in order to dislodge the enemy. We were under a small arms fire which lasted for five hours at an unimaginable intensity. Our lads shot away all their cartridges, and those of their dead and wounded comrades...

...In this sorry state of affairs the Duke of Bevern came galloping up..."Children," yelled the Duke, "Shoot for God's sake, shoot and advance!" "Oh, dear father," the lads replied, "What shall we do?" We have no more powder, and are being shot dead without reply!"

Despite the obvious melodrama Kirstenmacher shows the feeling of helplessness which running out of ammunition could impart to soldiers. It is possible that these soldiers fired away 90 cartridges, rather than 60, as sources describe taking 30 rounds from unengaged units.

At the Battle of Leuthen in 1757, both sides replenished their rounds from ammunition carts, and it appears that some Prussian infantry may have fired over 180 rounds. At the Battle of Hochkirch in 1758, both the Prussian and Austrian infantry ran short of ammunition.

In the Prussian case, some soldiers fired over 120 rounds. At the Battle of Torgau in 1760, multiple sources in the Austrian Army reported that the primary reason for failure was a lack of infantry and artillery ammunition.

Franz Moritz von Lacy reported "Finally, everyone was agreed that there was no more ammunition for either the artillery or the infantry." Austrian Jacob Cogniazzo reported: "...the lack of ammunition, a defect which should never be found in a purposeful institution..."

"..and is always a sign of irresponsibility. But we had experienced it before, particularly at the Battle of Breslau. Sufficient ammunition was not brought forward, by way of the drummers and their drums, because they had to haul the ammunition from a very great distance.."

When fighting in Continental Europe, the British often relied on firepower. A Dutch officer observed that at the Battle of Fontenoy, the British fired all their cartridges, or perhaps between 20-36 per man.

During the Seven Years' War, British infantry began to carry 30 and 60 rounds per man, rather the regulation 24. Yet more ammunition was ready-made in specialized wagons following the army.

In the Seven Years' War in North America, British ammunition allocation seems to have fluctuated between 36 and 70 cartridges per man. Despite the fluctuation, three extra flints appears to have been the standard issue.

Continental Army soldiers, too, reported a heavy expenditure of ammunition. During the winter of 1775-1776, the American army outside of Boston, could scarcely, "furnish four rounds a man."

At the Battle of Germantown, Lt. Colonel Adam Hubley reported that almost every unit but his own 10th Pennsylvania had, "expended forty rounds," after a firefight that lasted, "4 hours, without the least intermission."

At the same battle, General John Sullivan recalled that "my division with a Regiment of North Carolinians,... finding themselves unsupported by any other troops[,] Their Cartridges all Expended[,]... retired with as much precipitation as they had before advanced[.]"

Joseph Plumb Martin, present at Germantown, also mentions this idea: "l the first division that was engaged had expended their ammunition. Some of the men unadvisedly calling out that their ammunition was spent, the enemy were so near that they overheard them..."

Timothy Pickering, with Washington recalled: "General Sullivan's divisions ... engaged ... the enemy... this fire was brisk and heavy... Washington said to me, 'I am afraid that General Sullivan is throwing away his ammunition; ride forward and tell him to preserve it.'"

One of the few estimates for ammunition usage by an entire army is Mauvillion's calculation of the Prussian army at in 1742: "According to my sums, the Prussians fired 650,000 rounds of musketry during their advance at Chotusitz."

When we divide that sum by the roughly 17,000 Prussian infantry at the battle, it seems that the average man fired 38 rounds. With the amount of guesswork involved, I would be cautious about using such a sum as evidence in anything but a casual conversation.

In both North America and Europe troops ran short of ammunition, and worked feverishly to bring more cartridges into the fight. As armies recognized this issue, soldiers began to carry more and more ammunition and enjoyed close support by ammunition wagons and carts.

For the Continental Army on the offensive at battles like Germantown and Eutaw Springs, a lack of ammunition caused attacks to stall, and American forces to give up momentum they had created. Ammunition shortages plagued these armies.

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