Chasing the link between the transgender ideologist in the 1990s and the United Nations. Remember that in the Proceedings for the 1993 ICTLEP Conference we find these news. I could find no evidence of this on the UN documents' repository.
At the 2004 meeting of the Human Rights Commission in Geneva we find Stephen Whittle, of Press for Change, attending as a member of the International Service for Human Rights. documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/…
This NGO was founded in 1984, as noted on their website. One of their goals was to liberalise attendance by human rights NGOs to the proceedings of the Sub-Commission on Human Rights, as its founder recounts. ishr.ch/defender-stori…
By the mid-2000s they are heavily involved in pushing gender identity in international law and they are involved in the Yogyakarta Principles' drafting, the least democratic and transparent human rights project ever.
These are some members of the current Board of ISHR. All of them display their pronouns. The ideological capture is now complete.
By the way, in 2020 Vrinda Grover, a self-identified feminist, had the gall to state this.
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It seems now finally people have woken up to the "passport policy". So a thread of some of the times (there are more than a 100) I posted about this issue, and was mostly ignored or rebuffed. This is when I realised there was a huge problem with the GC campaigns.
So I pointed this out. This is the same document now Maya is referencing to show cross-dressers can get a female marker on their passport.
Reading the news, it would seem only the University of Edinburgh is breaking the law with regards to its trans policy. So I took a look at the other Russell Group members. The @unibirmingham does not seem to have a specific policy.
The @BristolUni has a remarkably fair policy and mentions the Workplace Regs specifically.
The @Cambridge_Uni policy is predictably bad, but the site says it is under review.
On interpretation, again. This is s9 of the GRA. There are three important interpretative issues arising from this frankly badly drafted section.
The first, the "all purposes" proviso. I have said for years clearly this means "legal" purposes and this has now been confirmed in the EAT Forstater v CGD. It certainly could not mean social, or cultural, or political purposes but we had to argue with LAWYERS this point .Sigh.
The "all" still needs clarifying, because all legal purposes would still be quite wide as a proviso. Here one needs to apply the contextual rule of statutory interpretation, i.e. a term needs to be interpreted in its context.
I thought the accusation by JR that to use female pronouns in public but then "misgendering" in private is classic bully behaviour was a good argument. Of course misgendering is bullshit, but Sex Matters advises to do that, selecting when to use preferred pronouns.
It is an irrational compromise that exposes you precisely to the sort of charge that JR leveled at Sandie Peggie. As for the upcoming disciplinary hearing, it was the judge in Forstater to say we cannot misgender with impunity? What did people think that meant?
To decide when to grant and when to withdraw the "privilege" of female pronouns for a male is the sort of irrational behaviour that employers will not look at with favour. It is like being nice in public while abusing in private, they will think.
I often thought most lawyers, and especially male lawyers, are not bothered with the arguments about repeal of the GRA because only women are directly affected. The same human rights arguments used to advance the rights of "transwomen" are discounted when used for women.
And in fact there are valid human rights arguments for repeal. I have made them repeatedly and also argued the ECHR does not prevent repeal as a matter of law. But there is another, and in my view more disturbing, dimension.
I have argued forcefully before that the GRA introduces a category error in law. This is well above what "deeming provisions" (the fashionable interpretation) do in law. A deeming provision introduces a legal fiction whereby something is to be "deemed as" something that it is not